Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations by Greenbaum, Dov
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 19 Volume XIX 
Number 2 Volume XIX Book 2 Article 1 
2008 
Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the 
Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations 
Dov Greenbaum 
Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Law and the Biosciences, Stanford Law School 2007-2008 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for 
Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 331 (2008). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol19/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole 
System for Both Developed and Developing Nations 
Cover Page Footnote 
Thank you to the Branco Weiss Society in Science Fellowship, Swiss Federal Insititute of Technology 
(“ETH”), Zurich for its generous support. Thank you also to Professors John Barton, Mark Gerstein, Hank 
Greely, Olaf Kübler, Mark Lemley, Robert Merges, and Joshua Sarnoff. 
This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol19/iss2/1 
VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM 2/26/2009 3:47:32 AM 
 
311 
Academia to Industry Technology 
Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-
Dole System for Both Developed and 
Developing Nations 
Dov Greenbaum* 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................... 313 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 314 
I. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF UNIVERSITY TO INDUSTRY 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ...................................................... 325 
A. The Current State of American Academic Technology 
Transfer......................................................................... 325 
B. The Technology Transfer Office ................................... 329 
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES...................................................... 333 
A. Pre-World War II.......................................................... 333 
C. Bayh-Dole ..................................................................... 340 
D. Concurrent Events in Science ....................................... 343 
E. Concurrent Biotechnology Industry Growth ................ 346 
F. Concurrent Events in Patent Law................................. 347 
G. Concurrent Legislative Efforts ..................................... 349 
III. EFFECTS OF A CULTURAL SHIFT TOWARDS TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER ............................................................................. 354 
A. Revisiting the Technology Transfer Office ................... 354 
1. The Technology Transfer Office’s Effect on 
Research ................................................................ 358 
2. Material Transfer Agreements............................... 361 
3. Joint Research Agreements ................................... 364 
4. General Issues in University Industry 
Relationships ......................................................... 369 
B. Effect on Science Fraud................................................ 372 
VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM 2/26/2009  3:47:32 AM 
312 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:311 
IV. SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS WITH THIS ARTICLE—LACK OF 
EMPIRICAL DATA .................................................................. 376 
V. PROPOSED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PARADIGM FOR 
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS .............................. 378 
A. Centralized Technology Transfer Office....................... 381 
1. Funds ..................................................................... 383 
2. Particular Strengths of a Large Centralized 
Office..................................................................... 384 
3. Potential and Perceived Problems with the Proposed 
System of Centralized Offices............................... 385 
B. Grant Payment System.................................................. 388 
1. Concerns with the Grant System........................... 391 
C. Early IP Valuation........................................................ 392 
1. Strategies for Early IP Evaluation ......................... 394 
2. Elements of a Proposed Early Evaluation System 395 
D. Flat Rate Licensing....................................................... 397 
1. Exclusive Licensing Concerns .............................. 401 
2. Exclusive License Option...................................... 403 
E. Anticommons Concerns and Experimental Use  
Doctrine ........................................................................ 404 
F. Streamlining the System................................................ 407 
G. Long Term Implementation........................................... 408 
CONCLUSION................................................................................. 409 
VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM 2/26/2009  3:47:32 AM 
2009] ACADEMIA TO INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 313 
ABSTRACT 
 Renewed efforts to bring science and technology to the 
center of economic revival in developing nations recognize the 
centrality of the university in the creation and promotion of science 
and innovation.  Many developed nations, following the 
paradigmatic U.S. technology transfer system, transfer their 
academic innovations to industry—through licensing intellectual 
property—for eventual commercialization.  While conventional 
wisdom places the Carter era Bayh-Dole legislation at the center of 
that successful American system, this Article argues that the U.S. 
biotechnology and high tech booms are more likely attributable to 
the confluence of unique and propitious conditions, and that Bayh-
Dole played a marginal role in the commercialization of American 
academic ingenuity and the resulting socioeconomic prosperity.  
Instead, this Article suggests that Bayh-Dole’s legacy is chiefly the 
ubiquitous university technology transfer office, at best a drain on 
limited university resources, but potentially a major impediment in 
the innovation and commercialization process.  
 After reviewing Bayh-Dole and similar efforts in other 
nations, the author advocates an alternative system for those 
developing (and even developed) nations seeking to grow their 
economies through the commercialization of academic inventions.   
 In contrast to the inefficient local technology transfer office, 
this Article suggests a centralized and independent office that 
would have the infrastructure, informatics and incentives necessary 
to take advantage of economies of scale in the patenting, licensing 
and marketing of academic research.  With recent studies now 
suggesting that patents woefully under-incentivize academic 
researchers, this system would provide a more relevant incentive to 
promote the commercialization of academic research.  This 
streamlined and efficient process would allow researchers to trade 
their intellectual property rights, forgoing unlikely future royalty 
streams, for a more enticing and less risky research grant with a 
value tied to the expected value of the patented innovation.  The 
innovation, once acquired and patented by the central technology 
office, would then be offered to industry via a flat rate non-
exclusive license, relieving the current debilitating and inhibitory 
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transaction costs, and diffusing the technology efficiently, rapidly 
and broadly throughout society. 
INTRODUCTION 
Representatives of the fifty-three member African Union 
gathered recently in Ethiopia to discuss one of the most critical 
issues in Africa and the developing world: Science.1  At the 
summit, keynote speaker Calestous Juma emphasized the 
importance of “[b]ringing science and technology to the centre of 
Africa’s economic renewal,” and underscored the centrality of 
universities and research institutions in the creation of science and 
technological innovation.2  Although Africa made scientific 
growth a priority earlier in the century, “[t]hroughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, science and technology investments were not 
prioritised despite considerable empirical evidence . . . showing 
A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2937.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
*  Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Law and the Biosciences, Stanford Law School 
2007-2008; J.D., Berkeley Law (Boalt Hall), University of California, Berkeley, 2004;   
Ph.D., Genetics/Bioinformatics, Yale University, 2004; M.Phil., Yale University, 2002.  
Thank you to the Branco Weiss Society in Science Fellowship, Swiss Federal Insititute of 
Technology (“ETH”), Zurich for its generous support.  Thank you also to  Professors 
John Barton, Mark Gerstein, Hank Greely, Olaf Kübler, Mark Lemley, Robert Merges, 
and Joshua Sarnoff. 
1  8th African Union Summit, Addis Ababa, Eth., Jan. 22–30, 2007, http://www.africa-
union.org/root/AU/Conferences/Past/2007/January/summit/summit1.htm (last visited Jan. 
30, 2009). 
2  Calestous Juma, Professor of the Practice of Int’l Dev., Belfer Ctr. for Sci. and Int’l 
Affairs, Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., The New Culture of Innovation: Africa 
in the Age of Technological Opportunities, Keynote Address at the 8th African Union 
Summit (Jan. 29, 2007), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/juma_au_summit_ 
keynote_jan_29_2007.pdf; see also Kofi Annan, Science for All Nations, 13 SCIENCE 
925, 925 (2004).  Other groups have also highlighted the importance of science and 
innovation in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (or “MDGs”): “The role that 
science and technology play in the attainment of the MDGs is implicit in the Millennium 
Declaration adopted by the Heads of States.” AFRICAN MINISTERIAL COUNCIL ON SCI. & 
TECH. (“AMCOST”), AFRICA’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONSOLIDATED PLAN OF 
ACTION 9 (2006), available at http://www.nepadst.org/doclibrary/pdfs/ast_cpa_2007.pdf.  
The eight United Nations Millennium Development Goals can be found at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
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that investment in science and technology yields direct and indirect 
benefits to national econ 3
Developing nations, now intent on integrating themselves into 
the global knowledge economy, becoming self-reliant, and 
fostering sustainable development, have only recently revisited the 
connection between promoting local scientific innovation and a 
strong economy.  Many nations are now working toward 
harnessing and applying science and innovation within their 
borders.    
Historically, scientific innovation has been an integral 
component to national development and growth.4  Postwar success 
stories in Europe, and more recently in Asia, are often touted as 
proof of concept.5  Externalities from scientific innovation also 
extend beyond pure economic development: indigenous science 
and technology can help create solutions to specific regional and 
local problems that themselves impede innovation, such as health 
or agricultural issues.  Further, basic research innovations often 
have consequences and ramifications beyond their specific and 
particular goals, eventually becoming part of a feedback loop that 
fuels the engine of local innovation and productivity.6 
3  AMCOST, supra note 2, at 8 (“In many countries infrastructure for R&D has been 
neglected and is decaying.  Institutions of higher education, particularly universities and 
technical colleges, are in urgent need of renewal after many years of neglect and 
disorientation from local and national priorities.”). 
4  “Since the Industrial Revolution, the growth of economies throughout the world has 
been driven largely by the pursuit of scientific understanding, the application of 
engineering solutions, and continual technological innovation.” NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. & 
NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM: ENERGIZING AND 
EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER ECONOMIC FUTURE 41 (2006). 
5  There is a substantial body of literature on the nature and causes of Asian postwar 
success. See generally Robert Wade, East Asia’s Economic Success: Conflicting 
Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence, 44 WORLD POL. 270 (1992).  “Over the 
past two decades a literature big enough to fill a small airplane hangar has been produced 
on the causes of East Asian economic success.” Id.  Note that, like the rise of American 
science, there are numerous factors that have led to the success of science in Japan as 
well as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. See generally Boris Holzer, 
Miracles with a System: The Economic Rise of East Asia and the Role of Sociocultural 
Patterns, 15 INT’L SOC. 455 (2000). 
6  It also is thought to limit the brain drain to more developed nations. See, e.g., David 
Dickson, Turning The Brain Drain From A Threat To Opportunity, SCI. & DEV. 
NETWORK, Nov. 2, 2007, available at http://www.scidev.net/en/science-and-innovation-
policy/editorials/turning-the-brain-drain-from-threat-to-opportunity.html (discussing how 
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 Striving to recreate the prior successes in now-developed 
nations, many developing nations, often with unrealistic 
expectations,7 look to re-enact the American technology transfer 
successes, linked by many to the Carter era Bayh-Dole legislation.8  
With the growing appreciation of the university’s function as the 
central scientific and technological innovator—particularly in 
developing nations with little to no appreciable technological 
infrastructure9—many scholars, non-governmental organizations 
(or “NGOs”), and local politicians in both developed and 
developing nations have suggested importing Bayh-Dole-like 
a recurring brain drain may induce developing nations to limit their investment in science 
education and noting that developing countries need to provide their scientists with the 
proper incentives to continue their research in developing nations). 
7  See, e.g., A.D. Heher, Implications of International Technology Transfer 
Benchmarks for Developing Countries, 4 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
207, 207 (2005). 
8  Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006); see ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), A NEW ECONOMY? THE CHANGING ROLE OF INNOVATION 
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH 9 (2000) (noting that many OECD nations 
see Bayh-Dole as a major factor in the success of science in the United States).  In the 
United States, the Bayh-Dole Act (1980), which extended patent protection to publicly 
funded research, helped to strengthen the role of science in the innovation process and 
was an early step in facilitating industry-university collaboration.  Since then, further 
policy reform in this area has facilitated innovative performance.  A recent analysis of 
United States patent citations found, for example, that more than 70% of citations in 
biotechnology were to papers originating solely at public science institutions, while a 
study of scientific publications in the United Kingdom showed that the proportion of 
articles authored by industry scientists with an academic co-author rose from 20% in 
1981 to 40% in 1991. Id.; see also COMM. ON UTILIZATION OF TECHS., NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, RUSSIAN ACAD. OF SCI., TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION: RUSSIAN 
CHALLENGES, AMERICAN LESSONS 85 (Nat’l Acad. Press 1998) (“A joint working group 
could be established to consider the relevance of the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act to 
Russian conditions.”); Ken Howard, Global Biotech Expansion Taking Cues from Bayh-
Dole¸ BIOENTREPRENEUR, May 20, 2004, http://www.nature.com/bioent/bioenews/ 
052004/full/bioent811.html. 
9  See, e.g., GARETH WILLIAMS, JAMES ROBERTSON & MIKE GILBERT, MARKS AND 
CLERK BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 2007, at 17–20 (2007) (noting that most of the influential 
patents, as measured by citations, come from universities, and that American universities 
tend to be domestic patent leaders in terms of sheer numbers of patents). But see David 
Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University-Industry Technology Transfer: A 
Policy Model for Other Governments? 2, http://www.merid.org/bayh-dole/BDRF 
paper_Mowery.pdf (noting that most industries look to open science).  
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legislation, to help promote the transfer of knowledge and 
technical know-how from the university to industry.10 
Further, regional scientists in developing nations are quickly 
learning that joint ventures and collaborations with more affluent 
labs, and the access to knowledge and technical knowhow which 
comes with such interactions, is indispensible in growing local 
science.11  But these interactions require that those labs in 
developing nations provide similar levels of intellectual property 
protection as their developed brethren to alleviate much of the 
unfortunate mistrust and suspicion.12  These and other 
requirements necessary to interact in the modern academic science 
world necessitate the incorporation of intellectual property laws 
into the everyday workings of the developing world’s science 
laboratories. 
Notwithstanding this global interest in promoting university to 
industry transfer, there is a shortage of scholarly work on the 
promotion of innovation and scientific advancement in developing 
nations, and, in particular, the effect of Bayh-Dole-like legislation 
on developing nations’ economies and academies.  The lack of a 
10  See, e.g., Press Release, Arizona State University, Innovate or Perish? Helping 
Developing Countries Fight Neglected Diseases (Oct. 25, 2005), http://www. 
eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2005-10/asu-iop102405.php (discussing the exportation of 
Bayh-Dole to other countries); see also Goldie Blumenstyk, Turning Research—Slowly—
Into Riches, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 7, 2005 (discussing Bayh-Dole-like 
legislation in Europe). See generally SARA BOETTIGER & ALAN BENNETT, THE BAYH-
DOLE ACT’S EFFECTS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION, 
http://www.merid.org/bayh-dole/Boettiger%20BDRF%20Paper%20v3%20_final_.pdf 
(draft report for The Rockefeller Foundation); Karim Maredia, Frederic Erbisch & Maria 
Sampaio, Technology Transfer Offices for Developing Countries, 43 BIOTECH. & DEV. 
MONITOR 15 (1997); Jerry Thursby & Marie Thursby, University Licensing Under Bayh-
Dole: What are the Issues and Evidence?, May 2003, http://opensource.mit.edu/ 
papers/Thursby.pdf.  Ironically one of the many criticisms of Bayh-Dole has been the 
resulting shift by research institutions away from unprofitable developing nation-oriented 
research—i.e., tropical diseases—to more profitable diseases of affluence.  Note, 
however, that many developing nations may also be suffering with these diseases. See 
Majid Ezzati et al., Rethinking the “Diseases of Affluence” Paradigm: Global Patterns of 
Nutritional Risks in Relation to Economic Development, 2 PLOS MED. 0404 (2005), 
available at http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv?request=get-document& 
doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020133. 
11  See generally Clemente Forero-Pineda, The Impact of Stronger Intellectual Property 
Rights on Science and Technology in Developing Countries, 35 RES. POL’Y 808 (2006). 
12  Id. 
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rigorous empirical analysis has resulted in this aforementioned 
inadvertent promotion of misinformation regarding the ability of 
developing nations to mimic American and Western European 
successes in innovation simply through importing Bayh-Dole like 
legislation.13   
Much of the current conversation on optimal methodologies for 
promoting innovation in developing nations suggests a 
misunderstanding of the role of the Bayh-Dole legislation in the 
current success of science and innovation in the United States.  
Simplistically, other potentially more important factors are often 
overlooked: a great deal of Bayh-Dole’s purported successes in the 
United States must be credited to a preexisting strong and 
expansive intellectual property regime, a recognition of the 
market’s importance in promoting innovation and development, 
preexisting interactions and collaborations between industry and 
academia, an emerging culture of academic patenting, a pre-
existing academic entrepreneurial spirit, extensive venture capital 
markets, and an exceedingly well-funded high quality research 
system.   
Nevertheless, developing nations on the cusp of innovation—
i.e., many of those nations that fall within the World Bank’s 
Middle Income Developing Nation categorization14—need to 
implement some form of system to promote the transfer of their 
academic basic research to the private sector for further 
development and commercialization.  “Corporate America is 
increasingly moving academic research programs to schools 
overseas, particularly to the developing world, where results are 
outstanding, costs are low and arguments over IP are 
nonexistent.”15  Now is the time to take advantage of these newly 
13  See, e.g., Frank Rothaermel, Shanti Agung & Lin Jiang, University 
Entrepreneurship: a Taxonomy of the Literature, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 691 (2007) 
(providing an exhaustive review of the relevant literature), available at 
http://olympus.cs.cmu.edu/links/rothaermel-4002-3-T.pdf. 
14  See, e.g., Country Classification Definitions, The World Bank Group, 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 
2008). 
15  Thomas K. Grose, A Challenging Matchup: Time Consuming Wrangling Over 
Intellectual Property Issues is Affecting the Relationship Between Academia and 
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developing collaborations and institutionalize some form of 
academia to industry technology transfer schema.  This Article 
suggests a promising new methodology for developing nations, 
allowing them to simultaneously reap potential pecuniary gains 
from their growing research sectors and to promote local science 
and innovation.   
The first half of the Article delves into an analysis of the 
current state of university to industry technology transfer within 
the United States.  The Article provides a critical analysis of the 
Bayh-Dole Act16 and the historic developments leading up to its 
conception.  This historical review attempts to establish the 
centrality of some particular extrinsic factors, including concurrent 
scientific developments, market driven forces, and other legislation 
that were relevant for the boom in American innovation.  By 
highlighting these factors, the Article hopes to diminish the 
perceived relevance and importance of the Bayh-Dole legislation 
itself within the rapid expansion of American innovation.17   
In particular, this Article will first review the basic history of 
United States technology transfer between universities and 
industry, starting from the Morrill Act of 186218 and culminating 
in the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.  Through establishing the 
unique nature of the historical and academic environment in the 
development of the U.S. technology transfer phenomenon, this 
Article would hope to dissuade other nations from thinking that 
creating a similar piece of legislation would guarantee similar 
results.  
The following section will establish the contention that the 
Bayh-Dole Act, while not directly responsible for the present state 
of affairs vis-à-vis technology transfer in universities, can be 
Industry, 15 AM. SOC’Y FOR ENGINEERING EDUC. (“ASEE”) PRISM 18, 20 (2006), 
available at http://www.prism-magazine.org/feb06/feature_IntellectualProperty.cfm. 
16  Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006). 
17  But see generally Nat’l Acads. Bd. on Sci., Tech. & Econ. Policy, Comm. on 
Intellectual Prop. Rights in the Knowledge-Based Econ., Workshop on Academic IP: 
Effects of University Patenting and Licensing on Commercialization and Research 
(2001), http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/ipwkshp_PDF.pdf (unedited verbatim 
transcript of the conference of Apr. 17, 2001, “Intellectual Property Rights: How Far 
Should They Be Extended?”). 
18  Morrill Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–308 (2006). 
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shown to be the impetus for the ubiquitous technology transfer 
office (or “TTO”)—a consistent thorn in the side of many 
researchers and businesses alike—and an actual bottleneck in the 
innovation process.  Any implementation of Bayh-Dole-like 
legislation would necessitate the creation of a local equivalent to 
the United States technology transfer office—an ineffectual and 
ultimately undesirable result. 
The next section looks to the particular effects of academia-
industry technology transfer on universities in the United States, 
noting both positive and negative effects, including potentially 
limiting the extent of research fraud, and the growth of material 
transfer agreements.  Any developing nation interested in 
implementing its own system of technology transfer should be 
aware of the strengths and limitations of the American system of 
technology transfer.  Determining where the American system has 
resulted in positive and negative externalities will allow 
developing nations the opportunity to cherry-pick the superior 
aspects of the United States system while leaving behind the 
flawed components. 
The second half of this Article—a proposed alternative to 
Bayh-Dole-like legislation—is directed primarily at developing 
nations.  With the understanding that Bayh-Dole-like regulations—
particularly the granting of intellectual property rights to 
universities and not the inventing academic researchers, and the 
regulatory hoops that Bayh-Dole requires in order for the 
university to retain that intellectual property19—are encumbrances 
rather than impetuses to innovation.  This Article suggests 
reforming or preventing the creation of the technology transfer 
office—the most significant result of the Bayh-Dole Act.  As the 
19  See April L. Butler, Stealing Thunder from Government Contractors: Thwarting the 
Intent of The Bayh-Dole Act in Campbell Plastics v. Brownlee, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
477, 477–78 (2006) (“Government contractors: proceed with caution—if you make one 
wrong move, the Government may steal your invention.  Now, the tough part is . . . 
making sure you immediately document it on an exact form, within the exact time frame, 
and with significant detail.  The Bayh-Dole Act . . . has turned into an opportunity for the 
Government to take advantage of small business firms who require its support.  The 
effect of the Bayh-Dole Act has become hazy by the recent decision of Campbell Plastics 
v. Brownlee, which has done little to guide future claims and has left government 
contractors with paperwork anxiety.”). 
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primary implementer of commercialization of academic research, 
much of the failures attributed to Bayh-Dole can be traced back to 
these offices, each arguably an unfortunate necessity for the 
university’s implementation of its side of the Bayh-Dole bargain. 
A central tenant of this Article’s proposed solution lies in the 
abolishment of technology transfer offices, as we know them, and 
a reformulating of the ideas that necessitated their creation.  
Simplistically, this solution would look to a centralized 
organization or government agency to essentially buy out a 
scientist’s intellectual property (or “IP”) risk—her future and 
perhaps somewhat unlikely revenue streams from her innovations.  
This entity would then non-exclusively license out that academic 
scientific research at a flat rate to industry for commercialization.  
Notably, as opposed to the current system in the United States and 
many other developed nations, this proposal would require the 
implementation of a Hochschullehrerprivileg, i.e., an academic 
exception to the common patent regulation that automatically 
transfers ownership of an employee’s innovation to the 
loyer.20   
As this Article will point out, many of the particular issues with 
local technology transfer offices can be remedied through the use 
of a regional or national office that deals with the inventors, not the 
administrators at the university.  Of particular interest is the 
possibility that a centralized system could remove encumbering 
conflicts of interest and take advantage of economies of scale, 
reducing transaction costs and broadening the target audience for 
each piece of innovation.  Nonetheless, technology transfer offices 
may still be necessary in some research universities; these offices 
would simplify the proposed system by evaluating and prosecuting 
the patents prior to transferring the IP rights to the centralized 
agency.  Note that these offices would be treated as core facilities 
by the university—not-for-profit components of a research facility 
 
20  See Christian Kilger & Kurt Bartenba h, Ne  Rules for German Professors, 298 
SCIENCE 1173, 1173 (2002). 
c w
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requiring the 
reas
veloped and developing nations’ 
aca
23  
As 
igned only to support the research endeavors without the need 
to financially justify their existence or maximize revenue.21 
  Inevitably, some academic innovations will require an 
exclusive license in order to fully incentivize industry 
involvement.  In these instances, licensees would be able to take an 
exclusive license, although with a viral clause 
onable and non-discriminatory licensing of the IP and possibly 
even the derivative innovations back to academia.22  
With many scientists generally uninterested in the 
commercialization of their research, this particular system would 
provide novel and appreciable incentives in the form of grants for 
researchers to hand over the IP rights in their developments, 
without the need for obtrusive and pushy technology transfer 
officers.  The system would also allow, and potentially even 
encourage, scientists to hold on to their intellectual property rights 
when the researchers feel that they can better license the science or 
technology themselves—a proven strategy when commercializing 
early innovations, and a promising approach to inculcate an 
entrepreneurial culture into de
demic research and, according to many, the next step in the 
evolution of academia. 
Imposing a new system of technology transfer may not even be 
that radical and, as such, more likely to be implemented in the 
context of developing nations.  Recent research into the status of 
technology transfer in developing nations indicates that most 
universities are currently woefully under-equipped to handle the 
complexities of patenting and licensing of basic science research.
such, this proposed system might be just as easily implemented 
as any other system currently available to developing nations. 
 
21  See Howard Hughes Med. Inst. (“HHMI”), Core Facilities at Medical Schools Help 
Power Biomedical Research, HHMI SCI. EDUC. NEWS, Oct. 15, 1997, 
http://www.hhmi.org/news/core.html. 
22  See, e.g., Phil Albert, GPL: Viral Infection or Just Your Imagination?, 
LINUXINSIDER, May 25, 2004, http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/33968.html (offering a 
layman’s explanation of the GPL viral copyright license).   
23  See Julie Stackhouse & Rachel Day, Global and Regional Practices in University 
Research Management: Emerging Trends, 4 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
189, 190–99 (2005). 
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00 U.S. life scientists suggests that the vast 
maj
not be as ingrained into the research process as conventional 
Notwithstanding this focus on developing nations, the proposed 
system of university-to-industry technology transfer may also be 
relevant for developed nations as well, including the United States.  
Still, it is less likely to be adopted in the United States as it 
requires a fundamental overhaul of the current entrenched 
system.24  Nevertheless, supporting the contention that such a 
system could be introduced, even in the United States, a recent 
survey of more than 1,8
ority of researchers had little to no interaction with industry 
and few if any patents, with only 8% of the respondents ever 
receiving any form of patent royalties;25 the current system may 
wisdom might imply.  
 
24  The proposed system would look to inventors themselves as the primary owners of 
the innovation—passing the proposed benefits of the system to the inventor and 
circumventing the academic institution.  Under Bayh-Dole, “although title still vests in 
the named inventor, the inventor remains under a legal obligation to assign his interest 
either to the government or the nonprofit contractor . . . .” Bd. of Trustees of the Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (interpreting Bayh-Dole to give the government the right of first refusal and 
the academic institution the right of second refusal, ahead of the named inventor); see 
also Fenn v. Yale Univ., 184 Fed. App’x 21, 23 (2d Cir. 2006) (denying the National 
Institutes of Health’s ability to allow the named inventor to retain the rights to his 
invention if the academic institution has yet to elect to retain the rights to the same 
invention); FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 982 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting 
that Bayh-Dole divests the patentee of all interests in her invention, by operation of law, 
then the academic institution can acquire those interests by satisfying the regulatory 
requirements in the Bayh-Dole Act).  Note, additionally, that failure to follow these 
regulations results in the forfeiture (automatic or otherwise is subject to debate) of the 
academic institution’s right to the patented invention, and the rights revert back to the 
Federal Government. But see Campbell Plastics Eng’g & Mfg. Inc. v. Brownlee, 389 
F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that the government has discretion in 
determining whether or not to invoke forfeiture of the patent rights following the failure 
to properly follow the regulatory requirements of Bayh-Dole); TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM 
Corp., 121 F. Supp. 2d. 349, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Failure to comply with the 
conditions of § 202 [Bayh-Dole] results in the Government’s acquiring title.”); Cent. 
f rights to a patent is automatic upon failure 
Admixture Pharmacy Serv. Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C., No. CV-00-2430, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95833, at *21–22 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2006) (criticizing the TM 
Patents decision, stating that the forfeiture o
to follow the regulatory requirements of Bayh-Dole). 
25  See Press Release, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Basic Research Robust in 
Face of More University Patenting (Sept. 14, 2007), http://www.eurekalert.org/ 
pub_releases/2007-09/uow-brr091407.php. 
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he universities, 
their researchers, and the licensors who are eagerly looking for 
alternatives to the dysfunctional American system. 
 
As a general industry disgust with American academic 
technology transfer methods becomes more pervasive,26 more and 
more companies are looking to offshore sources for research and 
innovation, in particular to universities that are less protective of 
their intellectual property and less likely to involve themselves in 
protracted negotiations.27  To stem this tide and the subsequent 
potential loss of foreign graduate students and postdocs to these 
foreign universities, flush with cash and technology from foreign 
investors, American universities need to reassess and possibly 
drastically change their current technology transfer procedures and 
mindsets.28  Meanwhile developing nations ought to take 
advantage of this situation, implementing the streamlined transfer 
policies suggested in this Article that will benefit t
26  The current stagnation and forecasted decline in industry investment in American 
academic research, a decline in academia-industry collaborations, and fewer citations of 
academic articles in industry invented patents may be partially attributable to these poor 
interactions. See generally Alan I. Rapoport, Where Has the Money Gone? Declining 
Industrial Support of Academic R&D, INFOBRIEF: SCI. RESOURCES STATS., Sept. 2006, 
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf06328/nsf06328.pdf. 
27  See THOMAS K. GROSE, AM. SOC’Y FOR ENG’G EDUC., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
UNIVERSITIES, CORPORATIONS AND FINDING A COMMON GROUND 3 (2006), 
http://www.asee.org/activities/organizations/councils/edc/2006-IP-White-Paper/IPWhite 
Paper-WEB.doc (“Frustrated by the hassles endemic in negotiating sponsored research 
contracts, many American companies are taking a growing amount of their research work 
to foreign academic labs—often in the developing world—where costs are not only low, 
but there’s no desire on the part of most schools to own the IP.  And, as Wisconsin’s 
Dean Peercy says, the companies get excellent results. . . .  [A]cross the developing 
world, these burgeoning schools are using faculty educated and trained in the United 
States, ‘and they are top-notch,’ Peercy says.  Taking research to foreign schools is 
decidedly a growing trend among many Fortune 500 companies . . . .  ‘The levels of 
talent and domain expertise are extremely high, and you very often have outright access 
to the IP that gets created.’. . . ‘[M]any high-quality foreign universities are very eager to 
work with American companies, and by keeping attorneys out of the discussion 
completely, they have streamlined the processes.’ . . .  [I]t typically takes three weeks to 
negotiate a sponsored-research contract with a foreign school, as opposed to the six 
months it takes in the United States. . . .  [T]hat time savings is a cost savings, too. . . .  I 
can easily envision a time when we actually encourage our (in-house) researchers’ to 
seek overseas research partners. . . .  ‘American universities will either have to modify 
their behavior or lose their industrial customers.’”). 
28  Id. at 25. 
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I. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF UNIVERSITY TO INDUSTRY 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
A. The Current State of American Academic Technology Transfer 
Although dubbed “[p]ossibly the most inspired piece of 
legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-century,”29 
the Bayh-Dole Act30 does not suffer for lack of detractors.31  
Bayh-Dole, and its potential effects on science, have been 
examined, praised, and derided in the months leading up to, and 
following, the recent 25th anniversary of its enactment.32  
29  Innovation’s Golden Goose, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2002, at 3-3. But see Bayhing for 
Blood or Doling Out Cash?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2005, at 50.  
30  Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006). 
31  See, e.g., Sara Boettiger & Alan Bennett, Bayh Dole: If We Knew Then What We 
Know Now, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 320 (2006) (reviewing the various opinions regarding 
Bayh-Dole); see also MICHAEL CRICHTON, NEXT 422–23 (2006) (discussing his 
opposition to Bayh-Dole); A Conversation with Michael Crichton: The Charlie Rose 
Show (television broadcast Feb. 19, 2007), available at  http://www.charlierose.com/ 
shows/2007/02/19/1/a-conversation-with-michael-crichton (communicating a less 
extreme opinion). 
32  See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 319, 109th Cong. (2005) (observing a biased view of the 
success of the legislation).  
[T]he 96th Congress enacted Public Law 96-517, entitled “An Act to 
amend the patent and trademark laws” . . .  in 1980 . . . before 1980, 
only 5 percent of patents owned by the Federal Government were 
used by the private sector—a situation that resulted in the American 
people being denied the benefits of further development, disclosure, 
exploitation, and commercialization of the Government’s patent 
portfolio . . . the Bayh-Dole Act established a “single, uniform 
national policy designed to . . . encourage private industry to utilize 
government financed inventions through the commitment of the risk 
capital necessary to develop such inventions to the point of 
commercial application”, and eliminated the 26 different Federal 
agency policies that had existed regarding the use of the results of 
federally funded research and development . . . .  Bayh-Dole Act 
fundamentally changed the Federal Government’s patent policies by 
enabling inventors or their employers to retain patent rights in 
inventions developed as part of federally funded research grants, 
thereby promoting licensing and the leveraging of contributions by 
the private sector towards applied research, and facilitating the 
transfer of technology from the laboratory bench to the marketplace . 
. . Bayh-Dole . . . ha[s] played a vital role in enabling the United 
States to become renowned as the world leader in scientific research, 
innovation, ingenuity, and collaborative research that involves 
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oney-grubbing 
corporate shills.    
 
Anecdotal evidence has suggested, and numerous studies have 
attempted to prove, how Bayh-Dole has created the biotechnology 
revolution, or distorted the academic mission of American 
universities, or has brought incredible untapped wealth through 
licensing fees to universities, or has reallocated scarce research 
resources away from basic science research, or has turned white-
coated, pure-hearted curious scientists into m
33
institutions of higher education and the private sector . . . [and] has 
made substantial contributions to the advancement of scientific and 
technological knowledge, fostered dramatic improvements in public 
health and safety, strengthened the higher education system in the 
United States, served as a catalyst for the development of new 
domestic industries that have created tens of thousands of new jobs 
for American citizens, strengthened States and local communities 
across the country, and benefitted the economic and trade policies of 
the United States . . . . 
Id. (“[T]he Bayh-Dole Act has stimulated two of the major contemporary scientific trends 
of the last quarter century—the development of the biotechnology and information 
communications industries—and the Act is poised to continue playing a central role in 
new fields of innovative activities, including nanotechnology . . . .”).  
33  See, e.g., Wesley Cohen, Patents and Appropriation: Concerns and Evidence, 30 J. 
TECH. TRANSFER 57 (2005); Pierre Azoulay et al., The Impact of Academic Patenting on 
the Rate, Quality and Direction of (Public) Research Output (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 11917, 2006); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal 
Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An 
Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. W11465, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=755701; see also Mark A. 
Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
611 (2008) (noting that universities sometimes are more focused on maximizing licensing 
revenue than on maximizing the overall social impact of technologies). But see D. 
Blumenthal, Academic-Industry Relationships in the Life Sciences. Extent, Consequences, 
and Management, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3344, 3344 (1992) (noting that the interaction 
overall has been good) (“The balance of known benefits and risks suggests that academic-
industry relationships should be permitted and even selectively promoted.  However, 
there is also a need for enhanced vigilance on the part of academic institutions and 
government to reduce risks posed by certain types of arrangements. . . .”); David C. 
Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat, & Arvids A. Ziedonis, The Growth of 
Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99, 99 (2001) (“The evidence suggests that Bayh-Dole 
was only one of several important factors behind the rise of university patenting and 
licensing activity.  Bayh-Dole also appears to have had little effect on the content of 
academic research at these universities.  A comparison of these three universities reveals 
remarkable similarities in their patent and licensing portfolios 10 years after the passage 
of the Bayh-Dole Act.”); James Stuart, Comment, The Academic-Industrial Complex: A 
Warning to Universities, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1040–41 (2004). 
VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM 2/26/2009  3:47:32 AM 
2009] ACADEMIA TO INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 327 
 
The debate is based on the arguably faulty assumptions that 
Bayh-Dole has been primarily responsible for the phenomenal 
growth in science and technology in the United States during the 
past quarter century, and, concurrently, that Bayh-Dole has been 
responsible for the growing prioritization-shift among academic 
research and a parallel devaluation of academic ideals within the 
university.34  This Article argues that history proves otherwise.  
While the encroachment of a proprietary mindset in science, 
blamed on Bayh-Dole, has been argued by scholars to be either a 
boon or a bust for innovation and advancement,35 historically, 
Bayh-Dole has only been a small player in the introduction of a 
patent culture into the science lab.  While the commodification of 
research and the corporatization of the university may have been 
somewhat spurred along by Bayh-Dole, the current state of 
American university research programs and U.S. science, in 
general, cannot be wholly attributed to the Act.36   
34  See generally Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of 
Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1091 (2006) (discussing 
some of the effects of commercialization, patenting and licensing on academia). 
35  The Economist Technology Quarterly claims that “[m]ore than anything, this single 
policy measure helped to reverse America’s precipitous slide into industrial irrelevance.” 
Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 29; see also Rep. Sensenbrenner Makes 
Statement Supporting H. Con. Res. 319, the Bayh-Dole Resolution, AUTM NEWS, March 
15, 2006, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20071219033045/http://autm.net/ 
news/dsp.newsDetails.cfm?nid=81.  
The Bayh-Dole Act transformed research and development in 
America.  The technology boom that daily changes our lives arises 
from a combination of basic research, applied research, and 
ultimately, the commercialization of innovation.  The passage of the 
Bayh-Dole Act obliged U.S. universities, hospitals and research 
institutions to invest significantly in the process of managing the 
intellectual property that emerges from research.  The revenues 
arising from these commercial and licensing activities are all directed 
back into the university community.  
Id. 
36  See, e.g., David Mowery & Bhaven Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and 
University-Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?, 
Seminar at The Center on Employment and Economic Growth, Stanford University 18 
(May 12, 2004), http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/HBSemulationtalk.pdf 
(“[W]e believe that much of the growth in licensing and university-based ‘spinoffs‘ that 
has occurred since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act almost certainly would have 
occurred in the absence of this piece of legislation . . . .  [W]e believe that the Bayh-Dole 
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Current research in fact suggests that patenting in academia 
(i.e., the goal of Bayh-Dole) does not impede research, alter the 
research goals of universities toward more commodifiable research 
directions, or promote a veil of secrecy over research.37 
Moreover, independent of the veracity of the above allegations, 
the infusement of corporate ideals into scientific research is not the 
paradigm shift it is claimed to be.  Classical Mertonian ideals,38 
while noble, were merely ideals,39 the modern science 
establishment has long had the anti-Mertonian vices of secrecy,40 
Act was neither necessary nor sufficient for the post-1980 growth in university patenting 
and licensing in the United States.”). 
37  See generally John P. Walsh & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents 
and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill, eds., 2003). 
38  See generally S. Shapin, Mertonian Concessions, 259 SCIENCE 839 (1993) 
(providing a short discussion of Mertonian ideals). 
39  ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (Free Press 1968) 
(1949).  “The right to search for truth implies also a duty; one must not conceal any part 
of what one has recognized to be true.” Einstein Memorial, The Nat’l Acad. of Science 
Bldg., http://www.nasonline.org/site/PageServer?pagename=ABOUT_building_einstein_ 
memorial (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (quoting inscription on the Albert Einstein 
Memorial Statue located on the Academy grounds). 
40  Note however, that while secrecy has been a “fact of life in academic science” due 
to priority or cost concerns, secrecy is on the rise.  Additionally, researchers have found 
that a researcher’s association with industry increases her propensity to withhold data.  A 
decade ago, David Blumenthal and his colleagues found that “[w]ithholding of research 
results is not a widespread phenomenon among life-science researchers.” David 
Blumenthal, Eric G. Campbell, Melissa S. Anderson, Nancyanne Causino & Karen 
Seashore Louis, Withholding Research Results In Academic Life Science—Evidence 
From a National Survey of Faculty, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1224 (1997).  More recently 
they came to a different conclusion: “Data withholding is common, takes multiple forms, 
is influenced by a variety of characteristics of investigators and their training, and varies 
by field of science.” Blumenthal et al., Data Withholding in Genetics and the Other Life 
Sciences: Prevalence and Predictors, 81 ACAD. MED. 137, 137 (2006). See generally Eric 
Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics; Evidence from a National 
Survey, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 473 (2002).  Note, though, that John P. Walsh and Wei 
Hong found that while “[s]ecrecy is strongly predicted by scientific competition . . . the 
focus on commercialization as the cause may be misplaced.” John P. Walsh & Wei Hong, 
Secrecy is Increasing in Step with Competition, 422 NATURE 801, 802 (2003); see also 
Arti Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES 136 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 
2005), available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php? 
fname=../pdffiles/phpWC.pdf (“Indeed, in the biological sciences, such calls for access 
may even create a Mertonian sphere more robust than that which existed before 1980.”). 
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rivalry, and inducements outside of noble curiosity and concern for 
social welfare.41  
Ironically, the Act may now serve to actually weaken the 
alliances between academia and industry.  There is an intensified 
need by industry for academic basic science research as a source of 
new innovation, but, with all the hurdles that Bayh-Dole and the 
technology transfer offices enforce,42 access to basic innovation is 
impeded by the technology transfer gatekeepers that protract 
negotiations, demand excessive fees and royalties, or write overly 
restrictive material transfer agreements.  Further, evidence from 
Japan indicates that when researchers are faced with complicated 
and time consuming hurdles to transfer technology, they will 
choose to either transfer the knowledge surreptitiously to a single 
corporation without disclosing the knowledge to the industry as a 
whole (e.g., through a patent or a publication), or will withhold 
disclosure altogether.43 
B. The Technology Transfer Office 
If Bayh-Dole is not responsible for either destroying academia 
or bolstering the economy, what then has Bayh-Dole accomplished 
over the past twenty-five years?   If nothing else, Bayh-Dole ought 
to be credited with bringing the legal and scientific universes 
closer together, although not in the most obvious sense.  For 
example, scientists, for the most part, continue to ignore 
intellectual property rights,44 infringing with impunity and relying 
on an ephemeral research exemption to use proprietary research 
41  As this Article’s author has learned through personal experience in academic labs.  
42  The productivity costs resulting from administrating is non-trivial and is thought to 
be an important factor in reducing the effectiveness of Japanese researchers, inhibiting 
their innovative capacity.  
43  See generally Not Invented Here, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2007, at 68 (exploring 
business in Japan). 
44  See generally Kara Moorecroft, Scofflaw Science: Avoiding The Anticommons 
Through Ignorance, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 71 (2005). 
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tools,45 confident that no right-minded company would sue an 
academic establishment.46  
 This Article posits that Bayh-Dole does have a true academic 
legacy, albeit somewhat more mundane than those suggested by 
Congress in their rush to praise the legislation: Bayh-Dole brought 
science and the law, two very different worlds, together through 
the establishment of the now relatively ubiquitous technology 
transfer office.47   
Academic scientists typically lack the market knowledge and 
the resources to successfully commercialize their own innovations: 
“New firms created [independently by] scientists may lack critical 
resources such as technological resources, human capital and 
finance [and] typically lack industry experience.”48  To help the 
academe promote and commercialize innovations, universities 
have universally invested in the creation of technology transfer 
offices or offices of technology licensing (“OTLs”) to help 
academics “exploit knowledge-based business ideas” and lower 
barriers to commercialization.49 
On paper, technology transfer offices seem like a great idea—
an in-house institution designed and devoted to bridge the science, 
law and business goals of the research institution in the 
encouragement of technology, information, and knowledge transfer 
to promote social welfare and, on the side, provide some revenue 
to cash-strapped research departments reeling from recent funding 
cuts.  Regrettably, the result has been an unexpected culture clash.  
Research scientists are often reluctant or, at best, accidental 
45  See John R. Thomas, Scientific Research and the Experimental Use Privilege in 
Patent Law, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Oct. 28, 2004. 
46  Note, however, there are conflicting opinions about the integration of law into 
science. See, e.g., STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA 
104 (1994) (“Doing research today without concern for the ultimate legal consequences is 
like doing a high wire act without the wire.”). 
47  Note that Bayh-Dole is often credited with bringing together industry and academia, 
but these were well on their way to finding each other—it is law and science that truly 
make strange and uncomfortable bedfellows. 
48  Colm O’Gorman, Orla Byrne & Dipti Pandya, How Scientists Commercialise New 
Knowledge Via Entrepreneurship, 33 J. TECH. TRANSFER 23, 24 (2006), available at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/fhm16744j0577243. 
49  Id. at 25.  
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entrepreneurs, typically only interested in commercializing their 
research either to supplement their grant funding or to validate 
their research by proving its commerciability.  There is a definite 
lack of scientists interested in spending the time and effort to 
patent and license what will be a wholly university-owned 
invention. 
Technology transfer offices, on the other hand, are interested in 
proving their usefulness to their home institution, preferably by 
licensing the next big blockbuster technology.50  These offices 
tend to focus on the distant secondary effect of technology 
transfer—revenue generation, at the expense of the primary 
purpose—the transfer of knowledge for the benefit of society.  
However, technology transfer offices often either just break even 
or are outright money-losing ventures for the univers
[M]any schools earn only enough from IP royalties 
to cover the costs of running a technology transfer 
office, and a significant number don’t even manage 
to do that: They’re in the red. “There is a lot of 
mythology out there” concerning royalties, says 
Don Giddens, dean of Georgia Insistute of 
Technology’s engineering school.  And even if a 
tech transfer office’s overhead is only just covered 
by royalty revenues, “What are the benefits of 
that?” asks Nino A. Masnari, dean of the College of 
Engineering at North Carolina State University.51 
Nonetheless, this pervasive inability to prioritize between the 
secondary and primary goals is not the only reason for the 
problems that this Article associates with technology transfer 
offices: Bayh-Dole legislation mandates that each university patent 
all academic patentable innovation or risk losing the right to patent 
that particular innovation.52  With this overwhelming 
responsibility looming over their heads, technology transfer 
50  The fact that Nature Biotechnology published a three page piece on getting along 
with technology transfer offices is indicative of the poor relationship between technology 
transfer offices and scientists. See O. Prem Das, Building Relationships With Technology 
Transfer Officers, 23 NATURE BIOTECH. 781 (2005). 
51  Grose, supra note 15, at 20.  
52  35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (2006). 
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officers need to constantly hound and pester researchers for 
information relating to anything patentable.53  This strained 
interaction is somewhat understandable: the technology transfer 
office may be one of the only sources of interaction between 
scientists and law and business interests.  Unfortunately, a 
quantitative and qualitative assessment of the interaction between 
scientists and technology transfer personnel is non-trivial.  While a 
comparison of technology transfer regulations and material transfer 
agreements may be somewhat enlightening, such an analysis 
would have to account for differences between regulation and 
actual practice in the technology transfer office, as well as those 
scientists who avoid technology transfer rules by wo
54  
 Previous studies focusing on technology transfer offices may 
not be as reliable, nor as valuable, as direct conversations with 
scientists in determining the extent of the impediments imposed by 
technology transfer offices on basic science research.  This Article 
will later suggest a potential system to measure this interaction and 
determine the extent to which research is actually being inhibited.  
Through quantifying and qualifying the interactions between 
scientists and licensing professionals, Congress, and those 
developing nations interested in implementing Bayh-Dole, locally, 
may be persuaded to reassess the success of Bayh-Dole and 
potentially implement a new and better system.   A retrospective 
analysis questioning conventional wisdom’s understandi
53 See David Schwartz, Long-term Tech Transfer Success Depends on Strong TTO-
Researcher Relationships, TECH. TRANSFER TACTICS, Dec. 10, 2007, 
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/content/2007/12/10/long-term-tech-transfer-
success.   
[I]n the daily crush of work most TTOs experience, the focus is on 
their invention disclosures, potential partners for their technologies, 
legal documents, valuation, market analysis, seed funding . . . .  And 
in the context of the daily grind, it’s easy to forget that these 
researchers are more than the financial value of their ideas—they are 
people; individuals, or clients, who must be courted, cajoled, 
pampered, communicated with, assisted, and educated.  
Id. 
54  See Moorecroft, supra note 44. 
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II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 
A. Pre-World War II 
Although Bayh-Dole is often credited for spawning the patent 
culture within American universities, patenting and 
commercialization within the Ivory Tower considerably predates 
the United States government’s interventions in the early 1980s.  
“The phenomenal innovation and job creation that America 
produced during the 1990s sprang from significant investments in 
education, infrastructure and research and development—that 
began in the 1960s,”55 if not earlier.  Arguably, American 
academia had been transferring technology and knowhow to the 
private sector from its very inception through the publication of 
papers, private consulting activities,56 and presentations at 
conferences.57 
The Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890 established the land grant 
university system.58 In 1862, legislation sponsored by 
Congressman Justin Morrill of Vermont granted every state in the 
Union 30,000 acres of public land for every representative that the 
state had in Congress.59  Over seventy land grant institutions of 
55  Editorial, Job Losses: The Wrong Debate; Look to the Future: Preparing American 
Workers for the Next Wave is the Key, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 21, 2004, at 4. 
56  “The best way to send information is to wrap it up in a person.” J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, The Eternal Apprentice, TIME, Nov. 8, 1948, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,853367,00.html. 
57  In a 1997 study, the National Science Foundation found that 73% of all papers cited 
in industry patents were from academic and public sources. Bruce P. Mehlman, Assistant 
Sec’y for Tech. Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Testimony on the Virtues of the Bayh-
Dole Act, Opening Statement to the President’s Committee of Advisers on Science and 
Technology (May 9, 2002), available at http://patapsco.nist.gov/ts/220/external/tech% 
20transfer/testimony%20on%20virtues.htm.  
58  The act’s express reasoning was to “promote the liberal and practical education of 
the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life” through “the 
endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object 
shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military 
tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and mechanic arts.” 
7 U.S.C. § 304 (2006). 
59  Thus under the Constitution every state received a minimum of 90,000 acres 
because each state has at least three representatives in Congress (two senators and one 
congressman). U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
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university research,68 there were many in academia who felt that 
 
engineering, agriculture and military science were set up under the 
act.  The 1890 Act further extended the land grants to the sixteen 
southern states.60  Given the obvious technical nature and 
vocational orientation of these land grant universities, there were 
powerful incentives within the universities to create close 
relationships with industry,61 and potentially to patent and to 
license to industry.62 
In 1912, Frederick Cottrell, a faculty member at the University 
of California, Berkeley, established the Research Corporation,63 in 
an effort to manage his,64 and other’s,65 scientific patents, and 
allocate the surplus income from those patents back into 
arch.66 
By the 1920s there were already a handful of universities that 
were involved in transferring basic science research to industries.67  
Despite the fact that several academics supported patenting 
60  Backgrounder on the Morrill Act, http://web.archive.org/web/20070824033550rn_1/ 
usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/27.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
61  DAVID MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION, UNIVERSITY-
INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH DOLE ACT 13 (2004). 
62  Id. at 39. 
63  Cottrell later acknowledged that patenting within public institutions was more 
trouble than it was worth.  Moreover, he felt that with the exception of a few discoveries, 
society would be better off if researchers just published promptly. See Charles Weiner, 
Patenting and Academic Research: Historical Case Studies, 12 SCI. TECH. & HUM. 
VALUES 55 (1987).   
64  For example, his electrostatic precipitator for cleaning smokestack emissions. 
Research Corporation for Science Advancement—About RSCA, http://www.rescorp.org/ 
about-rsca/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
65  The Research Corporation was integral in providing funds for numerous projects 
prior to extensive government funding of research after World War Two.  These included 
the development of the cyclotron by Ernest Lawrence, R.H. Goddard’s experiments with 
rockets, and organic synthesis experiments conducted by Robert Burns Woodward. See, 
e.g., Chem. Heritage Found.—Chemical Achievers: The Human Face of the Chemical 
Sciences, http://www.chemheritage.org/classroom/chemach/environment/cottrell.html 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
66  Research Corporation for Science Advancement, supra note 64. 
67  COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A GUIDE TO THE 
LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 2 (1999), available at 
http://www.cogr.edu/docs/Bayh_Dole.pdf; see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 61, at 57 
(noting that inter-institutional competition, administrative structure of universities and the 
need for more funding helped push universities towards stronger ties with industry). 
68  Elihu Thomas, President of MIT, stated in 1920:  
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patenting was not the appropriate method to transfer knowledge to 
industry or to the public.69   
With uncertainty as to what ought to be the appropriate level of 
university patenting, many universities in the early part of the 20th 
century set out to devise guidelines for patenting academic 
research.  Yale University, although formally against patenting, 
created policies allowing for some patents to be granted under 
specific circumstances.70  Harvard, in 1934 adopted a similar 
policy.71  Other universities, such as the University of Wisconsin, 
I have known some well-meaning scientific men . . . to look askance 
at the patenting of inventions, as if it were a rather selfish and 
ungracious act, essentially unworthy.  The answer is very simple.  
Publish an invention freely, and it will almost surely die from lack of 
interest in its development.  It will not be developed, and the world 
will not be benefited.  Patent it, and if valuable, it will be taken up 
and developed into a business. 
Nicholas H. Steneck, Priorities For Federal Innovation Reform Making Ethical Dialogue 
a Part of the National Innovation System 1–2 (issue paper submitted to the NSTC 
Committee on Technology), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/doc/ 
steneck2.doc. 
69  See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 63, at 50.  George and Gladys Dick, at the McCormick 
Institute in Chicago developed an antitoxin to Scarlet Fever.  After publishing their 
results, the market was flooded with antitoxins, many of them substandard.  In an effort 
to retain quality control, it was suggested that the Dicks patent their antitoxin.  The Public 
Health Service, citing the patenting of insulin at the University of Toronto, noted that the 
ethical barriers to academic patenting were crumbling and suggested that the Dicks also 
patent.  The Dicks offered to donate their patent to the American Medical Association, 
who turned down the offer as there was significant dissention within the AMA as to the 
propriety of patenting medical cures.  Although the Dicks were nominated for a Nobel 
Prize in 1925, the Nobel committee did not award a prize for medicine that year, 
reinforcing the criticism that was already rampant in the medical community both 
stateside and abroad. Id. at 52–53. 
70  Yale AIDS Network, University-Industry Relations: Historical Perspective, Apr. 19, 
2003, http://www.yale.edu/aidsnetwork/Spring%202003%20Univ%20IP%20History.ppt. 
[I]t is, in general, undesirable and contrary to the best interests of 
medicine and the public to patent any discovery or invention 
applicable in the fields of public health or medicine; but if, at any 
time, any member of the faculty deems it necessary solely for the 
protection of the public, without profit to himself or the University, to 
control any invention or discovery by means of a patent, he shall 
bring the matter before the Prudential Committee.   
Id. 
71  “No patents primarily concerned with therapeutics or public health may be taken out 
by any member of the University, except with the consent of the President and Fellows; 
nor will such patents be taken out by the University itself except for dedication to the 
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were more aggressive in their patent policies.  The Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation (“WARF”), founded by Harry 
Steenbock and other alumni of the University of Wisconsin, was 
set up in 1925 to manage the licensing of the research coming out 
of the University of Wisconsin at Madison.72  By the 1930s WARF 
was so successful that other universities, principally other land 
grant institutions, began to emulate it.73  By the late 1940s most 
American universities had developed some sort of patent policy.74  
B. Post War University Research 
Following the success of the Manhattan Project, Vannevar 
Bush launched the postwar science era with the seminal report 
Science-The Endless Frontier.75  In arguably one of the most 
important science pronouncements of the 20th century, Bush called 
for, among other things, the establishment of a centralized 
government funding source for research, stimulating the formation 
of the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) and the National 
Institutes of Health (or “NIH”), and establishing the notion of 
significant government funding for basic research.76  Bush 
highlighted the importance of basic science research as an impetus 
public.” Id.  In fact, Harvard, in 1926 refused to patent a medical therapy for anemia, 
deciding that it was unethical to patent medical therapies. Id. 
72  Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation—Steenbock and WARF’s Founding, 
http://www.warf.org/about/index.jsp?cid=26&scid=33 (last visited Jan 30, 2009).  
73  MOWERY ET AL., supra note 61, at 39–40. 
74  Id. at 42. Although in summarizing the history of university patenting prior to the 
end of World War II, Weiner notes that in most instances patenting did not pay off and 
even when it did, universities also had to deal with credibility issues, general public 
disgust, and conflicts of interests arising out of the patents. See Weiner, supra note 63, at 
57; see also Bhaven N. Sampat & Richard Nelson, The Emergence and Standardization 
of University Technology Transfer Offices: A Case Study of Institutional Change 6–12, 
Prepared for the 1999 Conference of the International Society for the New Institutional 
Economics (“ISNIE”), in D.C. (Sept. 16–18, 1999), 
http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE99/Papers/nelson.pdf (noting a number of scholars in the ’30s 
and ’40s who commented on the trajectory of most universities toward patent polices). 
75  VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE THE ENDLESS FRONTIER: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 3 
(1945). 
76  AAAS made similar pronouncements a decade earlier, stating “that aggressive 
governmental support of scientific work is essential to any sound program of building for 
the future national welfare.” AAAS RESOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF SCIENTIFIC 
WORK (Dec. 31, 1934), available at http://archives.aaas.org/docs/resolutions.php? 
doc_id=199.  
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for American innovation and success.77  Still, Bush cautioned that 
much of the success of basic science research was contingent on 
the differences between academia and industry, particularly those 
positive aspects of academic research that distinguished academia 
from industry.78 
The eventual surge in federal funding, particularly in more 
recent decades for biomedical research, cemented ties between 
basic science researchers and those participating in its clinical 
applications.  This promoted rapid innovation in the biomedical 
fields.79  With this increased funding, academic research in the 
United States dwarfed all other industrialized economies in much 
of the postwar period.80 
Prior to 1950, there was no uniform United States government 
policy as to the intellectual property status of research produced 
via government funds; each agency created and followed their own 
guidelines.81  In 1955, the precursor to the Department of Health 
77  “The information, the techniques, and the research experience developed . . . by the 
thousands of scientists in the universities and in private industry, should be used in the 
days of peace ahead for the improvement of the national health, the creation of new 
enterprises bringing new jobs, and the betterment of the national standard of living.” 
BUSH, supra note 75, at 3. 
78  “It is chiefly in these institutions that scientists may work in an atmosphere which is 
relatively free from the adverse pressure of convention, prejudice, or commercial 
necessity. . . .  Industry is generally inhibited by preconceived goals, by its own clearly 
defined standards, and by the constant pressure of commercial necessity.  Satisfactory 
progress in basic science seldom occurs under conditions prevailing in the normal 
industrial laboratory. . . .  [I]t is rarely possible to match the universities in respect to the 
freedom which is so important to scientific discovery.” Id. at 19. 
79  MOWERY ET AL., supra note 61, at 25. 
80  Id. at 26. 
81  PETER BARTON HUTT & THOMAS MAYS, GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 
COLLABORATION IN AIDS DRUG DEVELOPMENT: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 3 
(1994), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=9196&page=3. 
Interestingly, government policy towards the patenting of federally funded projects 
generally ignored issues relating to universities during this time period (1940s and 
1950s), as universities, at this point, were only a fraction of federal research and 
development spending. Bhaven N. Sampat, Recent Changes in Patent Policy and the 
“Privatization” of Knowledge: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Developing 
Countries, in 1 KNOWLEDGE FLOWS, INNOVATION, AND LEARNING IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 39, 54 (2003), available at http://www.cspo.org/home/cspoideas/know_flows/ 
CSPO_Rockefeller_Vol1.pdf. 
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and Human Services, the Health, Education and Welfare 
Department (“HEW”), promulgated regulations, noting that in 
most circumstances, inventions derived from federally funded 
research ought to be made available freely to the public, and, if 
patented, should be made available to the public royalty-free and 
with non-exclusive licenses.  Eventually, in 1968, the NIH granted 
universities the right to freely patent and license the innovation.82  
For the most part, these allowances were limited to those 
exceptional circumstances where commercial development was 
integral to social welfare.  In these instances the institution 
requesting to license out their research had to request an 
Institutional Patent Agreement (or “IPA”) from the Surgeon 
General, or, alternatively, petition for title from the granting 
agency.83  These IPAs, (typically few and far between) gave the 
research institution the right to determine and define the ownership 
of the invention.84 
In 1963, President Kennedy (and later Nixon85 and Carter86 as 
well, but to lesser degrees) issued a memorandum that attempted to 
harmonize the government’s patent policy, creating government-
wide criteria and objectives for the distribution of inventor’s rights 
82  The National Science Foundation followed shortly after in 1973. Ken Howard, Tech 
Transfer’s Living Legacy, BIOENTREPRENEUR, Oct. 24, 2004, http://www.nature.com/ 
bioent/2004/041001/full/bioent832.html. 
83  Sampat, supra note 81, at 54.  
84  HUTT & MAYS, supra note 81, at 4; see also William Broad, Patent Bill Returns 
Bright Idea to Inventor, 205 SCIENCE 473, 473 (1979) (noting that scientists often 
complained of the ‘bureaucratic knots’ resulting from HEW’s policies and that it was 
common for years to “slip by before a funding agency decide[d] whether or not to return 
the patent rights to an inventor’s organization”). 
85  President Nixon’s 1971 memorandum invoked the Harbridge Report and was later 
endorsed by the Bayh-Dole Act. See Lawrence Rudolph, Overview of Federal 
Technology Transfer, 5 RISK 133, 134 (1994). “The thrust of [that memo]: ‘A single 
presumption of ownership of patent rights to government-sponsored inventions either in 
the government or its contractors is not a satisfactory basis for government patent policy 
and, that a flexible, government-wide policy best serves the public interest.’” Howard W. 
Bremer, The First Two Decades of the Bayh-Dole Act as Public Policy, Presentation to 
the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (“NASULGC”), 
Nov. 11, 2001, at 6, http://www.lsuhsc.edu/no/administration/otd/Bayh_Dole_Act.pdf. 
86  ANDREW Z. MICHAELSON, THE LAW OF THE LAB: USING ZERIT TO INFORM 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 21, 22 (2002), available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/ 
512/michaelson.pdf. 
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in government funded research.87  In spite of these memoranda, 
government agencies continued to act independently and 
inconsistently.88  HEW, in particular, refrained from assigning 
further IPAs until the General Accounting office reported that 
HEW’s policies were deterring industry cooperation with basic 
research.89  In 1968, the executive branch commissioned a report 
from Harbridge House which noted that commercial utilization of 
government funded research and development was low.90  
Interestingly, the report also found that “the evidence does not 
indicate that either title or nonexclusive licensing is uniformly the 
best way to promote utilization” of academic research.91 
 As the decade progressed, the uncertainty regarding the 
government’s views on patenting research and development grew 
as well.92  Nevertheless, even without a coherent government wide 
policy,93 university patenting grew significantly during this period 
and into the 1970s.94  But, without a clear, coherent patent policy 
on government-funded research, many in industry were reluctant to 
fund research in educational institutions, fearing that a comingling 
of even a de minimus amount of federal funds with their private 
funds would contaminate the private funds and limit industry’s 
ability to claim ownership to commercialize an invention.95   
87  Memorandum of October 10, 1963 [Government Patent Policy], 28 Fed. Reg. 
10943, 10944 (Oct. 12, 1963) (following an analysis by Dr. Jerome Weisner, President 
Kennedy’s science advisor). 
88  HUTT & MAYS, supra note 81, at 4.  “Despite numerous congressional hearings on 
this issue, no legislation was adopted during the 1950–75 period, because of the inability 
of supporters of opposing positions outlined above to resolve their differences.”  Sampat, 
supra note 81, at 54.  
89  HUTT & MAYS, supra note 81, at 4–5. 
90  MICHAELSON, supra note 86, at 21. 
91  Id. 
92  Bob Dole famously stated that “rarely have we witnessed a more hideous example 
of overmanagement by the bureaucracy.” BHAVEN N. SAMPAT, PRIVATE PARTS: PATENTS 
AND PUBLIC RESEARCH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17 (2003), available at 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/research/stp/papers/SAMPAT-Nov-03.pdf.  
93  Rudolph, supra note 85. 
94  MOWERY ET AL., supra note 61, at 50, 57 (noting that federal fund dispersion 
increased negotiations of IPAs, changing content of research, and noting a greater trend 
by federal agencies towards allowing institutions to patent). 
95  See, e.g., Bayh-Dole: The Next 25 Years: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Science and 
Technology, Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation, 110th Cong. (2007).  These 
concerns were somewhat lessened by Bayh-Dole where the government’s retained rights 
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C. Bayh-Dole 
In September of 1978, Senators Dole and Bayh introduced 
Senate Bill 414, the University and Small Business Patent Act, 
which attempted to harmonize the government’s policies towards 
patenting of federally funded research, changing the presumption 
as to who ought to own a patent resulting from academic 
research.96  Interestingly, while much of the rhetoric surrounding 
the bill focused on losing the innovative edge to Japan and other 
foreign countries,97 there was no mention of the idea within the bill 
itself.98 
On July 1, 1980, a lame duck Congress, against all odds, 
passed the Bayh-Dole Act.99  The legislation gave universities and 
small businesses (and later by executive order, large businesses100) 
the ability to maintain title to their federally sponsored 
innovations,101 if a number of regulations are adhered to.102  These 
in the patent are limited to instances where the funds were used in either the conception 
of the invention or in the first actual reduction to practice. See John H. Raubitschek, 
Responsibilities Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 311, 313 
(2005). 
96  See, e.g., David C. Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology 
Entrepreneurship in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else?, Presented at 
the Colloquium on Entrepreneurship Education and Technology Transfer 11 (Jan. 21–22, 
2005), available at http://entrepreneurship.eller.arizona.edu/docs/conferences/ 
2005/colloquium/D_Mowery.pdf.  Note also that prior to Bayh-Dole there were 20 
statutes governing the United States policy towards patents. See, e.g., Clifton Leaf, The 
Law of Unintended Consequences, FORTUNE, Sept. 19, 2005, at 250. 
97  See, e.g., Broad, supra note 84, at 476. 
98  MICHAELSON, supra note 86, at 24. 
99  See, e.g., Ashley Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93 
(2004) (a compelling narrative of the events immediately preceding the passage of Bayh-
Dole). 
100  See Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987). 
101  “Bayh-Dole clearly and decisively answered the question whether academic 
researchers can own and commercialize government-sponsored research.  According to 
Bayh-Dole, they not only can but are also obligated to do so.” Steneck, supra note 68,  
at 3. 
102  Note however that these requirements have changed a couple of times over the 
years. See generally Raubitschek, supra note 95, at 311.  In exchange for title, receivers 
of federal funds can claim title to the invention if they: (1) report each disclosed 
invention to the funding agency, (2) elect to retain title in writing within a statutorily 
prescribed timeframe, (3) file for patent protection, (4) grant the federal government a 
non-exclusive, non-transferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced 
on its behalf throughout the world, (5) actively promote and attempt to commercialize the 
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included:  (i) the university must “disclose each subject invention 
to the Federal agency within a reasonable time (i.e., two 
months)103 after it becomes known to contractor personnel 
responsible for the administration of patent matters;”104 (ii) once 
disclosed the university must opt in to retain title and patenting 
rights to the invention within two years;105 (iii) the government 
“shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up 
license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United 
States any subject invention throughout the world;”106 (iv) the 
government also retains the right “to require periodic reporting on 
the utilization or efforts at obtaining utilization that are being made 
by the contractor or his licensees or assignees;”107 (v) the 
government can require that the patenting university “include 
within the specification of such application and any patent issuing 
thereon, a statement specifying that the invention was made with 
Government support and that the Government has certain rights in 
the invention;”108 (vi) the government also granted itself ‘march in 
rights’109 that is, a grant of either “a nonexclusive, partially 
invention, (6) do not assign the rights to the technology, with a few exceptions, (7) share 
royalties with the inventor, (8) use any remaining income for education and research, (9) 
give preference to U.S. industry and small business. 35 U.S.C §§ 200–212 (2006).  While 
typically lax in enforcing these requirements, the government has on at least one occasion 
refused to grant title when disclosure was not timely and piecemeal. See Campbell 
Plastics Eng’g & Mfg., Inc. v. Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding 
that while policy considerations behind the Bayh-Dole Act “clearly intended ‘to promote 
the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United States by 
United States industry and labor,’ and ‘to encourage maximum participation of small 
business firms in federally supported research and development efforts,’ [Congress] also 
provided the government with certain aforementioned rights to the inventions and sought 
to ensure the safeguard of those rights by requiring government contractors to disclose 
subject inventions.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000)). 
103  See, e.g., Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Serv., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, 
P.C., No. CV-00-2430, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95833, at *16 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2006) 
(citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-11(c)(1) (2007)). 
104  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1) (2006).   
105  Or sixty days prior to the expiration of the one year grace period granted to 
inventions that have been publicized, e.g., through a scholarly publication or conference. 
35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (2006). 
106  Id.  § 202(c)(4). 
107  Id.  § 202(c)(5). 
108  Id.  § 202(c)(6). 
109  Note, however, that march-in rights have been part of the government’s university 
patenting policy since the 1960s. See Raubitschek, supra note 95, at 312. 
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exclusive, or exclusive license in any field of use to a responsible 
applicant or applicants, upon terms that are reasonable under the 
circumstances;”110 (vii) universities cannot transfer ownership of a 
patented innovation developed in whole or in part with university 
funds to a third party; and (viii) all exclusive licensees must 
substantially manufacture the commercialized product in the 
United States. 
Although there is some flexibility in these regulations,111 
failure to conform could result in the forfeiture of the intellectual 
property rights to the invention, even if the government was in no 
way harmed.112  Additionally, failure to comply limits the ability 
of the patent owner to enforce her patent against putative 
infringers.113  
Bayh-Dole provisions apply only to inventions conceived or 
first introduced into practice as a result of a project funded either in 
whole or in part by the federal government.114  When this is the 
case, Bayh-Dole gives the named inventor the right to acquire the 
patent rights to her invention in the relatively unlikely event that 
the contractor, i.e., the academic institution, does not elect to retain 
its title, and provided that the federal funding agency has consulted 
110  35 U.S.C. § 203(1).  The application of these rights are thoroughly noted in the 
Federal Register, Rights To Inventions Made By Nonprofit Organizations And Small 
Business Firms Under Government Grants, Contracts, And Cooperative Agreements, 37 
C.F.R. § 401.6 (2006).  Note that the idea of march-in rights dates back to at least 
Vanaver Bush, who thought that “[t]he public interest will normally be adequately 
protected if the Government receives a royalty-free license for governmental purposes 
under any patents resulting from work financed by the [National Science] Foundation.” 
See BUSH, supra note 75, at 38. 
111  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (2006) (allowing for the contractor to request 
additional time from the funding source to complete the regulatory requirements).  
112  “[N]oncompliance with a patent rights clause may have serious consequences on 
enforcing rights in any invention made with Government funding.  Although I doubt that 
agencies will start exercising forfeiture rights, I expect that contractors and universities, 
in particular, will be more careful in meeting their obligations under Bayh-Dole.” 
Raubitschek, supra note 95, at 318; see, e.g., Campbell Plastics Eng’g & Mfg. v. 
Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2004). But see Narda Microwave v. Gen. 
Microwave Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 231, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (allowing the 
contractor to rectify its oversight).  
113  See Filmtec Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991); TM Patents 
L.P. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
114  Raubitschek, supra note 95, at 313. 
VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM 2/26/2009  3:47:32 AM 
2009] ACADEMIA TO INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 343 
 
with the contracting academic institution at the request of the 
inventor and prior to granting the rights to the inventor.115  
Bayh-Dole had numerous policy objectives in addition to 
simply promoting innovation resulting from federally funded 
research.  Bayh-Dole legislation encourages the participation of 
small businesses in federally funded research and promotes 
collaboration between commercial and non-profit organizations, 
not just universities. 
President Jimmy Carter, in his signing statement on Bayh-Dole 
anticipated that the legislation would provide “some real benefits 
to the Nation's economic health by stimulating our people's 
innovative activity.”116  Although one cannot know for sure if 
Bayh-Dole provided any immediate stimulation to innovation, we 
can look to concurrent scientific advancements to see that 
biotechnology, in particular, was already well on its way to its 
1980s era boom, even without Bayh-Dole. 
D. Concurrent Events in Science 
Much of academic patenting and licensing is in the area of life 
sciences.  In order to assess the actual impact of Bayh-Dole on 
universities, it is important to put the legislative act within the 
historical context of the science at the time.  Molecular biology 
was going through its own paradigm shift concurrent with the 
events leading up to and following the passage of Bayh-Dole.117  
Modern understanding of molecular biology usually begins in 
1953 with the discovery of the structure of DNA.118  Watson and 
115  35 U.S.C. § 202(d). 
116  President James E. Carter, Patent and Trademark System Reform Statement on 
Signing H.R. 6933 Into Law (Dec. 12, 1980), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=44398. 
117  Eric Campbell calls the convergence of Bayh-Dole, molecular biology, and other 
events in this time period the “science and technology version of the Perfect Storm.” See 
Alan Dove, When Science Rides the MTA, 110 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 425, 425 
(2002). 
118  J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171 NATURE 
738 (1953).  Note, however, that there were numerous other earlier discoveries that led to 
many of the techniques commonly used today in biotechnology. See, e.g., J. Lederberg & 
E.L. Tatum, Gene Recombination in Escherichia Coli, 158 NATURE 558 (1946) 
(describing transfer of bacterial genes); S.E. Luria et al., Electron Microscope Studies of 
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Crick’s determination of the double stranded helical structure of 
DNA119 led to an understanding of how DNA replicates and serves 
as a template for the production of all the proteins in the cell.  In 
the early 1970s much of the Nobel Prize winning technology and 
knowledge that would be integral to the coming biotechnology 
revolution began to be discovered by academic research labs in 
quick succession.  This massive expansion of our understanding of 
the basic molecular nature of the cell helped create the 
biotechnology revolution.  Further, with many of these scientists in 
academia, this helped propel universities—now owners of these 
blockbuster innovations—into prosperous relationships with 
industry. 
The seventies began with the discovery of retroviruses by 
Nobel Laureates Drs. Temin and Baltimore in 1970.120  In 1972, 
Paul Berg determined how to isolate genes from one organism and 
recombine them with DNA from a different organism in vivo.121  
In 1973, Cohen and Boyer created functional organisms that were 
able to recombine DNA from other cells and replicate that DNA as 
their own.122  Drs. Hedges and Jacob discovered transposons in 
bacterial genomes in 1974, transferring amipicillin resistance from 
one plasmid to another.123  In 1975, Edward Southern created the 
Bacterial Viruses, 46 J. BACTERIOLOGY 57 (1943) (describing the mechanism of viral 
infection); Arne Tiselius, A New Apparatus for Electrophoretic Analysis of Colloidal 
Mixtures, 33 TRANSACTIONS OF THE FARADAY SOC’Y 524 (1937) (describing the 
technique of electrophoresis). 
119  Watson & Crick, supra note 118. 
120  D. Baltimore, RNA-Dependent DNA PolymeraseIin virions of RNA Tumour Viruses, 
226 NATURE 1209 (1970); H.M. Temin & S. Mizutani, RNA-Dependent DNA Polymerase 
in Virions of Rous Sarcoma Virus 226 NATURE 1211 (1970). 
121  J.F. Morrow & P. Berg, Cleavage of Simian Virus 40 DNA at a Unique Site by a 
Bacterial Restriction Enzyme, 69 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 3365 (1972). 
122  S.N. Cohen et al., Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids in 
Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 3240, 3240 (1973).  The famed Cohen-Boyer 
discovery brought in over 200 million dollars in royalties, with the bulk going to the 
University of California, San Fransisco and Stanford Universities. Interestingly, the 
inventors themselves plowed their third of the revenue back into research, declining to 
take any of the money for their personal use. See Baruch Brody, Intellectual Property and 
Biotechnology: The US Internal Experience—Part I, 16 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1.6, 6 
(2006). 
123  R.W. Hedges & A.E. Jacob, Transposition of Ampicillin Resistance from RP4 to 
Other Replicons, 132 MOLECULAR GEN. GENETICS 31 (1974). 
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Southern Blot, the precursor of today’s high throughput genomic 
chips and other technologies.124  Kohler and Milstein created the 
first monoclonal antibodies in 1975.125  Harold Varmus and J. 
Michael Bishop later received the Nobel Prize for their discovery 
of the cellular origin of retroviral oncogenes in 1976.126  In 1977, 
Maxam and Gilbert,127 concurrently with Sanger in the U.K.,128 
developed modern methods for sequencing strands of DNA—a 
necessary innovation for the eventual decoding of the entire human 
genome, as well as other genomes,129 and Itakura et al. first 
synthesized a human protein by bacterial transformation.130  In 
1980, the first transgenic mouse was created.131  In 1986, the 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methodology was introduced by 
Kary Mullis.132   
Note that this list of important biotechnology inventions is 
merely illustrative, and is far from an exhaustive list, of all the 
major accomplishments that occurred during the period leading up 
to and directly following the enactment of Bayh-Dole, in 1980.  
Science in general was experiencing a phenomenal and 
unprecedented growth spurt during this period: during the ’70s 
there was, on average an annual 2% increase in the number of 
124  E.M. Southern, Detection of Specific Sequences Among DNA Fragments Separated 
by Gel Electrophoresis, 98 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 503 (1975). 
125  G. Kohler & C. Milstein, Continuous Cultures of Fused Cells Secreting Antibody of 
Predefined Specificity, 256 NATURE 495 (1975). 
126  D. Stehelin et al., DNA Related to the Transforming Gene(s) of Avian Sarcoma 
Viruses is Present in Normal Avian DNA, 260 NATURE 170 (1976). 
127  Allan M. Maxam & Walter Gilbert, A New Method for Sequencing DNA, 74 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 560 (1977). 
128  Frederick Sanger et al., DNA Sequencing with Chain-Terminating Inhibitors, 74 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 5463 (1977). 
129  Maxam, supra note 127, at 561.  
130  Keiichi Itakura et al., Expression in Escherichia Coli of a Chemically Synthesized 
Gene for the Hormone Somatostatin, 198 SCIENCE 1056 (1977). 
131  Jon W. Gordon et al., Genetic Transformation of Mouse Embryos by Microinjection 
of Purified DNA, 77 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 738 (1980). 
132  K. Mullis, et al., Specific Amplification of DNA In Vitro: The Polymerase Chain 
Reaction, 51 COLD SPRING HARBOR SYMP. ON QUANTITATIVE BIOLOGY 263 (1986).  Dr. 
Mullis was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for this discovery. Press Release, 
Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., The 1993 Nobel Prize in Chemistry (Oct. 13, 1993), 
available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1993/press.html 
(“With PCR it is possible to replicate several million times, in a test tube, an individual 
DNA segment of a complicated genetic material.”). 
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scientific publications.133  Starting in the late 1970s and continuing 
on through the ’80s science saw a jump to an annual increase of 4 
or 5% in the publication of papers.134  By 1990 biomedical science 
was pumping out 85% more papers annually than it had produced 
in 1970.135  With much of the basic technology of the 
biotechnology revolution produced, published, and freely available 
long before Bayh-Dole passed, it seems difficult to ascribe even a 
large part of the current biotechnology boom to Bayh-Dole.   
E. Concurrent Biotechnology Industry Growth 
Wall Street was also very interested in biotechnology at this 
time, with equity investments in biotechnology companies 
increasing from $50 million to over $800 million between 1978 
and 1981.136  Genentech, which preceded Bayh-Dole, exemplified 
Wall Street’s early passion for biotech.  Long before the dawn of 
huge IPOs, the value of Genentech stock, a pioneer biotechnology 
company founded by University of California, San Fransisco 
professors Herbert Boyer and Robert Swanson, went from $35 
million to $89 million in the first 20 minutes of public trading.137  
Cetus (founded in Berkeley, California in 1971) successfully went 
public around the same time.138  Cetus’s initial public offering 
pulled in over 100 million dollars, making it the largest IPO on the 
American stock market at the time.139   
133  Data compiled by the author from PubMed, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/. 
134  Id.  
135  Id. 
136  Biotech Stock Letter—Investors History of the Biotech Industry, available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070202171703/http://biotechstock.com/en-us/pg_10.html 
(as the page appeared on Feb. 2, 2007). 
137  Brody, supra note 122, at 7. 
138  Id. at 8–9.  
139  Michael Rosen, The Birth of Biotech: San Francisco, Boston, Geneva or Chicago?, 
WIS. TECH. NETWORK NEWS, Aug. 25, 2004, http://wistechnology.com/article.php? 
id=1118.  In October of 1979, Business Week was already gushing about the future of 
biotechnology in industry:  
As recently as three years ago, predictions of a future technology 
based on bacteria sounded at best like science fiction . . . .  
[E]xcitement over industrial applications is building rapidly . . . .  
[T]he promise is nothing less than “the possibility of building a 
sustainable future based on renewable resources” . . . .  In the area of 
synthetic organic chemicals alone, J. Leslie Glick, president of Genex 
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By 1987, the San Francisco Bay Area’s biotech industry, 
benefiting from the quality and quantity of surrounding 
universities, a local agricultural biotechnology sector, and 
favorable non-compete laws that promoted cross-fertilization 
among companies, had grown to 112 companies, from 84 a decade 
earlier.140  These companies had revenues exceeding 2 billion 
dollars and created at least 19,400 San Francisco Bay Area jobs.  
The market only got hotter as the decade wound down, with 81 
new companies being formed in the Bay Area between 1987–
1990.141  Although exemplified in the Bay Area, innovation and 
productivity were also up nationwide, setting the stage for a 
competitive and robust biotechnology industry that would feed off 
of academic research.142 
F.  Concurrent Events in Patent Law 
In addition to the incredible advancements made in molecular 
biology, Bayh-Dole was enacted just as important changes in the 
United States patent regime—vis-à-vis the biotechnology 
industry—were taking effect.  Throughout the 1970s, patent 
eligibility requirements were confusing and contradictory,143 and 
Corp., has identified existing markets worth $12.4 billion annually in 
which he is convinced that bacteria have a high probability of being 
more efficient and economical than present technology. . . .  And 
Glick sees another group of markets worth $20 billion annually 
where less substantial inroads are possible, including the manufacture 
of such products as plastics, synthetic rubber, and pesticides.  Seeing 
the potential, a growing number of industrial companies are buying in 
to gain what Charles L. Ruby, Corporate planning manager at 
Standard Oil Co. of California (Socal), calls “a window on this 
technology.” 
Where Genetic Engineering Will Change Industry, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 160. 
140  BayBio—History of the Industry, http://www.baybio.org/wt/home/Industry_ 
Statistics (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
141  Id. 
142  See, e.g., Stephen A. Merrill, Executive Dir. Sci., Tech., & Econ. Policy Bd., The 
Nat’l Acads., Remarks at the Conference on IPR, Innovation, and Economic Performance 
(Aug. 28, 2003).  For slides of the presentation see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/51/ 
12040024.pdf. 
143  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Biotech Patents: Looking Backward While Moving Forward, 
24 NATURE BIOTECH. 317, 317 (2006). 
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standards for utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and written 
description were in flux.144  
In 1980, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty,145 solidified the expanded scope of patentable 
subject matter, proclaiming that the patent act will protect 
“anything under the sun that is made by man” including living 
organisms and other biological matter.146  This decision gave 
biotechnology firms and research institutions the opportunity to 
patent their bi
 Diamond v. Diehr147 set the stage for the patenting of 
computer software, an integral component of the growing fields of 
bioinformatics and computational biology, and necessary for the 
high throughput analysis revolution.  In 1990, the California 
Supreme Court in Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California148 ruled that the cell line derived from an unwitting 
patient could be patented, with the patient himself having no claim 
to those derived cells.149  “[T]he use of excised human cells in 
medical research does not amount to a conversion.”150   
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (or “USPTO”), in an 
interference decision, explicitly expanded the scope of 
patentability to include plants,151 and later more complex 
144  See generally id. 
145  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (ruling that a genetically engineered 
bacteria that consumed oil could be patented). 
146  Id. at 309. 
147  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).   
148  Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).  
149  Id. at 492–93. 
Human cell lines are patentable because long-term adaptation and 
growth of human tissues and cells in culture is difficult—often 
considered an art . . . .  It is this inventive effort that patent law 
rewards, not the discovery of naturally occurring raw materials.  
Thus, Moore’s allegations that he owns the cell line and the products 
derived from it are inconsistent with the patent, which constitutes an 
authoritative determination that the cell line is the product of 
invention.  
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotes omitted). 
150  Id. at 493.  “Moore’s allegations that he owns the cell line and the products derived 
from it are inconsistent with the patent, which constitutes an authoritative determination 
that the cell line is the product of the invention.” Id.  
151  Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444 (1985). 
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organisms152—eventually even issuing a patent for a transgenic 
mouse.153  During this time the Patent Office announced that it 
considered all “non-naturally occurring non-human multicellular 
living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject 
matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. [§] 101.”154  There were large 
institutional changes as well: The Federal Circuit, which is largely 
perceived as pro-patent155 and has been actively involved in 
shaping patent policy to support the biotechnology industry, was 
established in 1982.156  The Hatch Waxman Act of 1984157 
allowed pharmaceutical patentees to hold onto their patent 
monopoly a little longer, making up for time lost during the FDA 
approval process, further promoting the biotechnology indust 158
G.  Concurrent Legislative Efforts 
Even if one were to ascribe a significant portion of the 
responsibility for the biotechnological and high tech revolutions to 
Bayh-Dole, the act was only one piece of a larger set of relatively 
concurrent legislative acts that attempted to promote the transfer of 
technology.  Each of the other pieces of legislation focused on a 
particular niche, but together they helped set the stage for the 
biotechnological boom. 
152  Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1427 (1987) (allowing the patenting of 
polyploid oysters). 
153  Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) 
(issued Apr. 12, 1988).  
154  Brody, supra note 122, at 14. 
155  See Cohen, supra note 33, at 58 (discussing perception of CAFC granting large 
awards); Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUDS. 85, 114 (2006) (noting that 
“[i]n sum, we find that the CAFC has been pro-patent, but only with respect to 
validity.”). But see John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote 
in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 767 (2000) (“[T]he outcome of 
patent validity cases in the Federal Circuit has depended on the facts of the case, and not 
on the composition of the panel.”). 
156  U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—About the Court, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).  
157  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98. Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b–68c, 70b, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 301, 355, 360cc, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282). 
158  See generally Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its 
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999) (providing a 
history and the effects of the act). 
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In 1976, President Ford, in an effort to revive the presidential 
science advisory system (“PSAC”), signed the National Science 
and Technology Policy Organization and Priorities Act of 1976159 
which established an executive office of Science and Technology 
Policy (or “OSTP”).  The act gave the OSTP a  
broad mandate to advise the President and others 
within the Executive Office of the President on the 
effects of science and technology on domestic and 
international affairs . . . [and] authorizes OSTP to 
lead an interagency effort to develop and to 
implement sound science and technology policies 
and budgets and to work with the private sector, 
state and local governments, the science and higher 
education communities, and other nations toward 
this end.160   
The OSTP has had a significant influence on national innovation 
policies.  During the Carter presidency, the OSTP worked to 
influence the president to stimulate or remove barriers to 
innovation, promoted close industry-university relations, and 
created a close working relationship with the Office of 
Management and Budget effectuating a pro-science policy.161 
In 1978 the National Science Foundation started a pilot project 
to promote university-industry cooperation—something that had 
159   National Science and Technology Policy Organization and Priorities Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-282, 90 Stat. 549 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6614(a)(2), 
6615, 6618).  The law stipulated that the U.S. government  
adhere to a national policy for science and technology which includes 
the following principles: (1) the continuing development and 
implementation of a national strategy for determining and achieving 
the appropriate scope, level, direction, and extent of scientific and 
technological efforts . . . (2) the enlistment of science and technology 
to foster a healthy economy in which the directions of growth and 
innovation are compatible with the prudent and frugal use of 
resources . . . and (3) the development and maintenance of a solid 
base for science and technology in the United States.  
Id. at § 102.  
160  Office of Science & Technology Policy—About OSTP, http://www.ostp.gov/cs/ 
about_ostp (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).  
161  See Frank Press, Science and Technology in the White House, 1977 to 1980: Part 1, 
211 SCIENCE 139, 142 (1980). 
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been on the decline since the exponential growth of government 
research funds in the 1950s.162 
In 1980 Congress passed the Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act163 which promoted the patenting and licensing of 
federal laboratory research and development.  Like later 
technology transfer offices set up in universities in response to 
Bayh-Dole, Stevenson-Wydler required that federal labs set up 
Offices of Research and Technology Applications and set aside a 
portion of their funding for the explicit goal of transferring 
technology to the private sector.164  
The act also established the National Medal of Technology,165 
an honor “given annually to individuals, teams, and/or 
companies/divisions for their outstanding contributions to the 
Nation’s economic, environmental and social well-being through 
the development and commercialization of technology products, 
processes and concepts, technological innovation, and 
development of the Nation’s technological manpower.”166  “By 
highlighting the national importance of technological innovation, 
the Medal also seeks to inspire future generations of Americans to 
prepare for and pursue technical careers to keep America at the 
forefront of global technology and economic leadership.”167 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986168 allowed universities that had 
financed the construction of their facilities with tax exempt bonds 
to conduct industry-sponsored research in those facilities without 
162  See generally Richard C. Atkinson & William A. Blanpied, Research Universities: 
Core of the US Science and Technology System, 30 TECH. IN SOC’Y 30 (2008). 
163  Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 
2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–14) (“[T]he Federal Government shall 
strive where appropriate to transfer federally owned or originated technology to State and 
local governments and to the private sector.”). 
164  15 U.S.C. § 3719 (2006). 
165  Id. § 3711.  Note, however, that the first medal was not awarded until 1985. See U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office—The National Medal of Technology and Innovation, 
http://www.uspto.gov/nmti (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).  
166  National Medal of Technology and Innovation Nomination Application, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 57337 (Oct. 2, 2008).  
167  U.S. Patent & Trademark Office—The National Medal of Technology and 
Innovation, http://www.uspto.gov/nmti (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
168  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.   
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losing their tax exempt status.169  In order to retain this status, the 
resulting research had to fall within one of two safe harbors for 
basic research activities;170 either a corporate-sponsored research 
agreement—which required that the sponsor pay a fair market 
price for the intellectual property rights in the resulting research, or 
a joint industry governmental cooperative research agreement—
which  required that the “[t]itle to any patent or other product 
incidentally resulting from the basic research lies exclusively with 
the university and that the cooperating corporations would be 
entitled to no more than a nonexclusive, royalty-free license to use 
the product of any of that research.”171  
The Orphan Drug Act,172 with a particular focus on rare 
diseases, passed in 1983.   This act was designed to provide 
incentives for drug companies to invest in research and 
development,173 focusing primarily on classes of unprofitable 
169  IRS Rev. Proc. 97-14, 1997-5 I.R.B. 20 (IRB 1997).  This was superseded only 
recently on June 26, 2007 by Revenue Procedure 2007-47 that clarifies exactly how 
Bayh-Dole rights fit within the safe harbor parameters.  See, e.g., Mintz-Levin, Public 
Finance Advisory: IRS Clarifies Sponsored Research Limitations, July 13, 2007, 
http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2007/Pub-Fin-Adv-Sponsored-Research-07-
07/index.htm. 
170  Mintz-Levin, Public Finance Advisory: IRS Clarifies Sponsored Research 
Limitations, July 13, 2007, http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2007/Pub-Fin-Adv-
Sponsored-Research-07-07/index.htm. 
171  Id.  
172  Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (defining “rare” as any 
disease or condition which (A) affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States, or 
(B) affects more than 200,000 in the United States and for which there is no reasonable 
expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the United States a drug 
for such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of such 
drug). 
173  Orphan Drug Act, § 1(b)(4)–(6), 96 Stat. at 2049.  
[B]ecause so few individuals are affected by any one rare disease or 
condition, a pharmaceutical company which develops an orphan drug 
may reasonably expect the drug to generate relatively small sales in 
comparison to the cost of developing the drug and consequently to 
incur a financial loss; . . .  [Thus] there is reason to believe that some 
promising orphan drugs will not be developed unless changes are 
made in the applicable Federal laws to reduce the costs of developing 
such drugs and to provide financial incentives to develop such drugs . 
. . [and] it is in the public interest to provide such changes and 
incentives for the development of orphan drugs. 
Id.    
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drugs.174  The Act has helped build biotechnological science, 
create large and small pharmaceutical firms, and promote the type 
of research that might be conducted in an academic setting—
research on  niche diseases with little prospect of financial 
payback.175 
 The Federal Technology Transfer Act176 was enacted in 
1986 to amend Stevenson Wydler.  This act attempted to 
institutionalize technology transfer in government laboratories by, 
among other things, making technology transfer a component of 
employee evaluation.  To further promote technology transfer, the 
Act chartered the Federal Laboratory Consortium (or “FLC”) to 
actively “promote and strengthen technology transfer 
nationwide.”177 
 Other legislation contributing to the technological boom 
include: the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 
1982,178 Cooperative Research Act of 1984,179 Trademark 
Clarification Act of 1984,180 Japanese Technical Literature Act of 
174  By most accounts the Orphan Drug Act has been a success. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ee 
note (a)(5) (2006) (“Before 1983, some 38 orphan drugs had been developed.  Since the 
enactment of the Orphan Drug Act [Jan. 4, 1983], more than 220 new orphan drugs have 
been approved and marketed in the United States and more than 800 additional drugs are 
in the research pipeline.”).  
175  See, e.g., Steve Seget, Orphans Join European Pharma Family, PHARMAFOCUS.COM, 
July 5, 2005, http://www.pharmafocus.com/cda/focusH/1,2109,22-0-0-JUL_2005-
focus_feature_detail-0-353040,00.html (“Orphan drug legislation in the US is often cited 
as a major factor in the biotech boom of the 1980s.”); see also Beverly Goodman, The 
Biotech Boom: Big Money in Orphans, RED HERRING, July 27, 2001, 
http://www.redherring.com/Home/1396. 
176  Federal Technology Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (1986).  
177  Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer, 
http://www.federallabs.org/home/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).  Over 250 federal 
laboratories and centers and their parent departments and agencies are members of the 
FLC. See id. 
178  Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006) (“It is 
the policy of the Congress that assistance be given to small-business concerns to enable 
them to undertake and to obtain the benefits of research and development in order to 
maintain and strengthen the competitive free enterprise system and the national 
economy.”).  
179  Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 69 (2006) (establishing that 
cooperative research is not a per se antitrust violation).  
180  Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (2006) (amending the 
Lanham Trademark Act). 
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1986,181 the Executive Order Facilitating Access to Science and 
Technology,182 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988.183 
III. EFFECTS OF A CULTURAL SHIFT TOWARDS TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER 
A. Revisiting the Technology Transfer Office 
While the previous section noted numerous other forces at 
work that drove universities to their current patent culture and 
helped to promote the current U.S. technology industry successes, 
the significant consequence of the Bayh-Dole Act arguably has 
been primarily the expansion of technology transfer offices into 
hundreds of universities.184  The Association of University 
181  Japanese Technical Literature Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 3704 (2006); see Ronald 
Reagan, Statement on Signing the Japanese Technical Literature Act of 1986 (Aug. 14. 
1986), http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/081486f.htm (explaining 
that the Act will “increase the availability in the United States of scientific and technical 
literature published in the Japanese language”).  
182  Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987) (promoting 
technology transfer by establishing the Technology Share Program whereby “scientists 
and engineers in the private sector may take temporary assignments in Federal 
laboratories, and scientists and engineers in Federal laboratories may take temporary 
assignments in the private sector”).  
183  Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107.  
184  See, e.g., National Institutes of Health: Moving Research from the Bench to Bedside: 
Health Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Health of the H.Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 60 
(2003) (statement  of Jonathan Soderstrom, Managing Director, Office of Cooperative 
Research, Yale University, noting that Yale set up its licensing office as a direct response 
to Bayh-Dole); see also COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 67 (“With 
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, colleges and universities immediately began to 
develop and strengthen the internal expertise needed to effectively engage in the 
patenting and licensing of inventions.  In many cases, institutions that had not been active 
in this area began to establish entirely new technology transfer offices, building teams 
with legal, business, and scientific backgrounds.  These activities continue to accelerate 
nationally as the importance of the Bayh-Dole Act becomes fully appreciated.”). But see 
Sampat & Nelson, supra note 74, at 20 (noting that the inability of the Research 
Corporation to handle all of the licenses may have been an impetus to set up technology 
transfer offices and citing a 1974 Research Corporation report that found that every major 
institution was considering setting up a technology transfer office); id. at 20, 31 (noting 
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Technology Managers (or “AUTM”) lists over 700 university and 
research institute technology transfer offices in the United 
States.185 
During the last decade (between 1990 and 2000), invention 
disclosures to these technology transfer offices have increased by 
79%, patent applications by 253%,186 patents granted by 131%, 
and start-up companies evolving out of university research by 
92%.  
While many of these offices share similar goals and 
responsibilities,187 differences remain regarding the extent of their 
involvement in non-licensing related activities.188  In general, the 
offices are responsible for patenting university-created inventions, 
licensing faculty innovation, and helping faculty license in outside 
technology.  Many offices work with faculty to identify, evaluate, 
and determine commercial potential for patentable faculty 
inventions.  The offices also work to promote a patent-friendly 
culture among the faculty, foster contractual and business 
relationships between faculty and industry, and mediate complex 
negotiations between faculty, other academic institutions, and 
industry.   
that only 20 technology transfer offices were set up by 1980 and Bayh-Dole induced the 
proliferation of technology transfer offices).  
185  Association of University Technology Managers—Technology Transfer Offices, 
http://www.autm.net/directory/search_org_results.cfm?searchby=all (last visited Nov. 6, 
2008). 
186  Academics with industry support are more likely to apply for a patent.  In 1980, 240 
Patents were granted to universities—by 2004, the annual number had reached 3800. See 
ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004, at 2 (2004). 
187  In general, there are four types of TTO’s nationwide: (1) Centralized Licensing 
Offices: MIT’s technology transfer office is a centralized unit that coordinates all 
technology transfer activities university-wide; (2) Decentralized Licensing Offices: John 
Hopkins has three different offices for technology transfer—one for the medical school, 
one for the Applied Physics Laboratory and one for the rest of the university; (3) 
Foundations: The University of Wisconsin has a separate and independent foundation 
(WARF) that was specifically set up to handle all activities related to technology transfer; 
and (4) Contractors: Research Corporation Technologies Inc. has handled technology 
transfer activities for many universities. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAHY-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH 
UNIVERSITIES, GAO/RCED 98–126 (May 7, 1998). 
188  For example, while many offices handle material transfer agreements between 
researchers and outside entities, the University of California does not.  
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Some offices are also involved in creating start-up firms based 
on faculty innovation, educating the faculty regarding intellectual 
property (IP) and licensing issues, and holding regular seminars to 
discuss IP issues with faculty.  Outside of a university’s general 
counsel, the officers of the technology transfer offices are possibly 
the only attorneys that most academic scientists regularly interact 
with.189 
Unfortunately, “[a]cademic researchers and the technology 
transfer office at their universities have had a prickly relationship . 
. . .”190  Not only do the two professions deal with two very 
different subject matters very differently, scientists and technology 
transfer officers—and particularly those with legal training—also 
think differently, in vastly different time frames, and with different 
goals in mind.  For example, scientists, in their drive towards 
progressive approximations of the truth, unhurriedly seek out and 
attempt to solve universal problems.  Time is on the side of 
scientists, and they can afford to wait for the best answer.  
Meanwhile, in the short term, scientists are often satisfied with 
unknowns, unsolvables, and impossibles.  In contrast, even with 
the tacit acknowledgement that many complex issues cannot 
themselves be resolved, lawyers attempt to, nevertheless, resolve 
the questions brought before them now, not in some specified or 
indeterminate future.191  Having technology transfer offices and 
scientists working together on the same project with—often 
unstated but typically implicit—different processes, goals and 
timelines, can be somewhat harrowing for both the technology 
transfer professional and the scientist.192 
189  See, for example, varied documents on technology transfer websites outlining their 
missions and goals, including Yale University Office of Cooperative Research, 
http://yale.edu/ocr (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) and University of California Technology 
Transfer, http://www.ucop.edu/ott (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
190  Editorial, More than Money; Technology Transfer Offices are Learning from Their 
Mistakes, 440 NATURE 845, 845 (2006). 
191  While “no generalization is wholly true—not even this one,” scientists, unlike 
lawyers, tend to think in the long term. See THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 368 (Fred R. 
Shapiro ed., Yale University Press 2006) (attributing quote to Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr.). 
192  Typical comments include these by Chris Johnson, a computer science professor at 
the University of Utah:  
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Notwithstanding this Article’s aversion to the technology 
transfer office in its current form, there remains substantial 
sympathy for the plight of the technology transfer officers.  The 
job of a technology transfer officer is not easy.  Patent prosecution, 
maintaining patent portfolios, and licensing are non-trivial, often 
complex, tasks, and these responsibilities frequently stress the 
systems that are often not designed or funded to carry anything 
approaching such loads or expenses.193  Additionally, Bayh-Dole 
imposes considerable regulatory requirements and restrictions that 
require technology transfer officers to constantly coax and 
convince uncooperative and uninterested faculty members to 
complete invention disclosures for their discoveries.194  It’s not 
The tech transfer office saw inventions as a way to augment the 
shrinking university budget and [was] overly aggressive in trying to 
make money,” says Johnson.  “For us, the better research opportunity 
was to make it open-source, but they didn’t want to do that.  It was all 
very frustrating.  My philosophy was that, yes, I could make money, 
but I wanted to do it in a way that benefited more than just me, but 
also my research and my lab, and allow the software to get into real-
world situations.  Money wasn’t the primary motivation.  The whole 
process was so onerous. Since then, in the last year or so, the tech 
transfer office has been completely reformulated.  Thankfully. 
Ed Silverman, The Trouble with Tech Transfer: Fighting Tech Transfer—and Winning, 
21 SCIENTIST 40, 43 (2007); see also O. Prem Das, Building Relationships with 
Technology Transfer Officers, BIOENTREPRENEUR, May 23, 2005, available at 
http://www.nature.com/bioent/2005/050501/full/bioent861.html (noting how effective 
technology transfer is enhanced by a strong relationship between technology transfer 
personnel and the researcher). 
193  For example, in 2004, most technology transfer offices had less than five full time 
employees and spent at least 250 thousand dollars on legal fees, with six institutions 
spending at least four million dollars. See AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004, 
supra note 186, at 24. 
194  The Bayh-Dole Act requires universities to set patent policies that encourage 
patenting and inventing.  Other Bayh-Dole obligations include: (i) the filing of a patent 
on any inventions that the university wishes to claim; (ii) written agreements signed by 
the faculty that acknowledges that faculty must disclose all inventions and assign 
ownership to the institution; and (iii) technology transfer offices must use any excess 
revenue from royalties and fees to support research. See, e.g., Implementation of 
Proposition 71: Options for Handling Intellectual Property Associated with Stem Cell 
Research Grants, at the J. Informational Hearing of the S. Health Comm. Subcomm. on 
Stem Cell Research Oversight Assemb. Health and Assemb. Judiciary Comms. (Cal. 
2005), available at http://www.senate.ca.gov/ftp/SEN/COMMITTEE/STANDING/ 
HEALTH/_home/PROP_71_IP_BENNETT.doc (testimony of Alan Bennett, Associate 
Vice Chancellor for Research, UC Davis). 
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hard to understand why interactions with technology transfer 
offices by faculty are often strained and seen in a negative light by 
both sides.195   
Not only do academics feel harassed by technology transfer 
officers, but technology transfer offices are criticized by academics 
for not doing enough to commercialize their inventions.  Some 
faculty members feel that their inventions are ignored or 
undervalued by the technology transfer office and take up valuable 
time insisting that their disclosures be transformed into 
applications and licensed at unreasonable fees.196 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding this empathy for the technology 
transfer offices, the implementation of patent and licensing policies 
by these technology transfer offices is seen by many as the source 
of many of the negative consequences of Bayh-Dole.197 
1. The Technology Transfer Office’s Effect on Research 
While only a small minority of these offices is actually 
profitable,198 their near-ubiquity in universities continues—
possibly because of alumni pressure, the administration, or 
195  See generally Jason Owen-Smith & Walter Powell, To Patent or Note: Faculty 
Decisions and Institutional Success at Technology Transfer, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 99 
(2001) (noting that faculty dissatisfaction with technology transfer offices translates into 
independent faculty startups—which are increasing in frequency—indicating a growing 
unhappiness with the technology transfer offices and, further, that because many 
technology transfer offices are overworked, they delay applications, miss deadlines and 
drag on license negotiations, all creating  uneasiness between  faculty and technology 
transfer professionals). 
196  See, e.g., Silverman, supra  note 192, at 40 (“[T]he TTO failed to recognize the 
potential value, balked at the cost of filing a patent application, and didn’t pursue any 
leads, which ended up scuttling a chance to cut a licensing deal with a company.” 
(quoting a genetics researcher at UCLA)). 
197  Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 31, at 320 (“Many of the issues that are identified 
today as negative consequences of Bayh-Dole can be traced to the institutional policies . . 
. rather than to the Act itself.”). Contra Sheila Kirschenbaum, Patenting Basic Research 
Myths and Realities, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1025, 1026 (2002) (noting that technology 
transfer offices are invaluable for advancing research objectives and patenting). 
198  Returns on academic research hover around an average of 5%, at most 10%, for the 
most profitable institutions.  It is unlikely that licensing can adequately subsidize new 
research. See, e.g., Gregory K. Sobolski, John H. Barton & Ezekial J. Emanuel, 
Technology Licensing; Lessons from the US Experience, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3137 
(2005). 
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regional politician’s expectation that the office will find, patent, 
and license the next big thing.199  But, while some licenses may be 
a boon for universities and some academic inventors, the majority 
of income derived from licensing of academic innovation 
nationwide comes out of a handful of licensing offices, most of 
which predated Bayh-Dole, and even those take relatively little 
revenue home relative to the costs necessary to generate those 
innovations.200  Further, those offices that are profitable typically 
rely on one or two innovations to maintain that profitability. 
 More often than not, technology transfer offices drain 
university resources, promising the sky but delivering little.  
Further, they drain the resources and time of the researchers who 
must cooperate with the TTOs to draft and license patents.  With 
their monopolistic hold on all licensing efforts in the university, 
technology transfer offices may also inhibit many entrepreneurial 
efforts by the researchers themselves—stunting the growth of a 
patent-friendly environment in academia and hampering 
independent academia-industry collaborations.  Finally, with their 
indiscriminate and invariably slow efforts to license any potential 
research innovation, they create a bottleneck in the dissemination 
of academic science and innovation.  Further, technology transfer 
offices, through their common practice of publishing all possible 
provisional patent applications, as promoted by the Bayh-Dole 
199  See, e.g., id. at 3139 (“[T]he chance to generate significant revenue, however slight 
tends to create a distorted perception . . . .”); see also Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the 
Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 
ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 464 (2004); Kristen Osenga, Closing In On Open Science: Trends In 
Intellectual Property & Scientific Research: Rembrandts In The Research Lab: Why 
Universities Should Take A Lesson From Big Business To Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. 
REV. 407, 418 (2007); The Lemelson-MIT Intel Prop. Workshop, How Does Intellectual 
Property Support the Creative Process of Invention? 10, http://web.mit.edu/INVENT/n-
pressrelease/downloads/ip.pdf (Rochelle Dreyfuss notes that technology transfer has 
become the “new football”). 
200  See Leaf, supra note 96; see also Wayne C. Johnson, Changing Interfaces Between 
the Research University and Industry, Presentation at the 2005 Engingeering Research 
Council Workshop and Forum (Feb. 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.asee.org/asee/conferences/erc/2005/upload/wayne-c-johnson.pdf (“Of 3200 
universities, perhaps 6 have made significant amounts of money from their intellectual 
property rights.  IP rights should be pursued as a means for interaction with industry 
rather than as a means for raising revenue from commercialization.”(quoting John C. 
Hurt of the National Science Foundation)). 
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legislation,201 waste university funds and researchers’ time in 
drafting patents that may never get anywhere, or languish in the 
TTO as the office works feverishly to promote those developments 
that seem to be the most profitable.   
 While individually small, the combined interruptions caused 
by technology transfer officers on individual labs quickly adds up, 
taking away precious time and resources from research.202  
Further, many common practices in technology transfer offices 
serve to limit outside access to the underlying scientific data, often 
for an extra yea 203
 Few successful technology transfer offices win the 
metaphorical technology transfer lottery: successfully licensing 
one or, rarely, two blockbuster innovations.204  The obsession with 
winning the technology transfer lottery is somewhat contagious, 
and technology transfer offices note that some faculty also become 
too invention-focused,  demanding that every invention disclosure 
end up as a high profile licensed patent.205 
 With the growing realization that they are often a drain on 
tight university resources, the technology transfer offices are 
perversely incentivized to aggressively ramp-up their search for the 
next big thing in an effort to show their worthiness to the 
university administration.  Recent scholarship from the Kauffman 
201  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1) (2006) (disposition of rights). 
202  See, e.g., Leaf, supra note 96; see also Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and 
Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 228 
(2006) (“Encroachment of traditional sharing norms now often comes from university 
intellectual property policies codified in faculty handbooks and in the instructions of TTO 
personnel . . . .”). 
203  See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 202, at 248 (noting that in fiscal year 2004, 75% of the 
applications filed by universities, hospitals and institutes were provisional). 
204  “Most universities have not earned much money from royalties; the odds of making 
anything substantial from patenting a new discovery are extremely small.  Still, the 
extraordinary success of a few patents and the many millions of dollars in royalties 
earned each year by a small minority of schools are enough to keep scores of institutions 
scouring their labs for commercially valuable innovations.” DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN 
THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 77 (2003). 
205  See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, Wash. Univ., Opening the Bottleneck: Statutory and 
Regulatory Reforms for Tech Transfer, Presentation at the DePaul University College of 
Law Center for Intellectual Property Law and Information Technology, 2004 Intellctual 
Property Scholars Conference (Oct. 2004). 
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Foundation highlights these issues, finding that the current 
system’s “home run” mentality works to inhibit rather than 
promote commercialization of scientific and technological 
research.206  This attitude produces a monopolistic approach to 
revenue maximization and places that ideal ahead of potentially 
greater social goods related to university output maximization. 
 Although acknowledging that the probability of licensing 
that next blockbuster patent is slim, nevertheless, given that the 
potential payoffs can be in the hundreds of millions of dollars, the 
technology transfer office and its home university can still 
rationally choose to chase every potential patent.  In order to 
overcome this drive, the alternative opportunity has to be 
substitutable—equally valued in the eyes of the university.207  
2. Material Transfer Agreements 
Another overburdening document to come out of the 
technology transfer office explosion is the relatively recent 
phenomenon of material transfer agreements.  These may arguably 
have directly resulted from, or at least have been facilitated by, the 
introduction of technology transfer offices.208 
 Simplistically, material transfer agreements (or “MTAs”) are 
contracts delineating the terms of use for a shared resource, most 
often concerning the transfer of material (typically biological) 
and/or data, principally for research purposes.  Material transfer 
agreements exist between inter-industry collaborations, university-
university collaborations, and in industry-university collaborative 
206  See generally Robert E. Litan, Lesa Mitchell & E.J. Reedy, Commercializing 
University Innovations: Alternative Approaches, 8 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 31, 31 
(2007); see also Intellectual Property: Universities, Corporations and Finding a 
Common Ground 1, 9 (Am. Soc. for Eng’g Educ., White Paper, 2006), available at 
http://www.asee.org/activities/organizations/councils/edc/2006-IP-White-
Paper/IPWhitePaper-WEB.doc (“MIT’s Preston agrees that too many tech transfer offices 
are overly preoccupied with elusive licensing revenues.”). 
207  Although, note that such calculations would not take into account the expected 
utility to society resulting from the patenting of each and every innovation. 
208  See Wendy D. Streitz & Alan B. Bennett, Material Transfer Agreements: A 
University Perspective, 133 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 10, 11 (2003) (noting that the UC system 
executed 2000 MTAs in 2002 and that MTAs can have a significant impact on careers of 
student scientists, limiting their ability to publish). 
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efforts.  Many in academia find the agreements to be burdensome 
and tedious at best.   
  MTAs are also particularly useful at restricting access to 
patented technologies that could not be restricted without 
potentially being held liable for patent misuse.209   Without the 
MTAs, patented technology might still be accessible to researchers 
who are enabled by the patent or subsequent publications.  MTAs 
may potentially also be considered prior art and invalidate any 
subsequent resulting patents.210 
 “Even researchers who routinely accept such conditions . . . 
bemoan the tangled web that MTAs have become. . . .  [I]t’s ‘a 
horrendous problem’ . . . .”211  They generally dissuade 
cooperation with future collaborators that do not want to be 
hampered by third party contracts.  MTAs can also hamper follow-
on innovation by allowing the contracting parties to assert 
ownership over the subsequent innovations resulting from the 
original material transferred.  With limited rights in any subsequent 
innovations, researchers may be dissuaded from conducting 
productive research.  Unfortunately, a large majority of published 
research will require access to physical materials from the patent 
holder, the transfer of which will trigger an MTA resulting in 
restriction of use of the technology. 
  One of the main goals of an MTA is to outline the rights of 
the provider and the users with regard to the materials, themselves, 
and any derivative data or materials derived from experiments with 
the initial material.  Limitations on material and data typically 
involve issues of confidentiality, publication embargoes, and 
limitations on the type of research that can be conducted.  In 
extreme cases MTAs may even demand reach-through intellectual 
property rights.212  Reach-through rights guarantee either that the 
209  Patent misuse refers to an impermissible attempt to expand either the scope of the 
patent or to exact monopoly protections beyond its temporal scope. See Mallinckrodt, 
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  Patent misuse will often 
parallel the anticompetitive goals of antitrust law. See, e.g., id. at 708. 
210  See generally Victor Rodriguez, Material Transfer Agreements: Open Science vs. 
Proprietary Claims, 23 NATURE BIOTECH. 489 (2005). 
211  Elliot Marshal, Need a Reagent? Just Sign Here, 278 SCIENCE 212, 212 (1997). 
212  “At the same time that the numbers of MTAs are increasing, so is their complexity, 
with restrictions and obligations potentially reaching far beyond the material itself, to 
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provider of the material is granted an automatic license to use any 
discoveries arising out of her material, or that the owner of the 
material gets royalty payments for any revenue brought in by 
discoveries made with the material.  These agreements go against 
many of the basic customs of science, and apply to material that 
would have, in the past, been shared freely and without much 
inhibition.  MTAs also tend to require complex legal and time-
consuming negotiations.  
Given the contractual (and non-IP) nature of MTAs, they often 
dispense with the fair use and whatever research exceptions are 
available under patent and copyright law: fair uses may be 
contractually overridden, and the future attempts to reinvigorate 
the research exemption in patents,213 or other flexibilities directed 
at academic research, will be moot if academic institutions and 
corporations contract around them anyway with their MTAs.214 
 Efforts by the National Institutes of Health, and the 
introduction of the Uniform Biological Material Transfer 
Agreement (or “UBMTA”), have attempted to simplify and 
harmonize the MTA process through creating a straightforward 
and streamlined MTA to be used by all academic institutions.215  
Nevertheless, in spite of the original interest in UBMTAs, many 
technology transfer offices do not use them at all or use them only 
as starting, alterable templates.216  But, even when they are used as 
data or inventions made using the material and to derivative materials.  Because MTAs 
are contractual agreements between two parties, they typically do not have the 
geographic or temporal limitations of patented technologies and can, consequently, be 
much farther reaching than the scope of patent rights.” Streitz & Bennett, supra note 208, 
at 11. 
213  See, e.g., Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 31, at 321; Kenneth Neil Cukier, 
Navigating the Future(s) of Biotech Intellectual Property, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 249, 251 
(2006); Paulette Walker Campbell, Pacts Between Universities and Companies Worry 
Federal Officials; Research Agencies Fear that the Restrictions in Some Agreements May 
Impede Scientific Progress, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 15, 1998, at A37. 
214  See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 202, at 273–74 (calling for extended grace periods for 
scientific researchers). 
215  See Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement: Discussion of Public 
Comments Received; Publication of the Final Format of the Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 
12,771 (Mar. 8, 1995). 
216  See, e.g., Arti Rai & Rebecca Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole reform and 
the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 305–06 (2003); see also 
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initially intended, UBMTAs present some of the same problems to 
academic research.217  They still allow for the delay of 
publications, are often customized through time-consuming 
negotiation, are still perceived to be too complex, limit the use of 
materials, sometimes create overburdening confidentiality 
requirements, and are an additional step that must be completed in 
order to conduct scientific research.218   
 Without a local technology transfer office to facilitate and 
negotiate MTAs, one could expect them to become too 
burdensome for even the owner of the MTA and eventually a more 
simplistic academic model may arise. 
3. Joint Research Agreements 
 Joint Research Agreements are another outgrowth of the 
legal and business environment created by technology transfer 
offices and can, like MTAs, pose a substantial roadblock to 
scientific innovation.  Joint research agreements (or “JRAs”) have 
become more important subsequent to the passing of the 
Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act 
(“CREATE”),219 another effort by Congress to promote industry-
academia interactions.220  
Megan Ristau Baca, Barriers To Innovation: Intellectual Property Transaction Costs In 
Scientific Collaboration, 4 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶¶ 28–29 (2006).                                                                                                    
217  The growing concern over MTAs and their effect on research is growing as 
indicated by AUTM’s creation of an interest group on MTAs in 2003. See Rodriguez, 
supra note 210, at 489. 
218  Recent results suggest that MTAs may cause significant friction in the transfer of 
materials and information, even between academic scientists. See JOHN P. WALSH, 
CHARLENE CHO & WESLEY M. COHEN, PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO 
RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH (Sept. 20, 2005), available at 
http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=776&cf=8 (noting that while 
patenting did not have a major effect on research projects, MTAs, which made up 40% of 
all research transfers, do pose threats to researchers).  
219  35 U.S.C § 103(c) (2006). 
220  See Bagley, supra note 202, at 237. 
This bill makes a narrow but important change in our patent laws to 
ensure that the American public will benefit from the results of 
collaborative research efforts that combine the erudition of great 
public universities with the entrepreneurial savvy of private 
enterprises. . . . [W]e must encourage—not discourage—public 
institutions and private entrepreneurs to combine their respective 
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 The Federal Circuit in Kimberly-Clark,221 following 
precedent set by its predecessor court in In re Clemens222 and In re 
Bass,223 ruled that a strict interpretation of the obviousness 
standard in 35 U.S.C. § 103 would include secret prior art—i.e., 
prior art that is not yet publicly known or available—as a type of 
prior art that could invalidate a patent for obviousness.224  
Importantly for cooperating researchers, this even included 
instances where that secret prior art was only discussed among 
research collaborators.   
 Realizing that this might chill communication between 
collaborators during the inventive process, Congress amended the 
Patent Act in 1984 to, among other things, create a safe harbor for 
some forms of secret prior art by excluding materials that were 
passed among collaborators and co-inventors, excluding these from 
the definition of invalidating prior art.225  “New technology often 
is developed by using background scientific or technical 
information known within an organization but unknown to the 
public.  The bill, by disqualifying such background information 
from prior art, will encourage communication among members of 
talents in joint research efforts.  Indeed Congress committed itself to 
this principle when it passed the Bayh-Dole Amendments to the 
Patent Act.  
Id. (quoting Senator Orin Hatch during his introduction of the CREATE Act). 
221  Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
222  In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
223  In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
224  Kimberly-Clark, 745 F.2d 1437, 1444–46.  The patent law requires that the 
invention not be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the 
invention’s conception in light of the teaching of the prior art. See 2-5 CHISUM ON 
PATENTS § 5.01 (“The general purpose behind the requirement of nonobviousness . . . 
serves to limit patent monopolies to those innovations that in fact serve to advance the 
state of the useful arts.  New problems arise and call for new solutions.  A patent 
monopoly may issue only for those literally new solutions that are beyond the grasp of 
the ordinary artisan who had a full understanding of the pertinent prior art.”). 
225  Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383, § 103 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103) (“Subject matter developed by another person, 
which qualifies as prior art only under subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 of this title, 
shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and the 
claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person 
or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.”). 
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 results of “team research.”  
 
research teams, and patenting, and consequently public 
dissemination, of the 226
 Nevertheless, despite Congressional efforts, the law 
remained unclear on the issue of collaborators from different 
organizations, i.e., collaborators in different universities,227 and, in 
1997, was narrowly construed by the Federal Circuit in OddzOn 
Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.228 to be limited to instances 
wherein the collaborators were actually both in the same 
organization.229  The OddzOn ruling created the potential for a 
substantial chilling effect for open discussion among collaborators, 
particularly the many public-private research and development 
collaborations.  Apportionment of patents rights between 
collaborators would not get around the problem of invalidating 
secret prior art because federal granting agencies required that the 
granted university retain sole ownership of the invention, only 
licensing the rights to the private-sector research partners.230 
 The CREATE act was designed to overrule this narrow 
interpretation of §103 in an effort to promote greater collaboration 
among researchers in different organizations: “Congress intends to 
extend this exemption [from the 1984 Patent Law Amendments] to 
‘joint research agreement’ inventors, who may represent more than 
one organization . . . .”231 
226  Legislative History of the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Section-By-Section 
Analysis of H.R. 6286, Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 130 Cong. Rec. H10525–
529 (Oct. 1, 1984) (inserted by Representative Kastenmier, chairman of the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary), 
available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Legislative_History1984.pdf. 
227  But see, e.g., Patent Law and Non-Profit Research Collaboration: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property and the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Ph.D., Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation and the Council on Government Relations) (“The 
legislative history of the 1984 amendment clearly establishes that subsection 103(c) was 
[designed to help encourage teamwork at least] within organizations”).  Given the text of 
subsection 103(c) and its legislative history, it is clear that the enactment of subsection 
103(c) sought to encourage teamwork among researchers, rather than stifle team 
research. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006).   
228    Oddzon Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396(Fed. Cir. 1997).  
229  Id. at 1403 (ruling that private and confidential material between collaborators at 
different institutions may be seen as prior art for finding obviousness). 
230  See H.R. Rep. No. 108-425 (2004). 
231  Id. at 6. 
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(c)(1) Subject matter developed by another person, 
which qualifies as prior art only under one or more 
of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this 
title [35 U.S.C. § 102], shall not preclude 
patentability under this section where the subject 
matter and the claimed invention were, at the time 
the claimed invention was made, owned by the 
same person or subject to an obligation of 
assignment to the same person. 
(2) For purposes of this subsection, subject matter 
developed by another person and a claimed 
invention shall be deemed to have been owned by 
the same person or subject to an obligation of 
assignment to the same person if— 
      (A) the claimed invention was made by or on 
behalf of parties to a joint research agreement that 
was in effect on or before the date the claimed 
invention was made; 
      (B) the claimed invention was made as a result 
of activities undertaken within the scope of the joint 
research agreement; and 
      (C) the application for patent for the claimed 
invention discloses or is amended to disclose the 
names of the parties to the joint research agreement. 
   (3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the term “joint 
research agreement” means a written contract, 
grant, or cooperative agreement entered into by two 
Oddzon represents a significant potential threat to inventors who 
engage in collaborative research and development projects.  Put 
another way, the decision created a situation where an otherwise 
patentable invention may be rendered nonpatentable on the basis of 
confidential information routinely exchanged between research 
partners.  Thus, parties who enter into a clearly defined and 
structured research relationship, but who do not (or cannot) elect to 
define a common ownership interest in or a common assignment of 
inventions jointly developed, can unwittingly create an obstacle to 
patent protection by simply exchanging secret information among 
themselves. 
Id. at 5. 
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or more persons or entities for the performance of 
experimental, developmental, or research work in 
the field of the claimed invention.232 
 Although CREATE intended to promote further 
collaboration among public and private institutions, it has the 
dubious distinction of incorporating further bureaucracy and 
uncertainty into the commodification process.  It forces putative 
collaborators to first carefully structure a written collaboration 
agreement—i.e., a joint research agreement—prior to sharing 
information and their current research—effectively requiring 
scientific collaborations to initially practice at arm’s length and, 
through their technology transfer personnel, increasing the initial 
costs of beginning a collaboration.  These JRAs cannot be written 
off the cuff; they need to be written broad enough such that the 
resulting product, and eventual field of research fall within the 
scope of the JRA.  “The Act thus places a premium on well 
documented collaborative research activities.”233  Often they are 
written following substantial time-consuming negotiations between 
academics and their technology transfer offices. 
 Further, the legislative history suggests that in order to claim 
the safe harbor exemption of the CREATE act, the relevant parties 
need to be publicly disclosed—which may further chill public-
private collaborative research that benefits from anonymity.  
 Some have suggested that the increased usage of JRAs will 
also result in more IP litigation focused on infringing academics.  
JRAs create joint responsibilities and interests in the intellectual 
property.  These interests are protected by all the partners in the 
JRA—unifying their resources and strengthening their ability to 
target anyone they want and potentially scaring off risk-averse 
users of the technology.234  Further, there are concerns that the lag 
time resulting from the need to negotiate the agreement up front 
232  35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006). 
233  Kenneth Meyers, Joint Research Agreements and the CREATE Act 2004: IP Value 
in the Life Sciences Industries, Feb. 2006, http://www.finnegan.com/files/PDFs/ 
200812110431237535804news914.pdf. 
234  Ann E. Mills, Donna T. Chen, John Gillon, Jr. & Patti M. Tereskerz, The CREATE 
Act: Increasing Costs Associated with the Biotech Industry?, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 785, 
786 (2006). 
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prior to any potentially fruitful collaboration with another 
institution may further hamper scientific innovation. 
 Technology transfer offices are typically not staffed by 
lawyers, and, as such, some JRA experts warn technology transfer 
staff to be especially aware of the number of pitfalls and traps in 
the CREATE act.235  Like MTAs, JRAs have become more 
complicated and time-consuming because of the availability of 
technology transfer professionals.  As long as universities have 
technology transfer offices, there is little incentive for universities 
and academics to lobby to change the current state of the CREATE 
Act.   
4. General Issues in University Industry Relationships 
If nothing else, universities’ licensing offices, set up after 
Bayh-Dole in the hopes of patenting the next blockbuster drug, 
have created a mechanism for increasing and maintaining 
relationships between academia and industry236 that could 
potentially be exploited by either or both parties.  Public-private 
partnerships are considered critical elements for the future of basic 
and clinical research.237  And, public-private partnerships, while 
more difficult and subject to additional delays, often are less likely 
to abort prematurely than their homogenous counterparts.238  
235  See Nixon Peabody LLP, Technology & Intellectual Property Alert, Jan. 2005,  
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/TIPA_01282005.pdf. 
236  These relationships have been very beneficial to industry. See, e.g., David 
Blumenthal, Nancyanne Causino, Eric Campbell & Karen Louis, Relationships Between 
Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences—An Industry Survey, 334 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 368, 373 (1996) (suggesting “that research ties with academic institutions 
have demonstrable benefits for sponsors, that these benefits persist over time, that life-
science companies remain financially committed to university research, and that 
universities are well positioned to compete for industry funds”).  Note also that the U.S. 
government has a vested interest in promoting these types of relationships as indicated by 
the recent effort by Congress in legislating the CREATE act of 2004. 
237  See generally David Hill et al., Academia-Industry Collaboration: An Integral 
Element for Building “Omic” Resources, 14 GENOME RES. 2010 (2004); see also Joshua 
Newberg & Richard Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Law: Law, Values and Rules 
of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 187, 187 
(2002). 
238  Bronwyn H. Hall, Albert Link & John T. Scott, Universities as Research Partners, 
85 REV. ECON. & STATS. 485, 487 (2003). 
VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM 2/26/2009  3:47:32 AM 
370 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:311 
 
Overall estimates have shown industry supporting thousands of 
projects239 during the nineties.240 
Universities are beginning to realize that many of their industry 
relationships are now more important than ever: Science funding 
has had an unprecedented ride over the last few years, particularly 
in the United States.  Inexplicably, while other United States 
government agencies regularly get budget cuts, science funding 
has been growing at a steady clip until recently.  Total research and 
development spending for 2004 was $41.25 billion, up from $38.5 
billion in 2003,241 but this will not last forever.  Already the budget 
for government funding of biomedical science seems to be 
stagnating, barely keeping up, if at all, with inflation.242  While 
industry’s contribution to public R&D funding is still, for the most 
part, in the single digit billions,243 it may grow in the near future 
and will be particularly important, if and when the nation’s science 
budget begins to decline.244  Those institutions that have strong 
industry ties will probably benefit the most as industry’s role in 
science funding grows.245  A number of forward-looking 
technology transfer offices have actually begun to focus more on 
creating fruitful partnerships than on controlling technology 
transfer, often prioritizing one over the other during negotiations 
with industry.246 
239   Eric Campbell et al., Inside the Triple Helix: Technology Transfer and 
Commercialization in the Life Science, 23 HEALTH AFF. 64, 66 (2004). 
240  Id. (noting that it was at a cost of $1.5 billion).  
241  See AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004, supra note 186, at 24. 
242  See, e.g., J. Michael Bishop & Harold Varmus, Re-Aim Blame for NIH’s Hard 
Times, 312 SCIENCE 499, 499 (2006) (noting that NIH will have 11% less spending power 
in 2007 than it had in 2004). 
243  Industry funded research is growing but not substantially.  Industry funding towards 
academic R&D was $2.8 billion in 2004 and $2.8 billion in 2003. See AUTM U.S. 
LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004, supra note 186, at 24. 
244  But see Blumenthal et al., supra note 236, at 372 (“[A]cademic institutions may not 
be able to depend heavily on industrial support to maintain their intellectual vitality. . . . 
[A]lthough it is a substantial complement to federal support, industrial sponsorship 
remains small as compared with NIH funding.  It therefore seems unlikely that industrial 
funding could make up for any appreciable reduction in funding from the NIH.”). 
245  Although, note that “most research contracts with industry are small and short-
lived.” Id. 
246  From author’s personal conversations with technology transfer officers. 
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 There are many positive components to such interactions 
including, (i) opportunities for industry jobs for graduate students 
or postdocs, (ii) availability of high-end instrumentation that may 
be beyond the budget of an academic institution but available 
through industry contacts, (iii) new approaches and directions to 
research, and (iv) industry funding.  Unfortunately, though, many 
industry collaborations have been of short duration and with 
minimal monetary input from industry.247  
However, a focus on fostering industry-academia partnerships 
may also end up hurting science, as technology transfer offices 
may be more inclined to license to industry at favorable terms and 
conditions to industry, with less than optimal terms for researchers 
or for society. Some argue that the technology transfer offices are 
actually straining the relationship between industry and academia.  
Industry representatives recently told a subcommittee of the House 
of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, headed 
by Representative David Wu of Oregon, that technology transfer 
offices are typically overly concerned with money and are 
insensitive to the needs of industry.248 Frustrated companies told 
stories of prolonged lengthy negotiations with uncompromising 
technology transfer officers.249  As opposed to enhancing 
relationships, these offices may be hurting and hampering 
productive relationships, sending disgruntled corporate academic 
liaisons to other universities and potentially other countries in 
search of better collaborators.250 
247  See Virginia Gewin, The Technology Trap, 437 NATURE 948, 948 (2005) (noting that 
many companies are now backing away from dealing with academia and the flow of 
research dollars from industry to academia has slowed). 
248  The Bayh-Dole Act (P.L. 96-517, Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act of 
1980): The Next 25 Years: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 
Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation, 110th Cong. (2007). 
249  Id. 
250  See, e.g., Bernadette Tansey, The Building of Biotech 25 Years Later, 1980 Bayh-
Dole Act Honored as Foundation of an Industry, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 2005, available 
at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/06/21/BUG6JDBOSP1.DTL& 
hw=the+BUilding+of+biotech&sn=001&sc=1000 (“The companies that are in a position 
to actually translate academic research into useful therapies or products have trouble 
negotiating with financially strapped universities who want to recover as much money as 
they can from their scientists’ inventions.” (quoting Professor Michael Eisen)). 
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B. Effect on Science Fraud 
In addition to the possibility of enhanced relationships with 
industry, another possible positive secondary effect of technology 
transfer offices—and the growing number of industry relationships 
fostered by them—might be a reduction of fraud in academic 
science.  While many fear that the basic ethos of science is under 
attack by its corporatization, corporatization has also propelled 
science to a new level of professionalism.251  At this level of 
professionalism, fraud and misconduct are less tolerated than they 
were in the past.  Additionally, with the influx of corporate culture 
into science, formerly laissez faire scientists are considerably more 
vigilant in weeding out  fraud, particularly in the work of 
competitors.  In contrast to previous circumstances, where 
competing labs could publish similar results simultaneously and 
receive equal degrees of credit and prestige for their work, patents 
are often a winner-take-all game, and only one lab can be the 
winner.  
Historically, science was a gentleman’s pursuit.  Those who 
were independently wealthy, or had a wealthy patron, could afford 
to tinker.  This was the case even up to the Second World War 
when some of the best physics research was conducted at Alfred 
Loomis’ sprawling estate in the upscale Manhattan suburb of 
Tuxedo Park.252  With the onset of government funding, however, 
science started to become more professional.  This continued with 
greater vigor following Bayh-Dole and the advent of universal 
university technology transfer offices.   
For decades, the scientific community has been struggling to 
deal with a growing realization that misconduct in basic science 
research may be more endemic than previously thought.253  While 
251  The author’s personal experience has shown even the influx of corporate 
terminology like “action items” into science. 
252  See generally JENNET CONANT, TUXEDO PARK: A WALL STREET TYCOON AND THE 
SECRET PALACE OF SCIENCE THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF WORLD WAR II (2002). 
253  “There’s a lot to worry about.” Donald Kennedy, Research Fraud and Public 
Policy, 300 SCIENCE 393, 393 (2003) (noting that hard sciences are not the only sciences 
that suffer from fraud; in fact, often social scientists have political incentives to commit 
fraud, something that exists to a lesser degree in basic science research); see also 
Kenneth Ryan, Scientific Imagination and Integrity, 273 SCIENCE 163, 163 (1996) (“The 
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the three cardinal sins of fabrication, falsification and plagiarism254 
are committed by a relatively small number of scientists,255 studies 
have found that nearly a third of all scientists have been involved 
in some misconduct in their research over the course of their 
careers.256  Ethics courses do not seem to help.257  Neither fear of 
current research environment seems to foster cynicism about simple virtues such as 
honesty and fairness, and it clearly fosters hostility toward anyone who makes claims 
about misconduct.”); David. S. Oderberg, The Unholy Lust of Scientists: It May Be Time 
to Curtail Public Financing of Scientific Research,  S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 2006,  
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2006/01/ 
15/INGMDGMDSV1.DTL (“I venture to suggest that contemporary science is now so 
corrupted by the lust for loot and glory that nothing less than root-and-branch reform can 
save it. . . .  How could the millions thrown at scientists be anything other than a veritable 
inducement to misconduct?  When you combine it with the innumerable honors and 
awards that await the next would-be secular savior of humanity, one wonders that fraud is 
not even more common than it appears to be.”). But see Gerald Holton & Frederick 
Grinnell, Defining Misconduct, 273 SCIENCE 858, 858 (1996) (arguing against these 
accusations). 
254  See 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (2001) (“Misconduct or Misconduct in Science means 
fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those 
that are commonly accepted within the scientific community for proposing, conducting, 
or reporting research.  It does not include honest error or honest differences in 
interpretations or judgments of data.”).  The National Academy of Science suggested 
limiting misconduct to just fabrication, falsification and plagiarism. See, e.g., Charles 
Walter & Edward P. Richards, Defining Scientific Misconduct for the Benefit of Science, 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/IEEE/ieee23.htm#fn2. But see Jocelyn Kaiser, NSF Stakes a 
Position on Misconduct, 276 SCIENCE 1779, 1779 (1997) (citing the National Science 
Foundation’s ethics enforcer, Inspector-General Linda Sundro, explaining that the  
“serious deviation” clause in the definition of misconduct: “fabrication, falsification, 
plagiarism (“FFP”), or other serious deviation from accepted practices,” is the core of the 
definition).  The NSF is alone in this regard and many other science groups wanted the 
term “serious deviation” removed because many scientists found it too vague.  As a 
result, the White House interagency Committee on Fundamental Science suggested the 
term be removed. Id. 
255  See, e.g., Georg W. Kreutzberg, The Rules of Good Science, 5 EMBO REP. 330, 330 
(2004) (“When scientists hear about scientific fraud, they quickly denounce the culprits 
as not being ‘true’ scientists.  The true scientist, they argue, is only interested in unveiling 
step by step the countless enigmas of nature.  He or she labours long hours and weekends 
at a desk or in the laboratory to find the truth, not to invent it.”). But see K.J. Breen, 
Misconduct in Medical Research: Whose Responsibility?, 33 INTERNAL MED. J. 186 
(2003) (noting that these few are far from normal). 
256  See, e.g., Brian C. Martinson, Melissa S. Anderson & Raymond de Vries, Scientists 
Behaving Badly, 435 NATURE 737, 738 (2005). 
257  See, e.g., Charles E. Deutch, A Course in Research Ethics for Graduate Students, 44 
COLLEGE TEACHING (1996); see also Caroline Whitbeck, Teaching Ethics to Scientists 
and Engineers: Moral Agents and Moral Problems, 1 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 229 (1995). 
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criminal penalties,258 nor of civil suits,259 has in any way lessened 
the incidence of fraud. 
 While archaic yet noble Mertonian ideals arguably still drive 
some of the science in this country,260 it is becoming clearer, 
particularly with the significant increase in reports of fraud in 
science, that other incentives, particularly monetary, are also 
involved in driving academic science, in general, and potentially 
driving academic science to fraudulent activity.  Thus, while the 
lure of patents may drive scientists to work harder, hit more 
deadlines, and strive towards potentially lucrative results more 
efficiently than the reward of publishing alone, unfortunately the 
potential to make money in addition to publishing may push more 
scientists to fudge and cheat. 
 Patents and other imports from industry can be seen as a 
strong force against fraud in science.  The recent upsurge in 
ferreting out fraud, discussing fraud in journals, and teaching about 
misconduct in graduate programs may be part of the cultural shift 
to a more responsible corporate ideology represented by the culture 
of technology transfer offices.  Note however that this new 
zealousness in finding misconduct may unfortunately, and all too 
often, lead to unfounded accusations261—the fear of which could 
258  See, e.g., Susan Kuzma, Criminal Liability for Misconduct in Scientific Research, 25 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 357, 381 (1992); see also Bratislave Stankovic, Pulp Fiction: 
Reflections on Scientific Misconduct, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 975, 978 (2004). 
259  For example, under the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Franklin Hoke, Novel 
Application Of Federal Law To Scientific Fraud Worries Universities and Reinvigorates 
Whistleblowers, 9 SCIENTIST 1, 1 (1995); see also Keith D. Barber, David. B. Honig & 
Neal A. Cooper, Prolific Plaintiffs or Rabid Relators? Recent Developments in False 
Claims Act Litigation, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 131 (2004); Dan L. Burk, False Claims Act 
Can Hamper Science With ‘Bounty Hunter’ Lawsuits, SCIENTIST, Sept. 4, 1995, at 12. 
260  ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1973).  Mertonian Norms 
include: (1) Communalism;  (2) Universalism;  (3) Disinterestedness; (4) Originality; and 
(5) Skepticism. See Wikipedia—Robert K. Merton, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_ 
K._Merton; see also Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science, 
17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 195, 196 (1987) (noting that science does its best to at least show to 
the public that the norms are still in effect). 
261  In the United States, the Office of Research Integrity received 267 allegations of 
research misconduct in 2006.  Research misconduct was found in only 15 of the 28 cases 
that it actually closed that year. OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, 
at 5 (2007) (“Most Federal agencies win most of their cases before hearing offices in their 
own agencies.  In most cases, the batting average is over 70 or 80 percent.”); Gina 
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strain relationships with collaborators, principle investigators, 
students, and postdoctoral fellows.262 
 Still, there are many positive aspects, with regard to science 
misconduct, that have resulted from the technology transfer 
culture.  Whereas in the past fabrication of results may have helped 
a scientist get a prestigious paper published—and that was all she 
wanted, itself enough incentive to commit fraud—fraud cannot 
help one’s chance of practically applying one’s research with a 
patent, suggesting the incentives for science misconduct are 
diminished.  Moreover, while it is now clear that results are rarely 
reproduced by independent laboratories, companies licensing a 
patent will want to reproduce results.  With the possibility of more 
research licensed out to industry, there may be stronger 
countervailing forces not to cheat, than to cheat, in research.  
Additionally, the technology transfer offices’ common suggestion 
that researchers keep meticulous notebooks and records, albeit for 
patent-related reasons, can only help prevent fraudulent recording 
activity.  The licensing professional is also another set of eyes in 
her examination of the required invention disclosure and the 
documents leading up to a patent, lessening the chance that a 
fraudulent result will get past science’s gatekeepers.  
 Some issues relating to misconduct in science, however, 
may not benefit from a greater trend towards patenting and 
commercial culture—specifically, the growing issue of conflicts of 
interest among researchers, journal reviewers, grant reviewers, 
institutional review boards, and institutions.263  Nowhere is this a 
Kolata, Inquiry Lacking Due Process, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1996 at C3.  The inability to 
make the charges stick even in internal hearings may indicate an even smaller number of 
instances of true fraud than the numbers of claimed fraudulent activities indicates and 
that most claims of fraud are unfounded.  
262  See, e.g., Laura Bonetta, The Aftermath of Scientific Fraud, 124 CELL 873, 875 
(2006) (noting the data from the Office of Research Integrity (“ORI”): Of the 2700 
allegations of fraud submitted to ORI, there have been to date only 160 findings of actual 
fraud). 
263  See generally David Blumenthal, Biotech in Northeast Ohio Conference: Conflict of 
Interest in Biomedical Research, 12 HEALTH MATRIX  377 (2002). 
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greater concern than in the interactions between research labs and 
corporations.264  Others disagree completely.265 
IV. SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS WITH THIS ARTICLE—LACK OF 
EMPIRICAL DATA 
Much of this Article has been written in a speculative fashion.  
That is intentional.  In fact some of the historical information has 
been hyper-cited to draw out an important distinction: the paucity 
of empirical information with regard to some of the effects of 
Bayh-Dole and technology transfer offices on academic scientific 
research. 
There is a dearth of hard data on the effect of Bayh-Dole on 
basic research, and much of what is available is contradictory.  
While some claim that the ‘legal frenzy’ created by Bayh-Dole has 
significantly diverted scientists from doing their research,266 others 
have found no indication that the nature of academic research has 
changed.267  “It is too easy for academics and others to raise alarms 
when the bases for arguments are conjectural and understanding of 
the institutions and behaviors involved so limited.”268 
264  See, e.g., Press Release, Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology, 
FASEB Calls on the Scientific Community to Endorse Guideline for Conflicts of 
Interest—Unveils COI Toolkit (July 20, 2007), available at 
http://opa.faseb.org/pdf/July%20-%20Dec%202007/COIPressRelease.07.20.07.pdf 
(describing the recent guidelines for conflicts of interest created by the Federation of 
American Societies for Experimental Biology recently promulgated in July of 2007). 
265  See, e.g., JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY INC. (2004). 
266  See Leaf, supra note 96; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons In Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 
698 (1998). 
267  See, e.g., Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing Of DNA Patents By U.S. Academic 
Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31 (2006); Jerry Thursby & 
Marie Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052 (2003); 
see also WALSH, CHO & COHEN, supra note 218; John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley 
M. Cohen, View From The Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002 
(2005). Contra ECONOMIST, supra note 29 (“[T]here is ample evidence that scientific 
research is being delayed, deterred or abandoned due to the presence of patents and 
proprietary technologies.”); see also Ted Agres, Tying Up Science: Are Intellectual 
Property Protections Slowing Progress?, SCIENTIST, Jan. 2006, at 77.  
268  Cohen, supra note 33. 
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 Under the pervasive patent culture in universities, more 
basic science research tools are now being licensed and sold.  In a 
post-Madey269 world, where the courts have emphatically stated 
that no one, not even academics, are above the intellectual property 
laws, many corporations and universities are more willing to 
request, threaten, and/or sue to get universities to license the 
proprietary technologies they are using.270  Although academics 
are, at best, typically oblivious to intellectual property issues and 
potentially even knowing violators, risk adverse institutions that 
receive such cease-and-desist threats have, in the past, shut down 
research projects or forced labs to consider alternatives.271 
 In an attempt to determine the extent of the effect Bayh-
Dole had on the patent culture (although not the technology 
transfer office), empirical studies have tried to quantify both the 
number of threatening actions and their effect on academia.272  
University concerns about image and lawsuits have, thus far, 
impeded the collection of a sample size large enough for robust 
statistical analysis.273  Those that have provided information to 
researchers create a self-selecting sample that may understate or 
overstate the nature of  Bayh-Dole and technology transfer offices 
on research. 
 Inadequate record keeping and lack of faith in the anonymity 
of studies make university legal counsels the wrong source of 
information for an analysis on the effects on research resulting 
from such cease and desist actions.274  An alternative is to have the 
researchers themselves submit this type of information as they 
269  Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that an academic research 
exemption does not exist for research tools). 
270  See NAT’L ACADS., FIFTH MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEIN-RELATED INVENTIONS (2005), transcript available at 
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/Genomics_Committee_Meeting_6_ 
transcript.pdf. 
271  See Cukier, supra note 213, at 249 (noting that patent law never anticipated many of 
the issues arising out of patenting research tools and genomics data—principally the 
inability to work around the patent). 
272  Id. 
273  Id. 
274  Additionally, as opposed to patent data, licensing information and practices are 
typically viewed as proprietary and, thus, universities are often unwilling to divulge 
information. See, e.g., Pressman et al., supra note 267. 
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receive and react to it.   Moreover, with regard to issues like 
MTAs, sometimes a student or postdoctoral fellow may be the best 
source of information.  Surveys typically poll only the principle 
investigators who may be woefully uninformed about the true facts 
on the ground. 
V. PROPOSED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PARADIGM FOR 
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS 
This Article argues that the American system ought not be seen 
as a paradigm for developing nations intent on setting up their own 
technology transfer mechanisms between academia and industry.  
In fact, other developed nations somewhat vary from the U.S. in 
implementation of technology transfer.  This section will provide a 
brief overview of some other national mentalities and mechanisms 
for transferring knowledge and innovation to industry.  This 
Article suggests that there are some very useful components and 
ideas in other systems of technology transfer that can be imported 
into the American system or, alternatively, incorporated into a 
novel system implementable both in developed and developing 
nations. 
Implementation in the U.S. would require a complete overhaul 
of the current system.  Its execution in a developing nation, 
however, might be easier and more efficient than implementing a 
comprehensive Bayh-Dole-like system from scratch.  This 
comprehensive option for both developed and developing nations 
would serve to promote scientific research in their universities, and 
at the same time, advance innovation throughout the country.  
Although the solution presented herein is framed in the context of 
revamping the American system, and while the implementation of 
this system might be radically different in the context of a 
developed country, the overall structure of this solution can be 
applied equally well to developing nations.  Nevertheless, it is 
helpful to present the solution within the framework of the current 
U.S. system, as it allows for comparison. 
Taken as a whole, the following inventor-centric proposal 
contrasts starkly with Bayh-Dole, whose legislative history 
suggests that it was not enacted for the benefit of the individual 
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researchers.  Rather, “the intended beneficiaries of the Bayh-Dole 
Act are the institutions themselves and the government.”275  And, 
unlike Bayh-Dole which mandates that researchers report and 
patent all patentable innovation, the proposed system would try to 
incentivize, but never force the commodification of, basic science 
research.  In this sense, the system is also somewhat of a hybrid: 
while it suggests that academics transfer their patentable inventions 
to a centralized technology transfer office in exchange for further 
research grants, it allows for the inventor to hold on to some of her 
innovation, either patenting it and licensing it herself, or choosing 
to either let it fall into the public domain or keep it as a secret.  
However, like Bayh-Dole, this Article assumes that a 
technology transfer system is a critical feature in the development 
process of new technologies both in developed and developing 
nations.  While university researchers are often highly skilled at 
unearthing fundamental discoveries, they are woefully unequipped 
to commercially develop, manufacture, and market these 
innovations—and innovation and entrepreneurship are most likely 
to emerge from universities.  There is “No better text for a History 
of Entrepreneurship . . . than the creation and development of the 
modern university.”276  With this is mind, it is essential that some 
form of a qualified office be set up that can evaluate, patent and 
market academic innovations to industry.    
275  Platzer v. Sloan Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 787 F. Supp. 360, 364–65 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); see Sara Rimer, A Warning Against Mixing Commerce and Academics, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at D9 (“Unlike athletics . . . commercialization of research is 
still relatively new, and universities are not yet bound irrevocably to indefensible 
policies.  Only time will tell if they manage to do a better job of maintaining appropriate 
standards for science than they have done in upholding academic value on their playing 
fields.” (quoting Derek Bok)).  Note, however, that the case discusses instances where the 
inventor wants a larger percentage of the royalties and, in response, the court claims that 
the Bayh-Dole act was intended to funnel the money back into research, not to enrich the 
inventors.  Arguably then, it’s possible that current state of affairs frustrates the purpose 
of Bayh-Dole.  Sending royalties back to the institution is potentially more wasteful, 
given the administrative costs in divvying up the royalties, initially, and then putting 
them back into research projects.  It might be more efficient, and more in-line with the 
purpose of Bayh-Dole, to give the royalties directly to the researcher in the form of a 
grant that has to be used entirely on research. See Platzer, 787 F. Supp. at 368. 
276  PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 22 (2006). 
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This Article proposes a multi-part solution.  It requires the 
creation of a new paradigm of technology transfer offices, the 
licensing of all or most of academic innovation at a flat rate, and 
the creation of a grant system wherein the rights to patentable 
innovation are traded for grant money to be used for funding 
further research in the innovating lab.  While academic scientists 
as a self-selecting group is not heavily populated with wealth-
seeking individuals,277 their “begging and searching for money [for 
research] never stops.”278  It makes sense, then, to provide 
incentives that are particularly focused on funding research rather 
than personal wealth.279 
Note that this solution is not a government buyout or a direct 
reward program, as is often suggested, most recently for the 
American market by Senator Bernie Sanders.280  Here, as opposed 
to a pure reward system wherein the government provides financial 
incentives and an honorary prize in exchange for placing the 
innovation in the public domain, this system retains the bulk of the 
277  DANIEL S. GREENBERG, SCIENCE FOR SALE: THE PERILS, REWARDS AND DELUSIONS 
OF CAMPUS CAPITALISM 17, 23 (2007) (“The average laboratory scientist . . . is an 
unlikely exemplar of personal wealth, capitalistic instincts, or sumptuous living . . . .  
Moneymaking has never ranked high as a motivation for the scientific career . . . .  
[A]cademic science is one of the least remunerative and most uncertain career choices on 
the professional landscape.”). 
278  Id. at 12. 
279  Many researchers find the insufficiency of rewards to be a barrier to technology 
transfer from universities to industry. See Donald Siegel, David Waldman, Leanne 
Atwater & Albert Link, Commercial Knowledge Transfers from Universities to Firms: 
Improving the Effectiveness of University-Industry Collaboration, 14 J. HIGH TECH. 
MGMT. RES. 111, 118 (2003). 
280  See, e.g., S. 2210, 109th Cong. (2007); H.R. 417, 109th Cong. (2007) (proposing 
along with Senate Bill 2210 to provide incentives for investment in research and 
development for new medicines, to enhance access to new medicines, and for other 
purposes).  Other similar prize proposals have been suggested recently by Senators 
Lindsey Graham, John Edwards and Speaker Newt Gingrich. See Press Release, Graham 
Introduces H-Prize Legislation in the U.S. Senate (Jan. 24, 2007), 
http://schotlinepress.wordpress.com/2007/01/25/graham-introduces-h-prize-legislation-
in-the-us-senate/; John Edwards, Making Health Care Affordable, Accountable, And 
Universal, Jun. 14, 2007, http://www.johnedwards.com/news/headlines/20070614-health-
care-costs-quality.pdf; William Saletan, An Inconvenient Newt: Newt Gingrich, 
Environmentalist, SLATE, Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2176957. 
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typical intellectual property rights-based patent system.281  This is 
integral.  Patents, in addition to providing direct incentives to the 
innovator, also provide other social goods.  These include 
facilitating coordination among the actors in a particular 
technological field by providing a map of the current state of the 
field and dissemination of technology.    
This section will present each component of the proposed 
solution.  It will attempt to succinctly outline how each element in 
the system would work and raise some of the potential problems 
associated with each module. 
A.  Centralized Technology Transfer Office 
Many of the bottlenecks in the commercialization of academic 
science and innovation research are, ironically, created by the 
Bayh-Dole Act and other similar legislation initially designed to 
promote innovation.  In particular, as stated earlier in this Article, a 
major consequence of the legislation—the ubiquitous university 
technology transfer office—is a continual impediment.282  It is 
suggested that these holdups could be alleviated through the 
creation of a new, alternative system to promote the 
commercialization of basic science research.  
In this proposed system, a national or regional centralized 
technology transfer office—with the express goal of 
commercializing research—would be established.  In the U.S., the 
National Institutes of Health or the National Science Foundation 
would be optimal choices to accommodate such an office, although 
a private government-sponsored enterprise (“GSE”) could also be 
set up to specifically accomplish these goals.283   
281  See Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 61, 65 (1943); Brian 
Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes and Research Contracts, 
73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 694 (1983). 
282  See Gewin, supra note 247, at 948 (“[S]ome critics of the system contend that the 
Bayh-Dole Act, which virtually gave birth to the [U.S.] biotechnology industry, may now 
be strangling it, as universities seek patent protection on nearly everything . . . .  People 
are beginning to question whether we’re using the right model.”). 
283  “These enterprises were established and chartered by the Federal Government for 
public policy purposes.  They are not included in the Federal Budget because they are 
private companies, and their securities are not backed by the full faith and credit of the 
Federal Government.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
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While merging football teams with another university may be a 
hard sell, it may make economic and policy sense to merge 
technology transfer offices among different universities and 
colleges, creating larger, more objective regional offices.  Like 
football, technology transfer offices serve the school spirit, and, 
thus, the offices may feel obligated to comb every invention 
disclosure to find the Next Big Patent, raising the morale of the 
school and contributing to the school’s coffers.  Yet, individual 
offices lack the funds and manpower to thoroughly assess all 
invention disclosures.284  Nevertheless, individual offices often 
feel a need to justify their existence given a generally poor track 
record and, thus, aggressively attempt to garner as many 
disclosure
A regional licensing office may be able to deal with many of 
these issues.  Not serving any one particular school, the licensing 
professionals may be able to be more objective in their assessments 
of a patent’s value.  Regional offices do not have a greater need to 
justify their existence, serving numerous schools.  Regional offices 
will also have more licensing clout, giving them the ability to 
license better deals from and for academia.  Regional offices may 
have less incentive to be creative on their MTAs; representing a 
vast array of schools, they may have to be more standardized in 
their approach.  Regional offices will be more capable of allocating 
their resources towards finding and patenting marketable 
inventions.  Regional offices, potentially with a more established 
hierarchical structure than a small office in a single university, may 
be less likely to pay for patent applications on worthless or 
unmarketable inventions, as decisions will probably have to be 
vetted through more individuals.  Regional offices will be better 
suited to hire more professional and better qualified personnel and 
provide better services.285   
GOVERNMENT: FY 2006 at 1245 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
budget/fy2006/pdf/appendix/gov.pdf.  
284  Owen-Smith & Powell, supra note 195, at 99. 
285  Regional technology transfer offices could be networked in a similar fashion to the 
Federal Laboratory Consortium network for government laboratories. See Federal 
Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer—About, http://www.federallabs.org/ 
home/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
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Although regional offices, with their broad views, may miss 
some licensable technologies, scientists will still continue to 
publish their research, thus making sure that even those missed 
innovations still become part of the scientific record. 
Depending on the size and infrastructure of a particular 
country, such an agency/office could have either a singular, central 
well-staffed office or multiple regional offices.  Unaffiliated with 
any particular university and responsible primarily to the 
government and the regional population, this type of technology 
transfer office may be less inclined to simply aspire to blockbuster 
licensing deals.     
Alternatively, an agency could be set up in the model of the 
U.S. Federal Reserve, with long-term appointments of technocrats 
who would preside over a system of regional offices.  Like the 
Federal Reserve, the system of regional technology transfer offices 
could be designed to be independent of the government, meeting 
its operating expenses primarily from its own business.  The 
independent nature of the technology transfer system is important.  
With the possibility that the patenting and licensing of some 
academic innovations might become politically contentious, 
particularly in hotly debated areas such as cloning or genetic 
enhancement, there may be concerns that the patenting and 
licensing of innovations will be directed by immediate policy 
concerns rather than a desire to promote science and innovation. 
Independent of the exact structure of the office, what is integral 
is that the office be designed such that it has the infrastructure, 
informatics, and incentives to effectively and efficiently 
commercialize academic innovation. 
1. Funds 
These technology transfer offices might be supported fully or 
partially with public funding.  The State of Oregon has recently 
introduced legislation providing a sixty percent tax credit—which, 
as opposed to a tax deduction, reduces the overall amount of tax 
owed—to taxpayers who donate to technology transfer offices.286  
286  See Press Release, Oregon University System, Oregon Introduces Unique 60% Tax 
Credit to Donors Supporting Commercialization of University Research (Oct. 4, 2007), 
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Alternatively, these centralized agencies could bundle, package, 
and sell off what essentially amounts to the each scientist’s risk as 
complex financial instruments to institutional investors—patent 
license-backed securities.  These instruments, bundled as asset-
backed securities, have a potential future, but often predictable 
cash flows from licensing fees would be sold to institutional 
investors on the same or similar secondary markets that deal in 
mortgages or insurance policies, providing a continual flow of 
funds back into the central office for operating expenses.   
Government subsidies or a direct line of credit with the 
government could make up any shortfalls.  Further, like Fannie 
Mae (the Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac 
(the Federal Home Mortgage Corporation), such an institution 
could be exempted from taxes and from the expensive process of 
registering the securities that they would sell.  Although Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac securities are not guaranteed by the full faith 
and credit of the United States government, the central licensing 
offices might be, incentivizing wary investors.  
2. Particular Strengths of a Large Centralized Office 
Larger regional offices are more likely to have the funds to hire 
the necessary staff to deal with the needs of both scientists and 
businesses and to write consistently strong and sensible patents.287  
The impact of a skilled staff in a technology transfer office cannot 
be underestimated.288  There is some research to suggest that a 
available at http://www.ous.edu/news_and_information/news/100407.php (“A 60 percent 
income tax credit is now available to Oregon taxpayers who contribute to a new program 
designed to fast-track commercialization of research discoveries at Oregon’s eight public 
universities . . . .  No other state has a program where donors can receive such a generous 
tax credit in return for helping move research from lab to market . . .  This is an important 
link in moving innovation to new companies and jobs for Oregon.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
287  See Grose, supra note 15, at 22 (“Schools and companies at times wrangle over 
control of the patent-filing process. . . .  [Stanley] Williams [director of HP Quantum 
Science Research] is critical of the way universities sometimes handle patent 
applications, saying that they’re often too provisional and don’t contain carefully crafted 
claims sections . . . and they are often too weak to defend . . . .”).  
288  See Heher, supra note 7, at 221; see also Siegel et al., supra note 279 (noting that 
many in industry find that technology transfer offices have poor marketing, technical, and 
negotiating skills). 
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well-staffed technology transfer office could substantially increase 
returns on innovation.  This is of particular interest to small 
American institutions and to institutions in developing nations that 
may not have the funding to fully realize the increased return on 
investment that comes from having a professionally-staffed 
technology transfer office.  Further, several studies have shown 
that long term trust relationships between technology transfer 
officers and industry are integral for initiating and facilitating 
knowledge and technology transfer: “a high level of social capital 
can significantly reduce transaction and monitoring costs.”289  
A centralized agency can also deal with a common problem in 
IP licensing: Often a single commercial product will require the 
licensing of numerous patents—often owned by multiple inventors.  
With every research institution independently demanding their fair 
share of the revenues for their particular licensed innovation, it 
quickly becomes unfeasible to commercialize the product; 
revenues are overwhelmed by licensing fees.290  A central 
licensing agency might effectively alleviate the problem by 
bundling the licenses and providing them for significantly less than 
licensing each patent individually.  Transaction costs would also be 
minimized, as the licensee would negotiate with and be responsible 
only to the centralized agency and the multiple individual 
licensors.  Bundling may also provide distribution for unknown 
and untapped patents.  Creating a marketable product, industry 
licensees may also be incentivized to purchase somewhat 
tangential patents that they otherwise would have overlooked. 
3. Potential and Perceived Problems with the Proposed 
System of Centralized Offices 
A centralized and government-run agency may not be trusted 
in a developing nation context where corruption might be rampant 
289  Anna Nilsson, Henrik Friden & Sylvia Schwagg Serger, Commericalization of Life 
Science Research at Universities in the United States, Japan and China, SWEDISH INST. 
FOR GROWTH POL’Y STUD., at 17. 
290  See, e.g., Gewin supra note 247, at 948 (“[I]f a product requires dozens of patents, 
for example, and each university wants 5% of the profits, it soon becomes unfeasible to 
do the work . . . .”). 
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or unpredictable.291  In these instances, an international non-
governmental organization (“NGO”) could serve as the central 
clearinghouse for a particular country or an entire geographic 
region.  Such an NGO might also have international clout and 
respect that it could exploit to promote the catalog of licensable 
innovation.  Having an international body run a portion of the 
patenting and innovation process in a developing nation is not that 
novel.  Many countries already look to regional intellectual 
property offices to patent and copyright their innovation.292  It 
would not be a stretch to have a regional administration licensing 
out patents. 
Convincing universities to farm out these offices and dismantle 
current in-house services might be a hard sell.  Many universities 
in both developed and developing nations may be unwilling to lose 
their current technology transfer offices, optimistic that their office 
can still produce some blockbuster innovation and licensing deal.  
Further, universities might note the difficulties that local 
technology transfer offices have in just keeping up with local 
university innovation on campus.  Keeping up with a number of 
universities may be nearly impossible.   
With these concerns in mind it may be advantageous to 
maintain small technology transfer offices in many of the larger 
universities.  These offices will have two primary purposes: to 
license in technology for the benefit of university researchers, and 
to evaluate early stage research to: (a) determine whether at the 
current stage it ought to be patented, or if it requires more research 
to make it a viable licensable technology; and (b) to potentially 
291  See, e.g., Julien Penin, Patents Versus Ex Post Rewards: A New Look, 34 RES. POL’Y 
641, 644–45 (2005) (noting that corruption and collusion are not limited to developing 
nations).  Scholars have posited that alternatives to the current patent system, including 
ex post rewards and government buyouts of intellectual property, also present issues 
relating to collusion between innovators and the agency buying out or rewarding the 
inventor and a fear that the government will not pay out the committed reward or price. 
Id. 
292  Such offices include: OAPI, the African Intellectual Property Organization; ARIPO, 
African Regional Intellectual Property Organization; BOIP, Benelux Office for 
Intellectual Property; EPO, The European Patent Organisation; The GCC Patent Office, 
The Patent Office of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. 
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write many of the university’s patents that would then be passed on 
to the centralized agency for licensing.   
In these instances, the technology transfer would be 
repositioned as a university core facility.  Many research 
institutions already have multiple core facilities, i.e., central 
research tools such as microarray facilities,293 culture 
laboratories,294 light and electron microscopes295 or proteomic 
facilities, that are equally used and supported by multiple 
departments.  The technology transfer office would be a similar 
central tool.  Arguably it may be fairer to support the university-
wide tool with a slice of the patent royalties.  Nevertheless, there 
remain justifiable concerns that granting the office any monetary 
stake in the revenue might lead to the same problems and conflicts 
that American TTOs currently face.   
To further incentivize universities to use a centralized agency, 
the national patent office could consider relaxing patent rules and 
fees when filing through the centralized technology transfer office.  
For example, recent USPTO regulations limit the number of claims 
in a filing to twenty-five total, with a maximum of five 
independent claims.296  The USPTO could potentially relax these 
restrictive rules when a university patents and licenses through a 
central technology transfer office. 
Universities might be granted a small percentage of the 
licensing fees generated by the patent.  These fees could be used 
toward administrative or infrastructure costs, or could provide 
293  See, e.g., Yale WM Keck Foundation DNA Microarray Resource in the School of 
Medicine, http://keck.med.yale.edu/microarrays (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
294  See, e.g., Cell Culture Core Facility at the Yeshiva University Albert Einstein 
College of Medicine, http://www.aecom.yu.edu/home/hgp/cell_culture.htm (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2009). 
295  See, e.g., Light Microscopy Core Facility at Duke University, http://microscopy. 
duke.edu (last visited Jan. 30, 2009); Confocal & Electron Microscopy Core Facility 
Laboratory at Princeton, http://www.molbio1.princeton.edu/facility/confocal (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2009). 
296  See David Schwartz, Patent Costs, Paperwork to Spiral Under ‘Complex’ New 
USTPO Rules, TECH. TRANSFER TACTICS, 86, Oct. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/content/2007/10/17/patent-costs-paperwork-
spiral-under-complex-new-ustpo-rules.  The new rules, characterized by the 
Commissioner for Patents John Doll as extensive and complex, will also restrict 
applicants to two continuations and only one request for a continued examination. 
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additional funding for those researchers that do not produce 
patentable innovations. 
With the centralized office owning the patent and licensing at a 
relatively low flat rate there may be no incentive, if and when the 
time ever arises, to litigate a patent infringement case.  And, with 
no potential enforcement by the owner of the IP, potential 
licensees may see no incentive to ever license the patent; infringing 
at will.  Another concern related to the nature of the centralized 
office’s ownership is relevant to the quality of the patent.  With the 
responsibility to prosecute so many patents, and without any profit 
motive, the centralized agency lacks the incentives to create high 
quality patents that will stand up in litigation.  Not only would 
such a situation quickly bankrupt the system, but it could have a 
potentially catastrophic effect on a fledgling patent regime if it 
were to be implemented in a developing nation, by degrading the 
strength and validity of patents in general.  A possible solution to 
this potential problem could be to include, in the flat license, a 
clause requiring each licensee to pay into a legal defense fund to 
protect the patent should it ever be infringed.  Although data is not 
available for most nations, data for the U.S. patent system, known 
to be highly litigious, indicates an overall low rate of litigation.  
Justice Kimberly Moore counted, for instance, only 4500 patents 
litigated  out of a total of 180,000 patents granted that same 
year.297  With only 2.5% of all patents litigated, chances are 
relatively slim that the licensee’s particular patent will be litigated, 
making such a clause more amenable to the licensee. 
A centralized system where the inventor is quickly bought out 
and divorced from the potential patent may result in researchers 
who, for lack of any incentives, become unhelpful in the 
prosecution phase of the patent.  In these situations, it may be 
helpful to dock, or threaten to dock those researchers’ grants on 
future patents.   
B. Grant Payment System 
Research scientists could be incentivized into using the 
centralized agency through a grant-like system.  In this system, 
297  Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1521 (2005). 
VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM 2/26/2009  3:47:32 AM 
2009] ACADEMIA TO INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 389 
 
researchers would have the option to exchange their intellectual 
property rights for a grant-like transfer payment, assessed relative 
to the value of their innovation.   The centralized agency would, in 
effect, be buying the inventor's risk related to her future royalty 
streams.  Alternatively, researchers could hold on to the 
intellectual property themselves.  
   The volume of innovation in all countries has been shown to 
be directly proportional to the investment in research.298  Thus, 
particularly in developing nations where funding is limited, this 
grant system provides an important feedback loop in developing 
innovative technologies.  In this grant system, innovative research 
begets guarantees of further funding and investment in research—
further promoting innovation.  Note, however, that as a 
prerequisite to this system, the intellectual property rights to the 
invention must belong solely to the inventor and not to the 
university. 
Under the current Bayh-Dole regime in the United States, 
academic scientists often have to be prompted and cajoled by 
technology transfer officers to cooperate in commodifying their 
discoveries.299  Many if not most scientists seem to have no 
interest in going through the relatively tedious patent prosecution 
process.300  More often than not, faculty are more interested in 
funding their research through industry collaborations rather than 
securing entrepreneurial opportunities for their universities and 
themselves.301  There  are often more profitable and less irritating 
ways, albeit not as beneficial to society, to profit from academic 
298  Heher, supra note 7, at 218. 
299  Possibly recognizing the problems associated with having technology transfer 
officers badgering researchers for their latest developments, Austria’s implementation of 
the technology transfer office requires the researcher to contact the technology transfer 
officer and not vice versa. See, e.g., Graz University of Technology, Service for Inventors 
at Graz University of Technology: Technology Exploitation Office Celebrates its Success, 
Aug. 27, 2007, http://portal.tugraz.at/pls/portal/docs/page/Files/FTH/fth_tv/files/07_08_ 
29_Presseaussendung_TUG_vs3_e.pdf. 
300  A university’s success in patenting innovations has been tied to the faculty’s 
perception of the benefits in patenting. See Owen-Smith & Walter Powell, supra note 
195, at 105. 
301  See Yong S. Lee, The Sustainability Of University-Industry Research 
Collaborations: An Empirical Assessment, 25 J. TECH. TRANSFER 111, 121 (2000). 
VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM 2/26/2009  3:47:32 AM 
390 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:311 
 
technology transfer, e.g., through consulting.302  Recent research 
further suggests that academics only tend to be entrepreneurial 
about their innovations after the product has begun the 
commercialization process and remain mostly uninterested until 
that threshold time.  
Many faculty members, particularly in developing nations 
where a patent culture is not yet as pervasive as it is in developed 
Western societies, may not share the same Western drive for a 
blockbuster licensing deal.  This proposed regime would help to 
overcome that initial inertia by creating a more practical and 
Mertonian incentive (many academics in developing nations still 
officially subscribe to these classical ideals).   Academics can be 
further enticed by the prospect of contributing directly to society 
through the transfer of technology and then, once licensed, their 
innovation would give the researcher access to the relevant 
industries and their assets for further investigations.303  
Nonetheless, even with the grant component of this system, 
there still needs to be an active educational component directed at 
researchers, promoting the many positive features and assuaging 
the fears associated with technology transfer and patents in 
general.304  A strong educational module is necessary to make the 
system work and universities need to be proactive in informing 
researchers as to the importance and benefits of technology 
transfer.305   
Granting a researcher immediate cash instead of a future 
undefined royalty rate would also alleviate the issue commonly 
found throughout the lateral academic hiring process.  Under 
302  William Bains, How Academics Can Make (Extra) Money Out of Their Science, 11 
J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 353, 353 (2005).  Dissatisfaction with university technology 
transfer offices have also led academics to circumvent that method of technology transfer 
in favor of consulting. See, e.g., Owen-Smith & Powell, supra note 195, at 104. 
303  See Elizabeth R.J Bell, Some Current Issues in Technology Transfer and Academic-
Industrial Relations: A Review, 5 TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT 307, 308 (1993). 
304  A recent study found that a lack of understanding regarding industry norms plays a 
large part in creating a barrier to academic technology transfer. See Siegel et al., supra 
note 279, 119–20. 
305  See, e.g., Mauri Laukkanen, Exploring Academic Entrepreneurship: Drivers and 
Tensions of University-Based Business, 10 J. SMALL BUS. & ENTERPRISE DEV. 372, 375 
(2003) (noting the typical dysfunctional business attitudes of faculty). 
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Bayh-Dole and similar regimes, the university retains title to the 
invention and, as such, may threaten to withhold future royalty 
payments to those researchers who leave the institution.  This 
impediment to academic mobility could potentially have a 
devastating impact on the transfer of knowledge, particularly in a 
developing nation.  
1. Concerns with the Grant System 
The grant system does create some potential concerns: By 
creating a real and valuable incentive306—grant credits with 
minimal restrictions in exchange for handing over the licensing 
process to a centralized agency—academic researchers might be 
even too aggressive in trying to patent their discoveries.  Further 
concerns include the reality that universities, faced with the loss of 
their potential golden egg, will lobby heavily against such a 
system.  In the United States, the bulk of the royalties brought in 
by patents go to the university with typically only a small 
portion—at the university’s discretion—going to the actual 
inventor. 
In the absence of any current norms in developing nations, 
there may be initial levels of distrust among researchers and their 
institutions in divvying up the spoils of a license or in deciding 
who holds IP rights.  With a centralized agency holding the rights, 
and the grant credits going directly to the researcher, this no longer 
becomes as significant a concern. 
Further, grant money may fail to incentivize those researchers 
who feel that their particular innovation is worth much more than 
the credits offered.  In those situations, the system should allow 
researchers the opportunity to hold on to the intellectual property 
rights instead of transferring them for grant credits.  In situations 
where the researcher thinks that her particular discovery is worth 
306  Greater rewards for faculty involvement in technology transfer are directly related to 
enhancing a university’s technology transfer capabilities. See J. Friedman & J. Silberman, 
University Technology Transfer: Do Incentives, Management, and Location Matter?, 28 
J. TECH. TRANSFER 17, 17 (2003); see also Magnus Henrekson & Nathan Rosenberg, 
Designing Efficient Institutions for Science-Based Entrepreneurship: Lesson from the US 
and Sweden, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 207, 207 (2001) (calling for stronger individual 
incentives in technology transfer). 
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her entrepreneurial skills in either starting up a company or 
marketing it herself, the most valuable discoveries will be 
aggressively brought to the marketplace by those who know the 
research best.307  Technology transfer officers, in a recent survey, 
estimated that up to 71% of all licensed innovation could not be 
successfully commercialized without ongoing collaboration with 
the original researchers.308  Here it is important for local 
technology transfer offices to promote this entrepreneurial spirit: 
“there is strong evidence that the entrepreneurial culture resulting 
from the focus on technology transfer results in many other 
benefits which can neither be captured nor measured by the 
institution but which have an impact on the local economy.”309 
C. Early IP Valuation  
The proposed grant incentive system is predicated on the 
ability to efficiently ascertain whether the nascent innovation 
meets or exceeds the threshold patentability requirements set by 
the local patent offices.  And, more importantly, the system also 
needs to be able to effectively determine the current and potential 
value of the invention such that the grant payout neither over or 
under incentivizes, but rather provides the optimal level of 
incentivization both for the inventor and for society. 
307   Inventor cooperation and involvement is often crucial for commercial development.  
It is precisely the most profitable (and, possibly, important) innovations where this 
system would promote researchers to stay involved and cooperate with the licensor. See, 
e.g., Richard Jensen & Marie C. Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing 
of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 240–41 (2001); see also Brian Harmon 
et al., Mapping the University Technology Transfer Process, 12 J. BUS. VENTURING 423, 
423–34 (1997) (noting the importance of strong connections in the technology transfer 
process).  Note that studies have shown a number of entrepreneurial skills and proclivities 
in basic science researchers. See, e.g., Karen Seashore Louis, David. Blumenthal, 
Michael E. Gluck & Michael A. Soto, Entrepreneurs in Academe: An Exploration of 
Behaviors Among Life Scientists, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 110, 110 (1989). 
308  Jerry Thrusby & Marie Thursby, Pros and Cons of Faculty Participation in 
University Licensing Introducing Technology Entrepreneurship to Graduate Education: 
An Integrative Approach, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 193 (2005). 
309  Heher, supra note 7, at 218–19. 
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As opposed to the relatively straightforward patent situation 
where the inventor’s reward from licensing or selling the patent 
herself is directly correlated to the “invention’s being found useful, 
. . . the greater the usefulness the greater the reward . . . ,”310 this 
ex ante grant incentive needs to create some other fair, transparent, 
consistent, and reliable method of evaluating IP value at a 
relatively early stage in the life of the invention in order to 
establish a similarly incentivizing method. 
  There are legitimate concerns regarding the ability of any 
organization to fairly, and cost-effectively evaluate a patent in its 
earliest stages.  Patent values are highly heterogeneous and are 
controlled by a myriad of factors.  Determining and reducing a 
patent’s valuation to a single one time payout is non-trivial.  Even 
the current systems for IP valuation, often determining the value of 
the intellectual property well into the life of the invention, have 
been described as inappropriate, unreliable, or a series of 
guestimates.311  Most banks will not use intellectual property as 
collateral for these very reasons.312  But, given the time lag 
between the initial patentable research and commercialization, it 
would be impossible to properly incentivize researchers who may 
need to wait a decade or more before the grant value can be 
determined.  
Notwithstanding the computational difficulties inherent in the 
early determination of a patent’s value, there are a number of web-
based services that provide tools for IP current valuation and 
projected revenues.313  Further, most university innovations are 
310  JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR 
APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 933 (Sir W.J. Ashley ed., 1936) (1849). 
311  Shigeki Kamiyama, Jerry Sheehan & Catalina Martinez, Valuation And Exploitation 
Of Intellectual Property 26 (The OECD Directorate for Science, Technology, Working 
Paper, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/working-papers. 
312  Id. at 23. 
313  See, e.g., Jiang-Liang Hou, Hseu Yen Lin & Cheng-Chuang Hon, A Web-Based 
Platform for IP Valuation and Trading, Presented at the 35th International Conference on 
Computers and Industrial Engineering (2005), http://www.umoncton.ca/cie/Conferences/ 
35thconf/CIE35%20Proceedings/PDF/040.pdf; see also RoyaltySource, http://www. 
royaltysource.com; RoyaltyStat, http://www.royaltystat.com (containing “a subscription 
database of royalty rates and license agreements compiled from the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Edgar Archive”).  “In RoyaltyStat you can find 
comparable royalty rates for valuing (or licensing) intangible assets . . . [useful in] 
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licensed before they are even patented, suggesting that universities 
are already successfully engaged in early stage, pre-patent 
valuations on much of their innovations.314   
1. Strategies for Early IP Evaluation 
Early stage IP valuation can be accomplished through a 
number of procedures.315  The two cost methods look to either 
production or replacement costs in determining the value of the 
IP.316  Production costs are equal to the cost to invent and patent 
added to the desired profit margin.  The replacement method 
evaluates the cost to produce a similar invention with similar 
utility.  These methods are particularly useful for early stage 
technology or where there is no data on similar inventions that can 
be used as a comparison.  Nonetheless, critics of the cost method 
claim that it fails to assess any real measure of value to either the 
owner or the potential purchaser of the patent and fails to consider 
any potential future markets; no projected revenue or profit data is 
taken into account.   
The market method looks to comparable patents and their 
relevant historical sales data.  Uniqueness of individual patents 
[f]inding reasonable or comparable royalty rates; [or] Valuing intangible property for 
mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, bankruptcy, or other transactions.” Id.; SparkIP, 
http://sparkip.com. 
314  Daniel Elfenbein, Publications, Patents, and the Market for University Inventions, 
63 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 688, 693 (2007). 
315  Methods are said to borrow from quantum physics, statistics, mechanics, ballistics, 
climatology and game theory.  The Association of University Technology Managers 
provides some spreadsheets to help technology transfer officers determine the value of a 
patent.  Factors listed by AUTM that affect valuation include: the potential market; how 
well the technology fits with the licensee in terms of technology, markets served, 
manufacturing capabilities, and distribution channels; whether the proposed products 
open up new markets for the licensee or eat into current markets of the licensee; how far 
along the development of the technology is—already scaled-up and tested working units, 
working prototype, proof of concept, analytical work; the benefits of the technology vs. 
the current technology within the intended markets; the strength and enforceability of the 
patent protection; the margins that the industry and the technology can command; the 
cost savings for manufacture and distribution over current technologies; who will derive 
value; and follow on opportunities and multiple fields of use. See Valuate2000 & 
ValBio2000, at 2 (Dec. 1, 2000), http://www.autm.net/aboutTT/ValManual.pdf. 
316  David Drews, The Cost Approach to IP Valuation: Its Uses and Limitations, 
IPMETRICS, Jan. 12, 2001, at 1, http://www.ipmetrics.cc/Cost%20Approach.PDF.   
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makes this method speculative, at best.  The method is useful only 
within a narrow range of patents.  A proper evaluation using the 
market method requires an active market with sufficient publicly-
available data on a sufficient number of exchanges of a similar 
patent.  Overall, the market method is often thought to be a poor 
choice for IP evaluation, particularly given that individual 
negotiations for IP are often motivated by unknowable and unique 
strategic conditions that are reflected in the price.317   
 Other methods include the Industry Standards method, derived 
from Market Method, which looks to royalty rates in similar past 
transactions, and the Options Method which is based on the Black-
Scholes formula for valuing stock options.  The Options Method 
evaluates the patent/innovation through five variables, many 
particularly applicable to early stage research typical of an 
academic environment.  Here the IP investment is viewed as “an 
option to develop the IP further or to abandon it depending on 
future technology and market information.”318  Relevant factors 
include: (a) a determination of the remaining development cost to 
commercialize the innovation; (b) the average market value of 
similar patents; (c) time until commercial utilization; (d) product 
value volatility; (e) risk-free rate of return; and (f) remaining time 
until the patent expiration date.319  
2. Elements of a Proposed Early Evaluation System 
Simplistically, however one could also imagine a more 
straightforward, fair and accurate approach to evaluating the 
intellectual property presented to the centralized technology 
transfer office, than those suggested above.  Such a system would 
be a multistage process.  The initial evaluation would be to 
determine, broadly, whether the proposed innovation is 
317  See, e.g., W.H. Davidson & Donald G. McFetridge, Key Characteristics in the 
Choice of International Technology Transfer Mode, 16 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 5, 18–19 
(1985) (discussing the importance of the business status of the licensee and licensor 
parties in the pricing of IP). 
318  Ron Laurie, IP Valuation: Magic or Myth?, Presented at the Intellectual Property 
Issues in M&A Transactions (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.ip-
strategy.com/downloads/IP_Society_IP_Valuation.pdf. 
319  Id. 
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patentable—not a trivial decision.  Here, an unsophisticated one-
page form would provide a concise abstract of the invention, other 
similar patented or published research, and short answers speaking 
to the novelty, utility, and non-obviousness of the invention.  The 
inventor’s involvement in this procedure is imperative, as the 
information required at this stage is typically known best to the 
inventor.  At this early stage, questions as to the feasibility of mass 
production or marketability are not relevant and, most importantly 
for the scientists involved, time spent on patenting innovations is 
time spent away from research.  The faster and easier this process 
is, the more likely more researchers will get involved.   
Typically, a vast majority of putative patents will fail at this 
initial patentability threshold.320  Patent prosecutors would also 
determine whether a patent should be filed domestically, and 
internationally as well.  Depending on the particular nature of the 
research, the costs associated with international filings may not be 
necessary, or justifiable. 
For those patents that survive the first phase, the next level will 
then look to provide a basic valuation of the invention.  This stage 
should be perceived to be as objective as possible, to prevent 
researchers from becoming disincentivized by what may be seen as 
an unfair or corrupt evaluation.  Although pertinent to the 
discussion, the exact parameters of such an evaluation, which 
would probably include the maturity of the innovation and its field 
and the innovation’s market, the degree of innovation in the 
invention and the general background on the specific field, are 
beyond the skills of the author, necessitating significantly further 
research into the subject matter.  
It may also be helpful to consider the usage of a peer reviewing 
team.  Often it is the scientists themselves that have the clearest 
vantage point as to the overall direction of any particular 
technology.  The peer-reviewers could themselves be incentivized 
to participate through much smaller grant transfers.  Peer-to-peer 
analysis of patents is not a novel idea and is currently in use on a 
320  GREENBERG, supra note 277, at 24. 
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trial basis.321  Patent evaluation could also be automated based on 
a number of important and standardized criteria.322
This evaluation process would also require an arbitration panel 
to deal with those scientists who disagree with the evaluation of 
their research, although the use of such a panel should be 
discouraged, given the resources and time needed to appeal. 
Grants directly related to the evaluation of the innovation 
would then be provided to the researcher.  These grants would be 
similar to a government or NGO grant for scientific research, 
although, unlike most grants, they should have no strings attached 
to further incentivize researchers to present their research to the 
technology transfer personnel.  
The final stage of the credit evaluation would take place a few 
years later.  Here, scientists could opt to have their innovation 
reevaluated based on licensing data or technological changes that 
would increase the value of their invention.  Researchers would be 
credited for the increase in the value of their invention but would 
not be penalized for a fall in value. 
D. Flat Rate Licensing 
 American technology transfer offices are hampered not only 
by the bureaucracy involved in Bayh-Dole compliance, but by the 
transaction costs associated with licensing of academic research.  
A centralized agency may be more inclined to create a flat 
licensing system akin to IBM standard patent licenses, or 
Stanford’s standard licensing scheme on the Cohen-Boyer 
patent.323  The creation of a flat licensing scheme, in effect, would 
emulate the compensatory liability regime (“CLR”)324 proposed by 
321  See Peer to Patent Project, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/signup.htm (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
322  Jiang-Liang Hou & Hsiu-Yan Lin, A Multiple Regression Model for Patent 
Appraisal, 106 INDUS. MGMT. & DATA SYS. 1304, 1305 (2006).  
 323  For a review of the licensing strategy, see, for example, Maryann Feldman, 
Alessandra Colaianni & Kang Liu, Commercializing Cohen-Boyer 1980–1997, at 24–26 
(Danish Research Unit for Indus. Dynamics, Druid Working Paper No. 05-21, 2005), 
http://www.druid.dk/wp/pdf_files/Feldman_Colaianni_Liu.pdf. 
324  TRACY LEWIS & J. H. REICHMAN, USING LIABILITY RULES TO STIMULATE LOCAL 
INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PRIMER, PREPARED FOR 
THE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
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Professors Reichman and Lewis as an alternative to a utility patent, 
creating a patent-like system based on liability rather than property 
rules.325   
Professors Reichman and Lewis note how such a system would 
be particularly useful to a developing nation.326  This system 
would alleviate the hassle and costs of negotiating and licensing 
each individual patent, issues that often lead to breakdowns in 
negotiations,327 and the subsequent failure to commercialize an 
invention.328  This initial forgoing of the significant profits present 
in some licensing deals is not a novel proposal.  Some universities 
already waive license fees in an effort to create interest in their 
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 12 (2003), available at 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/lewisreichman.pdf 
325  See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (based on 
Calebresi and Melamed’s distinction between liability and property rules). 
326  See LEWIS & REICHMAN, supra note 324. 
327  Wayne Johnson, Changing Interfaces Between the Research University and 
Industry, Presentation at the Engineering Research Council Workshop and Forum, at 16 
(Feb. 27, 2005), http://www.asee.org/asee/conferences/erc/2005/upload/wayne-c-
johnson.ppt.   
Typically at present, negotiating a contract to perform collaborative 
research with an American university takes one to two years of 
exchanging emails by attorneys, punctuated by long telephone 
conference calls involving the scientists who wish to work together.  
All too often, the company spends more on attorneys’ fees than the 
value of the contract being negotiated.  This situation has driven 
many large companies away from working with American 
universities altogether, and they are looking for alternate research 
partners.  
Id. (quoting Stan Williams, Director, HP Quantum Science Research). 
328  See Gewin, supra note 247, at 949. 
At the same time, industry is tiring of disputes over intellectual 
property and, in some cases, withdrawing from collaboration with 
universities . . . .  “Fewer and fewer companies want to work with 
universities on sponsored research because they feel it doesn’t make 
good business sense” . . . .  “Companies could disadvantage them-
selves if it produces inventions that they are ultimately unable to 
license,” she adds.  Industry analysts point out that the growth in the 
flow of industry research dollars into universities has slowed and 
become more volatile in the past five years. 
Id. (quoting Susan Butts, External Technology Director at the Dow Chemical Company). 
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research and promote relationships with industry329—indicating a 
realization that complex and time-consuming negotiations may do 
more to hamper technology transfer between universities and 
industry, than they help.  
The flat rate component of the proposed system would also 
promote many of the researchers’ goals.  Exclusive licensing may 
inhibit basic research at an academic level—universities are 
typically risk averse in many arenas and, with an exclusive license 
tying up a portion of a technological field, researchers may be 
unable to pursue investigations in those particular areas.  Under a 
non-exclusive licensing plan, researchers can obtain a patent on 
their innovation without the fear that the patent will limit the 
usefulness and availability of that invention to other academics and 
the public at large.  And, with patents increasingly becoming more 
popular in academia and even being used as a factor in tenure 
decisions,330 it is likely that there will be a continued and strong 
interest in the patenting of research.  
University interests would also be served by a flat-rate license.  
The resultant minimal level of negotiations would simplify and, 
importantly, speed up the commercialization of research.331  
Licensing “delays [are] antithetical to the fast product turnaround 
demands that many companies labor under in today’s world.”332  
Further, “even modest transaction costs—like the costs of hiring 
lawyers to write up a licensing contract, or the value of the time 
329  See, e.g., UNMC Program Waives Research Licensing Fees, OMAHA WORLD 
HERALD, Aug. 25, 2007, available at http://www.omaha.com/index.php? 
u_page+1208&u_sid+10115633 (noting the University of Nebraska’s Medical center’s 
waiver of upfront fees in return for revenue sharing later on).  The University of Ottawa 
has a similar program. See Posting of David Schwartz to the Tech Transfer Blog, Will IP 
License Fee Waivers Become a Trend in Tech Transfer?, 
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/enews/enews952007.htm#3 (Sept. 5, 2007). 
330  See, e.g., Sara Lipka, Texas A&M Will Allow Consideration of Faculty Members’ 
Patents in Tenure Process, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 30, 2006, 
http://chronicle.com/daily/2006/05/2006053003n.htm. 
331  See Grose, supra note 15 (“Speed is a bigger issue than cost . . . GM says it is easier 
to merge one of its units with a company from Japan than to do IP negotiations with an 
American university.” (quoting Paul Peercy, Dean of the University of Wisconsin’s 
engineering school)).   
332  GROSE, supra note 27, at 3. 
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required by two parties to negotiate terms—are likely to make it 
unprofitable to trade many patented technologies.”333   
Cheaper and simpler flat licensing fees would also make basic 
science research available to even regional or state businesses, 
often unable to compete with national and multinational companies 
that have the infrastructure and the budget to negotiate and license 
promising academic research.  Bayh-Dole expressly calls for the 
promotion of technology transfer to small businesses, although it 
provides little in the way of actualizing this goal.  A system that 
creates an even playing field for all corporations would help 
governments achieve their oft-stated objective of promoting small 
businesses and startups. 
A flat licensing rate will often incentivize the uptake of 
relatively non-valuable academic innovation.  “All too often, the 
company spends more on attorneys’ fees than the value of the 
contract being negotiated.”334  If negotiating a license costs more 
than the resulting profit from the innovation, industry is less likely 
to be interested enough to pursue commercialization in that area.335  
Additionally, the cost of tracking royalties through product 
cycles presents another disincentive to licensing some innovation.  
Given those costs, industry will prefer to pay a lump sum licensing 
fee as opposed to recurring royalty payments.336 
333  Elfenbein, supra note 314, at 691; see also Johnson, supra note 327.  
Given that negotiations with an American university can take more 
than a year, the idea is often valueless before an agreement can be 
reached, and the company often spends more in legal expenses than it 
would be able to pay in royalties.  This can lead to a company just 
walking away from the negotiation, and declining to sponsor any 
further research at that university. 
Johnson, supra note 327. 
334  Grose, supra note 15, at 20 (quoting R. Stanley Williams, director of HP Quantum 
Science Research). 
335  Johnson, supra note 327 (“The partnership between industry and universities has 
been weakened over difficulties associated with negotiating IP rights in research 
contracts in recent times.”). 
336  See id.; see also Grose, supra note 15, at 21 (citing Joe O’Brien, University 
Relations Program Manager at Hewlett-Packard).  “Deborah Kilpatrick, director of new 
ventures at Guidant Corp., a California bioengineering firm, agrees.  ‘Downstream 
royalties give us serious concern in early-stage research and technology development.’  It 
is, she explains, very difficult to commit to them so far upstream of any commercial 
product.” Grose, supra note 15, at 21. 
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In order to make the centralized office independently 
economically viable, the revenue received from licensing should 
cover the administrative costs, patent office expenses, and the 
grant money offered to those innovators that trade in their 
intellectual property rights.  Licensing fees could be set at a global 
flat rate equal to the average cost of prosecuting and paying for the 
patent.  Alternatively, the system could discriminate, setting flat 
rates differently for different technologies and even subsectors of 
those technologies—potentially charging more for patents whose 
technology sectors happen to be in greater demand or more 
profitable. 
An alternative to the flat licensing may be a fee tied to the 
valuation of the patent plus the average prosecution costs.  
Licensees would probably accept such a system provided that the 
IP valuation methodology is transparent and conventional. 
1. Exclusive Licensing Concerns 
Exclusive licenses are often desired by licensees when a 
company must invest substantial resources to commercialize 
ground-breaking technology.  Nonexclusive licensing programs are 
used when a new technology is likely to become a standard,  is 
useful only in conjunction with other pre-existing technology, or is 
developed by a company that requires freedom to operate rather 
than an exclusive advantage over other companies.337  
A relatively low royalty rate may also alleviate the concern that 
without an exclusive license companies may be unwilling to outlay 
the costs to develop embryonic research.338  Arguably, if the cost 
to use the innovation is minimal enough, businesses might 
nevertheless be willing to take the risk of licensing the technology.  
And, with the concern that others may also be licensing the 
technology, businesses may be more aggressive and economical in 
developing that technology.  The flat licensing contract might also 
have a sunset provision allowing either side to renegotiate the 
337  See ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2006, at  
32 (2006). 
338  See, e.g., Thursby & Thursby, supra note 267, at 1052. 
VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM 2/26/2009  3:47:32 AM 
402 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:311 
 
license, within certain parameters, once the research has been 
shown to be either a success or a dud,  commercially.  
Nevertheless, there may be legitimate concerns that 
transferring back intellectual property into the hands of the 
government will revert the system to its pre-Bayh-Dole years when 
less than 5% of government patents were licensed to industry.339  It 
has been argued that much of the government’s failure to license 
its intellectual property can be traced to the fact that it would not 
provide exclusive licenses to companies.340  These arguments are 
not without merit.  With the fear that a competitor could be 
simultaneously working on the same project, it often did not make 
good business sense to go through the hassle of licensing the 
innovation.  
These fears are probably unfounded.341  The National Institutes 
of Health also has a successful technology transfer system 
involving mostly non-exclusive licenses.342  More than 60% of all 
IP licensed out of universities is non-exclusively licensed.343  The 
most recent data from the Licensing Survey by the Association of 
University Technology Managers indicates that only 5% of 
academic inventions are currently developed into startups, even 
with the option for exclusive licensing.344   
Additionally, there are reports of a licensing paradigm shift 
away from an earlier emphasis on protection and exclusive 
339  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED NO. 98-126, REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-
DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES, at 3 (May 7, 1998). 
340  See, e.g., Council on Governmental Relations, The Bayh-Dole Act: A Guide To The 
Law And Implementing Regulations (1999), available at http://www.ucop.edu/ 
ott/faculty/bayh.html. 
341  See ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2005, at 
14 (2006) (“Licensing to small companies dominated total licensing; the majority of all 
licenses were non-exclusive.”). 
342  See Carla Garnett, Tech Transfer Helps NIH Breakthroughs Break Through, NIH 
RECORD, May 5, 2006, http://www.nihrecord.od.nih.gov/newsletters/2006/05_05_2006/ 
story01htm. 
343  See AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2005, supra note 341, at 33. 
344  Press Release, InnovateTech, Technology Transfer Firm Launches to Create New 
Startup Deal Flow Channel for DC Region (Oct. 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/559520/pr.pdf (citing Gerard Eldering, founder and 
president of InnovateTech). 
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licensing and toward a more realistic goal of airing a simple ‘right 
to operate’, i.e., any sort of license.345  With the fast paced nature 
of technology innovation, the right to exclude competitors from a 
particular chunk of intellectual property through an exclusive 
license is no longer important.  A licensee now expects to extract 
the value of the license fees from future innovation developed from 
the licensed patent, not the actual patented innovation.346  
2. Exclusive License Option 
There may, nevertheless, be instances where an exclusive 
license is necessary to promote innovation, often in bioengineering 
and aerospace sectors.347  In some instances, then, it may be 
worthwhile for the transfer agency to negotiate a more complex 
exclusive license with a company.    
To prevent the exclusive licensee from impeding academic 
research, a clause in the exclusive license would require the 
licensee, and any subsequent licenses to the licensee’s follow on 
innovation emanating from the original exclusively licensed, to 
license back the innovation to academic institutions at a reasonable 
rate.  These so-called viral contracts are attempts to make 
“commitments run with a digital object . . . [thus attaching] the 
obligations regarding the content to the content itself, so that 
everyone who comes into possession of the content would also 
inherit the obligations to the initiator.”348  
345  See Marcia Anderegg, Joshua Thayer & Kathlen Williams, Trendspotting: A Shift in 
Intellectual Property Focus, BIOENTREPRENEUR, Apr. 24, 2006, http://www.nature.com/ 
bioent/building/ip/042006/pf/bioent907_pf.html. 
346  Id. 
347  See Wendy H. Schacht, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy and the 
Commercialization of Technology, Congressional Research Service, RL 32076 at CRS-10 
(updated Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.italy.usembassygov/pdf/other/ 
RL32076.pdf (“[E]xclusivity is what motivates firms to invest financial and human 
resources in technology development.  It provides an incentive for universities to take the 
time and effort to pursue a patent and to license those patents in its portfolio.  This has 
led to a significant increase in academic patenting.”). 
348  Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers & Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 
1125, 1132–33 (2000). 
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Some intellectual property licenses have already successfully 
incorporated a viral aspect,349 most prominently the GNU General 
Public License (“GPL”).350  Note that instances may arise where 
there may be disagreements as to whether a subsequent innovation 
is a derivative of the earlier exclusively licensed work or not.  Such 
disagreements have already occurred in the software industry.  
There are also legitimate concerns that viral or infectious terms in 
an exclusive license may serve as a disincentive to license, or more 
importantly may constitute patent misuse.351  Finally, licensees 
who have an exclusive license with a viral clause may find other 
commercial entities unwilling to collaborate or to even license 
their patents for a product that is derived from a virally licensed 
academic innovation. 
E.  Anticommons Concerns and Experimental Use Doctrine 
This regime would also limit the potential anti-commons 
effects thought to be associated with aggressive patenting and 
349  See Sapna Kumar, Enforcing The GNU GPL, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 9 
(2006); Andrés Guadamuz González, Viral Contracts or Unenforceable Documents? 
Contractual Validity of Copyleft Licenses, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 331 (2004), 
available at http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/guadamuz.pdf.  Note, it is unclear whether 
the viral component of a GPL license would actually stand up in an American or even 
European court—all cases on point have been settled out of court.  Additionally, there are 
solid arguments questioning the ability of such a license to withstand the requirements of 
contract law—particularly issues such as privity.  
350  See GNU General Public License Version 3, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
351  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006). 
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of 
his having done one or more of the following: . . . (5) conditioned the 
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product 
on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase 
of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent 
owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or 
patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned. 
Id.; see also Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is it Patent 
Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 118, 118 (2004) (concluding that the patent misuse 
doctrine should not apply to so-called open-source biotechnology). 
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restrictive licensing,352 predominantly by changing the nature of 
the technology transfer office from an inhibitory gatekeeper to a 
facilitator of technology transfer.353    
352  See Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998).  
The anticommons refers to a situation wherein “a resource is prone to 
under use . . . when multiple owners each have a right to exclude 
others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of 
use. . . .  Transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases 
of participants” exacerbates the issue . . . .  Once an anticommons 
emerges, collecting rights into usable private property is often brutal 
and slow.  
Id.; see also Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATL. MON., Mar. 
2000, at 39.  
[T]he  National Institutes of Health issued a report to NIH director, 
Harold Varmus, warning that changes in the way universities guard 
their intellectual property are endangering the free exchange of basic 
research tools—such as gene sequences and reagents—that are 
crucial to all research.  The NIH found that the terms universities 
impose on their research tools, through their technology-licensing 
offices, ‘present just about every type of clause that universities cite 
as problematic in the [contracts] . . . they receive from industry. 
Press & Washburn, supra.  Note that technology transfer offices themselves are often 
found to be too aggressive in exercising their intellectual property rights. See Siegel et al., 
supra note 279. 
353  See Hearing on Nanotechnology Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and 
Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(testimony of R. Stanley Williams, HP Fellow, Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Hewlett-
Packard Company), http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/government/testimony-
nanotechnology.pdf. 
American Universities have become extremely aggressive in their 
attempts to raise funding from large corporations.  Severe 
disagreements have arisen because of conflicting interpretations of 
the Bayh-Dole act.  Large US-based corporations have become so 
disheartened and disgusted with the situation they are now working 
with foreign universities, especially the elite institutions in France, 
Russia and China, which are more than willing to offer extremely 
favorable intellectual property terms.  
Id.; see also NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 
(NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (June 4, 1998), available at 
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm.  
Many scientists and institutions involved in biomedical research are 
frustrated by growing difficulties and delays in negotiating the terms 
of access to research tools . . . .  Over and over again, firms 
complained to us that universities “wear the mortarboard” when they 
seek access to tools developed by others, yet they impose the same 
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Succinctly, anticommons theorists fear that the transaction 
costs resulting from a system that over-incentivizes patenting and 
allows the control of scarce resources to be balkanized, i.e., too 
many individuals exerting the right to exclude others from those 
resources, will lead to the underutilization of patented 
innovations.354 
One particular anticommons-related issue has been the concern 
over the evisceration of the experimental use doctrine, formerly 
thought to generally exempt academic researchers from patent 
infringement if their research was not commercial in nature.  In 
Madey v. Duke,355 the Federal Circuit ruled that Duke University 
could not claim that their infringement of Professor Madey’s 
patents was defensible under an experimental use doctrine.356  This 
ruling essentially threw out any notion that academic institutions 
had any legal right to avoid paying licensing fees on patents, 
opening up the door to additional prosecution of academic 
researchers who infringe on someone else’s intellectual property.  
Universities, generally known to be risk averse, have responded to 
this decision by making it more difficult for researchers to use 
potentially proprietary tools and inventions. 
Heller and Eisenberg predict that “[a]n anticommons in 
biomedical research may be more likely to endure than in other 
areas of intellectual property because of the high transaction costs 
of bargaining, heterogeneous interests among owners, and 
cognitive biases of researchers.”357 
In this proposed system, the flat relatively cheap license, 
divorced from the inventor’s control and with minimal transaction 
sorts of restrictions when they enter into agreements to give firms 
access to their own tools. 
Id. 
354  Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 676–77 
(1998). 
355  Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[R]egardless of whether a 
particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as 
the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for 
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not 
qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.”). 
356    Id. at 1362. 
357  Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 352, at 701. 
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costs, will allow even academic institutions to simply and easily 
pay the license fee for use of patented innovation and not have to 
worry about the threat of a lawsuit.  Such a system could also 
incorporate lower licensing rates for research institutions. 
F. Streamlining the System 
 Under the current Bayh-Dole system there are typical 
logjams in the technology transfer process that take up the valuable 
research time of academic scientists.  A non-exhaustive list would 
include invention disclosures, complex negotiations, and the 
drafting of patents and licensing contracts.  To distinguish itself 
from the current crop of Bayh-Dole-like systems, it is integral that 
this proposed process guiding the patent from bench to license be 
as streamlined and as straightforward as possible.  
  Practically speaking, the centralized technology transfer 
office and/or its potential subsidiaries, can easily be overwhelmed 
without a simple uncomplicated procedure to process the 
potentially thousands of patent applications and licenses.  A 
backlog at these offices would hurt innovation by preventing 
scientists from publicizing their data for fear of losing their patent 
and grants and, additionally, by serving as a disincentive for 
scientists to transfer their technology at all, recreating the effects of 
the Bayh-Dole system that this process was designed to avoid.   
 With a streamlined process of commodifying innovation 
through the centralized agency, researchers can worry less about 
restrictions placed on publicizing their data, particularly in those 
regions that do not benefit from the publication safe harbors.358  
Under the current Bayh-Dole system researchers often need to 
clear their talks, presentations, and papers with the technology 
transfer office so as to not disclose any IP.  Such a disclosure often 
destroys the ability to patent an innovation.  The U.S. requires that 
patents be filed within one year of the public disclosure of the 
invention, and many foreign IP rights are immediately lost upon 
public disclosure of IP prior to having a patent on file.359  Under 
358  See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also John A. Tessensohn & Shusaku Yamamoto, 
Japan’s Novelty Grace Period Solves the Dilemma of ‘Publish and Perish’, 25 NATURE 
BIOTECH. 55, 57 (2007). 
359  35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
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this proposed system patenting done by a dedicated team of 
centralized professionals could lead to much quicker filing and less 
hindrances on discussing current research.  
 Notwithstanding the desire to centralize the technology 
transfer process, it is here that a local technology transfer office 
would remain most useful.  Without the need to create the next big 
multimillion-dollar license deal, and with researchers proactively 
choosing to commodify their research, one could imagine a 
productive symbiotic relationship between technology transfer 
professionals and scientists, even on a local level.  And, to deal 
with those scientists who want to forgo the grant incentives and 
market their discovery on their own, local technology transfer 
officers should look to relatively cheap local university 
resources—i.e., law and business professors—to work with the 
scientist to effectively market the discovery to keep costs down. 
 The system can be further streamlined, through the use of a 
web portal that could allow for easy uploads of new innovations by 
the researcher, and easily searched by industry with access to the 
potentially vast number of patents that will be available through 
the centralized office.  Corporations could even have the option to 
have the latest innovations in their field emailed to them as they 
come into the centralized office, thus keeping industry up-to-date 
on the latest academic innovations.  IP licensing portals covering 
small swaths of the IP universe are already in existence.  The 
possibility of creating a multi-tool database warehousing the bulk 
of the inventions coming out of the entire university system would 
seem to be very useful.360 
G. Long Term Implementation 
To avoid unrealistic expectations, developing nations should 
recognize and accommodate the relatively long time scales—
360  See, e.g., The iBridge Network, http://www.ibridgenetwork.org/iBridgeNetwork 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (“[A] program of the non-profit Kauffman Innovation 
Network, Inc., provides the transparency and access to university developed innovations 
that will lead to further advances and next-generation products.  The Network aggregates 
research materials, technologies, and discoveries in an online, easy-to-search forum—the 
iBridge Web Site.”); see also IP Supermarket, http://ipsupermarket.com; UTEK 
Knowledge Express, http://www.knowledgeexpress.com. 
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potentially up to 20 years— involved in realizing positive returns 
resulting from the implementation of any technology transfer 
regime.361   
But there should be positive returns.  “[I]t is widely accepted 
that the process is of economic benefit.  The many countries that 
are investing resources in technology transfer development 
confirm that there is widespread confidence that the investment is 
worthwhile and generates a positive return.”362  Universities, 
agencies and countries should set up adequate benchmarks to 
accurately monitor the situation and adapt it when necessary.  
Without clear and feasible benchmarks, “[u]nrealistic expectations 
of the benefits from technology transfer in smaller countries and 
institutions can damage the innovation process and lead to 
withdrawal of support—at the time when success may be just 
around the corner.”363 
CONCLUSION 
Bayh-Dole is still seen by many in the United States Congress 
as a paradigmatic piece of legislation designed to bridge the divide 
between the constitutional call to “promote the progress of science 
and useful arts” and the methodology prescribed by the 
constitution: “by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”364  In Bayh-Dole, Congress saw an approach that 
could fund universities (a large producer of progress in science), 
help them create from their science some useful arts through 
promoting patenting and commercialization, and, through using its 
power as a funding source, cabin the exclusive rights provided by 
the Constitution, those same rights that promote science but also 
may hamper it—principally through carving out government 
361  A.D. Heher, Return on Investment in Innovation: Implications for Institutions and 
National Agencies, 31 J. TECH. TRANSFER 403, 403 (2006). 
362  Id. at 409. 
363  Id. at 412–13. 
364  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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march-in rights and the like.365  Given that Bayh-Dole has not 
noticeably increased funding to universities from industry, cannot 
take much of the credit for the patenting culture in universities, and 
hasn’t effectively cabined the exclusive rights of patents, Congress, 
and countries interested in mimicking the Bayh-Dole legislation, 
must come to terms with the only real spawn of Bayh-Dole—the 
problematic technology transfer office. 
“[E]arning licensing income from academic research is neither 
a lucrative nor a reliable financial investment.”366  Unfortunately, 
it seems that many technology transfer offices act as if their goal is 
to make money for the university.  To this end, technology transfer 
offices have numerous policies and regulations, many required to 
comply with the regulatory requirements imposed by Bayh-Dole, 
that attempt to structure and fit scientific discovery into a patent-
oriented process.  This drive clashes head on with most scientists’  
desire to not be regulated and just continue to do their research, 
and, if and when desired, patent, but at their own pace.367  
Granted, Bayh-Dole gave scientists the opportunity to patent 
their discoveries and innovation, and it probably has helped 
promote innovation without devastatingly harming research.  
Unfortunately, the present actions of technology transfer offices is 
threatening to ruin any positive effects of Bayh-Dole and hamper 
innovation.368 
365  See, e.g., John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing—A New 
Twist For March-In Rights Under The Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 149, 150 (2005). The government has never, in the history of Bayh-Dole, 
exercised its march-in-rights and might never do so. 
366  Sobolski et al., supra note 198, at 3138. 
367  Freedom and the dearth of regulations are integral parts of what makes American 
basic science research so successful. See, e.g., BUSH, supra note 75, at 19. (“It is chiefly 
in these institutions that scientists may work in an atmosphere which is relatively free 
from the adverse pressure of convention, prejudice, or commercial necessity . . . .  All of 
these factors are of great importance in the development of new knowledge, since much 
of new knowledge is certain to arouse opposition because of its tendency to challenge 
current beliefs or practice.”). 
368  See Grose, supra note 15, at 18–19 (“Joe O’Brien, [a Hewlett Packard employee] 
recall[s] an era that ended some 20 years ago . . . when corporate-sponsored research 
contracts with university labs were casually reached over a cup of coffee with the faculty 
member who would lead the investigation . . . ‘[one] could have a collegial dialogue with 
faculty,’ and deals were quickly agreed upon. . . .”). 
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 Developing nations ought to look beyond importing Bayh-
Dole-like legislation.  It will, more often than not, not be the 
panacea for transforming their economies into innovation 
powerhouses.  This Article has attempted to show the minimal 
effect that Bayh-Dole had on the American technology transfer 
phenomenon and to highlight the particular characteristics of the 
American university that allowed for the American successes.  
 This Article, in addition to providing suggestions for 
gathering better and more useful data on the nature of the 
American technology transfer system, promotes a radically 
different type of system that should alleviate many of the negative 
issues associated with the American system. 
 In 1995 the newly elected Republican Congress threatened 
to significantly cut back on funding for granting agencies.  
Responding to this threat, a number of Fortune 500 companies 
took out an ad in the Washington Post stating that “large and small 
companies in America, established and entrepreneurial, all depend 
on two products of our research universities: new technologies and 
well educated scientists and engineers.”369  The proposed system 
in this Article would help fund and commercialize new 
technologies and, through direct grants to the researchers 
themselves and not to the bureaucracies of the universities, help 
fund the education of new scie
 
 
 
369  A Moment of Truth for America: An Open Letter to Congress from the Executives 
of Some of America’s Leading Technology Companies (May 1995), available at 
http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/lazowska/cra/ceo.letter.html. 
